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ABSTRACT

WORKING WITH THE DRIVE: A LACANIAN PSYCHOANALYTIC APPROACH TO
THE TREATMENT OF ADDICTIONS

By
Cristina R. Laurita, M.A.
August 2010

Dissertation supervised by Bruce Fink
This dissertation examines the clinical utility of applying Lacanian
psychoanalytic interventions to the treatment of addictions. By combining theoretical
exegesis with clinical case studies of psychotherapy with patients who struggled with
addictions, this project seeks to: 1) contribute to the improvement of the clinical
treatment of addictions; and 2) contribute to the advancement of Lacanian clinical
scholarship in the U.S. Although the work of French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan is
well‐known in Europe and South America, Lacanian clinical scholarship in the U.S. is
disappointingly sparse. As a result, most American clinicians are not aware of the
clinical usefulness of Lacanian theory. This dissertation focuses on how addictions
relate to the psychoanalytic concept of the drive, which is closely linked to the repetition
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compulsion and what Lacan refers to as jouissance—a kind of painful enjoyment beyond
the pleasure principle. Since addictions involve drive‐related circuits of repetition and
Lacanian psychoanalysis aims to facilitate transformations on the level of the drive, this
dissertation proposes that Lacanian interventions may be particularly relevant to clinical
work with addictions, which are notoriously difficult to treat. This project explores how
addictions are highly particular. They manifest themselves and function in very
different ways depending on where the individual is situated within the Lacanian
diagnostic categories—psychosis, perversion, hysteria or obsessional neurosis—as well
as how the individual’s experience of the drive is shaped by the particularity of his or
her history and events of development. This dissertation demonstrates how to go
beyond surface behavior and transform addictions on the level of the drive. While the
techniques and interventions discussed within this project can be used within a wide
range of clinical approaches, this project is the first of its kind, in that a Lacanian
psychoanalytic approach to the clinical treatment of addictions has not yet been written.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Introduction to the Problem
Most clinical practitioners, regardless of their theoretical or clinical
orientation, agree that addiction is one of the most difficult problems to treat. It
logically follows that a problem as remarkably tenacious as an addiction would
seem to require a treatment approach that is designed to target and transform
that which keeps an addiction so deeply entrenched and stuck in repetition. This
is precisely what Lacanian psychoanalytic practice aims to do: to create shifts
within cycles of repetition, to transform on the level of the drive. In this light, it
is perhaps ironic that although mainstream addiction treatment approaches
(which largely focus on surface behavior) abound, a Lacanian clinical approach
to the treatment of addictions has not yet been formulated.
Accordingly, in the chapters to follow I will attempt to articulate the
clinical utility of applying Lacanian analytic interventions to the treatment of
addictions, by combining theoretical exposition with clinical case studies of my
work with former patients who struggled with addictions. My hope is that this
project will accomplish two primary tasks: 1) to contribute to the improvement
of the clinical treatment of addictions; and 2) to contribute to the advancement of
Lacanian clinical scholarship in the U.S.
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Although Lacanian clinical praxis receives very little attention in the U.S.,
Lacan’s work is quite prominent in much of Europe and South America. For
instance, just a few years after his death, nineteen of the twenty psychoanalytic
organizations in France were grounded in Lacan’s teachings (Nobus, 2000, p.
213). And yet in spite of his significant popularity in other parts of the world,
Lacan is by no means as well known in the U.S. today. Somewhat strangely, in
the U.S. Lacan, a psychoanalyst who maintained a clinical focus throughout his
life’s teachings, is more likely to be taught in literature, film, or cultural studies
departments than in psychology departments. In spite of the tremendous impact
his work has had for psychoanalysts and clinical practitioners in other parts of
the world, in the U.S. today Lacan is largely absent from the clinical dialogue.1
As evidence of the effects of this absence from clinical dialogues, the
majority of Lacanian scholarship in English is not clinically oriented. Instead, we
usually encounter a motley assortment of non-clinical “applications” of Lacan.
For instance, Yannis Stavrakakis’s (1999) Lacan and the Political applies Lacanian
theory to various political issues, such as Green ideology and the hegemony of
advertising in popular culture. Joan Copjec’s (1994) Read My Desire: Lacan
Against the Historicists addresses everything from detective fiction to vampires,
but nothing about desire as it relates to the psychoanalytic process itself. Those
1

The scarcity of Lacanian scholarship in the US is also partly due to the fact that much of the existing
Lacanian literature is published in French or Spanish and is also difficult to obtain.
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who are interested in the application of Lacan to art or literature can refer to such
texts as Steven Levine’s (2008) Lacan Reframed: A Guide for the Arts Student, Ben
Stolzfus’s (1996) Lacan and Literature: Purloined Pretexts, or Karen Coats’s (2007)
Looking Glasses and Neverlands: Lacan, Desire, and Subjectivity in Children’s
Literature. The dubious value of too hastily “applying” Lacan to something else
(other than clinical practice) is perhaps best exemplified by one chapter from
Coats’s text that explicates the supposedly perverse psychic structure of Curious
George. Without engaging in a critique of the generally questionable scholarly
merit of such an endeavor, let me just note that attempting to analyze a cartoon
character such as Curious George seems to be a far cry from analyzing a real
person! Overall, scholarship that attempts to apply Lacan to things like film or
literary characters, precisely because such scholarship focuses on fictional
characters, fails to elucidate the realities of clinical work with real people. Lacan’s
work is about relief of suffering for real people.
Finally, no discussion of the myriad attempts to “apply” Lacan to
something else would be complete without giving a nod to the king of all
Lacanian applicationists: Slavoj Žižek. Considering the fact that he is one of the
best-known Lacan scholars today, it is perhaps surprising that in spite of his
having produced over forty books (and innumerable articles), not one of them is
directly clinical. This highlights the extent to which Lacan studies have lacked a
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focus on clinical work. A consequence of this neglect of the clinic is that the rigor
of Lacan’s work gets lost.
In Žižek’s writing, the sheer abundance of references to literature, film,
and so on, often creates more of a diffusion of examples than a consolidation of
ideas. For instance, in Žižek’s Interrogating the Real he touches on the difference
between desire and drive by shimmying from Rear Window to Who Framed Roger
Rabbit? to Dreamscape to Limelight and then finally to Hitchcock’s The Birds within
the space of just one page (Žižek, 2005, p. 177). This metonymic style seems to
occlude more than it illuminates, and in any case it is difficult to see how readers
who are unfamiliar with his cultural references can find such examples at all
helpful. Moreover, while he elaborates on the difference between desire and
drive in those films, any relation to actual clinical work remains completely
unexplored and thus opaque in Žižek’s text. While two of Žižek’s most popular
books are Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture
and Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Lacan (But Were Afraid to Ask
Hitchcock), given what I perceive to be a significant lack of connection between
that style of scholarship and actual clinical reality, I would suggest that readers
stop looking awry and when they want to know something about Lacan, just ask
Lacan himself! A re-centering of focus on the clinical Lacan is what I believe is
called for.

4

Lacanian Clinical Studies
Thankfully, a few Lacanian analysts and scholars have indeed contributed
to the project of focusing on the clinical import of Lacan’s teachings. For
instance, Lacanian psychoanalyst Dany Nobus’s Jacques Lacan and the Freudian
Practice of Psychoanalysis addresses such concepts as desire, transference, and
interpretation as they relate to clinical work. Stuart Schneiderman’s How Lacan’s
Ideas are Used in Clinical Practice is an interesting edited collection that includes a
few case studies by Lacanian analysts and even a transcription of one of Lacan’s
interviews with a psychotic patient. Two of Bruce Fink’s books, A Clinical
Introduction to Lacanian Psychoanalysis and his more recent Fundamentals of
Psychoanalytic Technique, are exemplary for their weaving together of theoretical
points with clinical examples to demonstrate how the theory actually relates to
clinical work. Fink’s text traces components of the analytic process such as
engaging the analysand in the work and making use of interpretation so as to
open up a space of desire for the analysand. It also elucidates Lacanian
structural diagnoses through theoretical expositions paired with case vignettes.
The latter text does a similar job of weaving together theory and clinical
examples but focuses in more detail on particular technical elements of Lacanian
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analysis, such as punctuating, scanding (the variable-length session), and ways
of working with dreams, daydreams, and fantasies.
In spite of these precious few scholarly contributions that successfully tie
together theory and clinical practice, the general climate of Lacanian studies in
the U.S. is decidedly not clinical. For those who want to learn about what
actually happens in Lacanian psychoanalysis, there are few scholarly sources to
turn to. Indeed, as Fink observes, "few if any books on Lacan available today
talk about how one goes about doing Lacanian psychoanalysis, what it really
involves, and what thus distinguishes it from other forms of therapy, whether
psychoanalytically oriented or not" (Fink, 1997, p. xi). Considering the mere
handful of Lacanian clinical texts, as opposed to the profusion of “applications”
of Lacan, it’s no wonder that so few people have any real sense of Lacanian
clinical praxis.
I think this situation often leads to unfortunate consequences. First,
because of the sheer abundance of works that apply Lacan to something else
(film, art, and so on), the momentum is on the side of more and more work being
produced that attempts to paste Lacan’s ideas onto something else (something
other than clinical work), since those are the arenas in which scholarly dialogue
about Lacan is primarily taking place. I think this lack of grounding in the clinic
sometimes leads to the production of less than rigorous scholarship and, more
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often than not, misunderstandings or misrepresentations of many of Lacan’s
ideas.
Another consequence of the neglect of the clinic in Lacan studies in the
U.S. is a drift away from what Lacan himself said was the aim of his work: “The
goal of my teaching has always been, and remains, to train analysts” (Lacan,
1964/1981, p. 209). Unfortunately, Lacan is rarely taught in psychology
departments and, to the best of my knowledge, he is not taught at any of the
psychoanalytic institutes in the U.S. that are affiliated with the American
Psychoanalytic Association (at least not in any kind of systematic or thorough
way). Unless further contributions to the field are made that bring Lacan’s work
back to its clinical roots, the future of clinical Lacanian work in the U.S. would
seem to be pretty bleak.

A Call for Lacanian Clinical Literature on Specific Clinical Problems
Of the handful of explicitly clinical books on Lacan mentioned in the
previous section, many of them are somewhat general or broad in scope. For
instance, Nobus (2000) explores a very wide range of concepts as they relate to
Lacanian clinical psychoanalysis. As interesting and clinically relevant as
Nobus’s book is, it still remains quite broad in its focus, spanning, for instance,
topics as diverse as handling transference and the organization of analytic
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training in different parts of the world. Schneiderman’s (1980) edited collection,
while a classic in the field, is similarly broad in scope. It contains, for instance, a
case study of an obsessional patient, a chapter on the onset of psychosis, and a
chapter that discusses transexualism. Fink’s A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian
Psychoanalysis is similar in scope to Nobus’s text, but Fink’s is more tightly
focused on different facets of the course of analysis and includes more sustained
case vignettes. Fink’s Fundamentals of Psychoanalytic Technique is exemplary in its
directly clinical relevance. Fink successfully weaves together theory and clinical
examples in order to explicate various aspects of Lacanian analytic techniques
(including particular ways of listening, punctuating, and scanding), and the book
is thus a major contribution to Lacanian clinical studies in the U.S., articulating,
as it does, how to actually do Lacanian analytic work.
Additionally, two recent graduates of Duquesne University have written
dissertations that examine clinical work from a Lacanian perspective. Yael
Goldman’s (2004) Neurosis and Fantasy: Lacanian Theory and Case Conceptualization
Through Three Case Studies offers Lacanian case formulations of some of her
hysterical and obsessional clients. Through three case studies, Michael Miller’s
(2006) Following the Letter: Case Studies in the Application of Lacanian Theory to
Psychotherapy explores the clinical impact of his Lacanian interventions designed
to follow the patient’s speech “to the letter.”
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In spite of the strong merits of all of these clinical contributions, because
they are fairly wide-ranging in scope, they do not rigorously delve into the many
facets of any one particular issue. To the best of my knowledge, no Lacanian
scholar has yet produced a book that weaves together the theoretical and clinical
with a specific and rigorous emphasis on one particular clinical problem or issue.2
The general groundwork has already been laid by the existing scholarship, and
perhaps new clinical contributions of more specificity are called for in order to
continue advancing the field while deepening its areas of focus.
For these reasons, my dissertation is designed with the aim of continuing
to develop clinical Lacan studies in the U.S. by focusing on one particular clinical
problem: addictions. In the next two sections, I will introduce why I am looking
at the problem of addictions and why I think Lacan might actually be ideally
suited to address issues of clinical work with addictions.

Addiction as a Major Problem in the U.S.
Addictions (or substance use disorders) are among the most common of
the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) diagnoses today. Indeed, a modest estimate is that
substance use disorders affect about 1 in 10 Americans per year (Kessler et al.,
2

Although Rik Loose’s (2002) The Subject of Addiction is a Lacanian exploration of one problem—
addiction—it is theoretical and not clinical.
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1994). This is not a problem that we as clinicians can ignore in that each year,
about 1 million Americans enter formal treatment for substance abuse (National
Institute of Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse, 1993). Of course, that estimate
doesn’t even include the number of people who do not seek treatment for
substance abuse. Given the high percentage of people being affected by
addiction and the high number of people who are actually seeking formal
treatment for it, odds are that any clinician in the mental health field, regardless
of theoretical orientation or institutional affiliation, will encounter many clients
who are struggling with addictions.
In the DSM-IV-TR, mainstream psychological definitions of addictions are
represented within the diagnostic categories of Substance-Related Disorders.
Substance-Related Disorders are broken down into two categories: Substance
Abuse and Substance Dependence. The DSM-IV-TR defines Substance Abuse as
“a maladaptive pattern of substance use manifested by recurrent and significant
adverse consequences related to the repeated use of substances” (2000, p. 198).
In order to receive a diagnosis of Substance Dependence, an individual must
meet the criteria for Substance Abuse and also criteria for tolerance, withdrawal
symptoms, and a pattern of compulsive use.
While the DSM-IV-TR defines “substances” of addiction as drugs,
medications, or toxins, I believe this limits our ability to understand how people
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can become addicted to other things that don’t fall within those categories, such
as sex and gambling. I will argue that in contrast to the mainstream
psychological way of defining addiction, a more useful framework would be a
Lacanian understanding of addictions as problems of the drive (which I will
explain in a later section of this chapter) and as problems that are not necessarily
about a particular object (substance) or specific quantity of a substance. I thus
believe that greater clinical efficacy in the treatment of addictions would result
from clinicians making use of something like a Lacanian formulation of addiction
rather than a mainstream definition of addiction. As the latter doesn’t help us to
understand how and why people become addicted or how their addiction
functions for them, treatment approaches based on this definition seem to lack
the very foundational understanding upon which proper treatment should be
built.
Currently, the two major mainstream treatment approaches to addictions
in the U.S. are Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) and 12-Step programs based
on Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and Narcotics Anonymous (NA). The vast
majority of people seeking treatment for addictions find themselves in 12-step
programs, with approximately 3.5 million participating in AA or other 12-step
self-help meetings (Room, 1993). Indeed, most addiction treatment programs in
the United States follow the 12-step intervention model (Wallace, 1996), and the
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second most predominant treatment model is CBT. These treatment modalities
have become so prevalent that they are often taken to be the only treatment
approaches that “work” or that “should” be utilized for addiction treatment.
Nevertheless, I would argue that they are taken up in this way primarily because
not enough substantive research has been done yet on other clinical approaches
to the treatment of addictions.
For a number of reasons, further research is called for. Firstly, even
though the American National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA) devotes
approximately $600,000,000 per year to scientific research on drug abuse (Loose,
2002, p. xv), no one has yet been able to formulate a sound scientific explanation
of addiction. And yet, in spite of all of this money devoted to researching the
problem, millions of Americans are still struggling with addictions, as evidenced
by the statistics above. This lack of sufficient research (assuming that more
adequate research could have more of an impact on the high rates of addiction
and its deleterious effects) thus affects not only the addicted individuals, but also
society as a whole, in that the financial cost to society owing to substance use
disorders amounts to over $100 billion per year (U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, 1990). What is more, relapse rates for chemical addictions
(which include, for instance, heroin, cocaine, nicotine, and alcohol) and across all
addiction treatment modalities are astonishingly and depressingly high: over
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75% (Armor, Polich, & Stambul, 1978; Hunt, Barnett, & Branch, 1971; Svanum &
McAdoo, 1989). These data may suggest not only that addiction is remarkably
tenacious, but perhaps also that these predominant treatment modalities leave
something to be desired.

Lacanian Clinical Work and Addictions
The primary hypothesis underlying my project is that Lacanian theory
and clinical technique may have a lot to offer with regard to the clinical
treatment of addictions. I will argue that addictions are problems of the drive
and that Lacan is particularly relevant to the topic of the addictions precisely
because Lacanian psychoanalysis has an impact at the level of the drive. Indeed,
as Fink states, “the drives themselves undergo a kind of transformation in the
course of analysis” (Fink, 1997, p. 209). It therefore logically follows that a
clinical approach that has as one of its primary goals a transformation of the
drives might be particularly relevant to clinical work with addictions.
Drives are very closely linked with repetition compulsion and jouissance
(a sort of “kick” or enjoyment beyond the pleasure principle, for Lacan). It is
easy to see how the addict’s tendency to get caught up in repetitive cycles of
pursuing some kind of enjoyment (e.g., getting high) over and over again is an
extreme example of “the circuit of the drive” (Lacan, 1964/1981, p. 178). As such,
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considering how to work with addictions through the techniques of Lacanian
analysis should be productive.
I will now offer an overview of the existing Lacanian literature on
addictions, because it is vis-à-vis the arguments posited in that scholarship that I
will situate my own ideas.

What Lacanian Literature on Addiction is Already Extant and What are its
Limitations (Why Do We Need More)?
The existing Lacanian literature on addiction is disappointingly sparse.
There is but one book to date that offers a Lacanian perspective on addiction!
This contribution is Irish Lacanian psychoanalyst Rik Loose’s book, The Subject of
Addiction (2002). Although Loose’s book is a major contribution towards
bringing together Lacanian studies and the field of addictions, I believe that
certain elements of his argument are flawed. The fact that his book is primarily
theoretical and not grounded in the clinical realm is another limitation, at least
from the perspective of Lacanian clinical studies. Consequently, more work is
called for—work that is specifically grounded in the clinical realm and addresses
how theory and practice can come together in formulating and putting into effect
a Lacanian approach to the treatment of addictions.
Without engaging in an exhaustive review of Loose’s book, I will give a
general overview of his central argument here. In The Subject of Addiction, Loose
14

presents his specific way of understanding addiction as an “actual neurosis” and
as a symptom that is not symbolically structured. Loose suggests that addiction
is related to “Freud’s (often forgotten) clinical category of the actual neuroses . . .
[which] would make addiction a clinical entity which is separate from the other
clinical structures and their symptoms” (Loose, 2002, p. 218). Loose’s way of
formulating addiction (similar to Paul Verhaeghe’s [2004] rehabilitation of the
notion of the actual neuroses in On Being Normal and Other Disorders) is grounded
in his sense that actual neuroses involve a confrontation with the real:
The actual neuroses are an anxiety reaction to the direct confrontation
with the real, because psychic processing is lacking in essential points.
The psychoneuroses are a continuous processing of this traumatic real
with signifiers and symptoms (i.e., symbolically structured formations of
the unconscious). The psychoneuroses are an attempt to cure the original
real trauma. The actual neuroses lack this type of cure because there is no
pacifying symptom. (Loose, 2002, p. 219)
What this boils down to is an argument that actual neuroses (including
addictions) are “not symbolically structured” (Loose, 2002, p. 146). Indeed,
Loose claims that in the actual neuroses there is a failure to symbolize, regulate,
process, and delimit an anxiety-inducing confrontation with the real (e.g., that
which is unsymbolized, traumatic, beyond the pleasure principle, etc.). Loose
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posits that because “The actual neuroses are characterized by an anxiety against
which the subject cannot defend himself” (Loose, 2002, p. 219) addicts, here
conceived as “actual neurotics,” turn to drugs precisely because “One way out of
the actual neurotic impasse is by regulating the organism with drugs and
alcohol” (Loose, 2002, p. 219).
Although Loose’s book is a noteworthy piece of scholarship, I believe it
has a number of limitations. For instance, I disagree with his argument that
addiction is based in actual neurosis, and is not a symbolically structured
symptom. In the chapters to come, I will give case examples that support my
claim that it is erroneous to assume that addictions are always actual neuroses.
In addition to disagreeing with Loose’s particular alignment of addictions with
actual neuroses, I also think he makes the mistake of turning addiction into a
separate diagnostic category (seemingly distinguishing it from neurosis,
psychosis, and perversion, which is a mistake also made in the DSM-IV-TR).
What is interesting is that Loose’s characterization of addiction as a form of
actual neurosis might actually repeat the same kind of mistake made in
mainstream approaches such as CBT and AA. Just as CBT and AA assume that
addiction is a general and monolithic whole, so too does Loose’s understanding
of addiction reduce it to one supposedly consistent and univocal category by
proposing a sort of general nomination: a claim that addiction is actual neurosis,
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a general and separate diagnostic category, and so on. In the chapters that follow
I will present several clinical case studies that demonstrate how addiction is
extremely complex and variable and that it can indeed be seen to be operative
within the traditional Lacanian diagnostic categories. I will explore, for instance,
how addiction in a psychotic subject is qualitatively different from addiction in
an obsessional neurotic subject, and that those diagnoses do not in any way
depend on assuming that addiction is actual neurosis.
Another limitation of Loose’s book is that it is highly theoretical and not
clinical. Unfortunately, Loose does not offer concrete clinical examples or cases
to illustrate what his ideas look like in the clinical realm, and so his claims
remain abstract. Further, his presentation makes it difficult to evaluate the
efficacy of his theoretical ideas. Finally, the book does not offer a way to work,
analytically/clinically, with addicted patients. As such, his book remains just as
limited as the “applications” of Lacan detailed earlier, at least in terms of the lack
of connection with the clinical realm.
I believe the primary strength of Loose’s work is the way he argues that
we can only know about the cause and nature of someone’s addiction by
listening to the subject:
The cause of addiction cannot be known a priori and . . . this cause can
only be articulated by the subject. One is only able to get to know

17

something about how the effects of drugs and alcohol cause addiction by
listening to how the subjects speak about their drug taking and how these
drugs affect them. (Loose, 2002, p. 110)
Unfortunately, since Loose does not include case studies that might present just
that—how the subjects speak about their drug taking—his argument goes
unsubstantiated. My primary hope for this dissertation is that the case studies
that I present here will return our focus to the clinic and, fundamentally, to the
subjects’ speech. Lacanian work is indeed nothing but that.
In addition to Loose’s book, there are a few other sources of Lacanian
literature on addictions, though they are mainly shorter article-length works that
do not set out to build the same kind of theoretical edifice that Loose’s does. For
instance, a number of particularly interesting ideas related to a Lacanian
perspective on addictions are offered by French psychoanalyst Eric Laurent
(1996) in his essay “From Saying to Doing in the Clinic of Addiction and
Alcoholism.” Unlike Loose, who aligns addiction with actual neurosis, thus
making it into something of a general category, separate from the other Lacanian
diagnostic categories, Laurent begins to suggest ways in which addictions might
be understood in terms of the pre-existing Lacanian diagnostic categories.
Nevertheless, Laurent’s speculation on this issue is limited, and does not
go far enough. Falling short of offering a full exploration of the ways in which
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addiction might show itself in each of the diagnostic categories, Laurent simply
suggests that “The drug incarnates a function connected either to desire or to
delusion, according to the subject’s structure” (Laurent, 1996, p. 132). Laurent’s
comment is rather compelling, but he offers neither more of a theoretical
exposition nor case material that might further illuminate his ideas. In addition
to offering this quick suggestion that addiction might fruitfully be understood in
terms of the diagnostic structures, Laurent also indicates that the analytic
treatment of addictions can operate within any of the three Lacanian orders—
imaginary, symbolic, or real. Still, he does not say what those different treatment
situations would look like, why the treatment would wind up operating in any of
those orders, or why the analyst perhaps should try to situate the treatment there
and to what effect. And so, overall, while Laurent certainly offers a few very
compelling ideas, they do not get unpacked or built out into a full exploration of
how this would get played out in a Lacanian treatment, which limits the value of
his contribution.
Charles Melman (1980), in his “Essay in Clinical Psychoanalysis: The
Alcoholic,” also takes up the question of how addictions can function within the
logic of each Lacanian diagnostic structure. Indeed, his article discusses how to
locate alcoholism within the diagnostic structures, as he considers whether it
makes sense as neurotic, psychotic, or perverse. By the end of the article,
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Melman suggests that alcoholism is a perversion because it involves a relation to
an object that is not sexual. While I appreciate his effort to try to think about
how addictions relate to diagnostic structures, I nevertheless feel he errs in
attempting to rigidly link alcoholism to just one diagnostic structure. The notion
that alcoholics are always perverts is suspiciously reductive, and from what I
have seen in several of my patients who are alcoholic but not perverse, his claim
simply doesn’t hold up to the clinical reality I have encountered. I believe that
Melman’s article makes theoretical errors in linking alcoholism and perversion,
and I hope to demonstrate through the case studies in this dissertation that
alcoholism (or addictions to a variety of substances) can potentially show itself in
any of the diagnostic categories. That is, one of my fundamental arguments in
this dissertation is that there is no one-to-one link between particular substances
and psychoanalytic diagnoses.
I believe a more sophisticated attempt to understand the relation between
an addiction and a psychic structure is made by Gabriela van den Hoven (2002)
in her essay “Toxicomania in Context.” In this essay, she includes a very brief
case vignette of a psychotic patient who was a recovering drug addict. She
discusses how the patient used drugs in order to deal with his sense that he was
not a part of the human race, which is one form of the psychotic’s sense of being
outside the social fabric. She also discusses how the patient used drugs in an
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attempt to detach from his body. In addressing how he turned to drugs to deal
with the feeling that his body was overtaken by an overwhelming anxiety that
left him feeling invaded, van den Hoven successfully begins to draw links
between addiction and the patient’s experience of psychosis. The primary
weakness of her essay is that this case vignette comprises a mere two pages! This
description of a case of a psychotic patient in drug withdrawal offers
illuminating initial thoughts, but doesn’t go far enough. She doesn’t offer many
case details, nor does she address what the analytic process was actually like.
Accordingly, we’re left wondering how the initial, valuable link that van den
Hoven builds between addiction and diagnostic structure actually impacts the
course of the treatment.
Thus, there are some interesting initial contributions to the potentially
fertile field of Lacan and addictions. Nevertheless, their limitations are that they
remain on the level of abstract theory, put forth flawed hypotheses, or make
interesting clinical or theoretical contributions that simply aren’t taken far
enough. More in-depth work tying together theory and detailed case studies is
needed.

21

Introduction to the Method
In an attempt to contribute both to the advancement of Lacanian clinical
work and to the fields of addictions and Lacanian studies, I will bring together
the theoretical and the clinical. For this reason I have chosen to ground my
theoretical expositions in concrete data: clinical case studies. I believe the
qualitative methodology of the case study is a research method that is ideally
suited to an exploration of clinical phenomena. I believe case study research is a
good medium through which to explore the complexity and multiple meanings
of what our patients talk about in therapy. Robert Yin, an authority on
qualitative research, echoes this idea when he states that “the distinctive need for
case studies arises out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena. In
brief, the case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and
meaningful characteristics of real-life events” (Yin, 2003, p. 2). Case studies, by
allowing the researcher to tell a story about what happens in psychotherapy,
allow us to study real life events in a way that preserves their richness and
inherent complexity. Since the therapeutic process is fundamentally an
interpersonal interaction grounded in speech, the narrative approach of the case
study allows us to focus on what is actually said between patient and clinician in
the therapeutic process. The case study methodology allows us to tell a story
about therapeutic interactions that most closely matches the phenomena. This is
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particularly appropriate given Lacan’s notion that fundamentally,
“psychoanalysis has but one medium: the patient’s speech” (Lacan, 1956a/2006,
p. 206).
By exploring in detail what actually happened in each of my cases, I will
highlight how certain therapeutic interventions may have contributed to shifting
the structure of each patient’s addiction. I believe this approach (trying to
understand and articulate the elements of clinical work that actually facilitate
change) is an essential component not only of improving the treatment of
addictions but also of furthering the growth and development of the field of
psychoanalysis itself. As Lacan attests, “If psychoanalysis can become a science
(for it is not yet one) and if it is not to degenerate in its technique (and perhaps
this has already happened), we must rediscover the meaning of its experience”
(Lacan, 1956a/2006, p. 221).
In other words, in order to avoid what Russell Walsh (2004) describes as
the “widely acknowledged gap between research and clinical practice” we need
more research that has a direct bearing on clinical work and focuses on the why
and wherefore of how therapy is conducted (Walsh, 2004, p. 3). Unfortunately,
there is precious little scholarship that does just that. Indeed, as British analyst
Ernesto Spinelli (1997) states, "what takes place between the therapist and the
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client once the door to the consulting room has been shut continues to remain
something of an enigma."
Including case studies in my dissertation should contribute to bridging
the gap between research and clinical practice, but it is important to recall that
this gap was much smaller during the early days of psychoanalysis when case
studies were by no means a rarity. Josef Breuer’s famous case study of “Anna
O.” marks the beginning of the psychoanalytic case study tradition. The case
illustrates how the “talking cure,” as “Anna O.” named it, proceeds by way of
the unraveling and working through of symbolically structured symptoms,
allowing “strangulated affect to find a way out through speech” (Freud &
Breuer, 1895/1974, p. 68). Of course, Freud was also a proponent of case studies.
In fact, Freud’s (1895) Studies on Hysteria, in which he offers four case studies of
his work with hysterical women—“Frau Emmy von N.,” “Miss Lucy R.,”
“Katharina,” and “Elisabeth von R.”—has been called the “starting point of
psycho-analysis” (see Strachey, SE II, p.xvi). His most famous cases—Dora, the
Rat Man, Little Hans, and the Wolf Man—also offer careful and detailed
accounts of both the process of analysis and the theoretical concepts
underpinning it. I hope to follow in this tradition of combining rigorous clinical
and theoretical exposition in the case studies in my dissertation.
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Overview of the Chapters
The case studies in the chapters that follow will situate each patient within
Lacanian structural diagnostic categories (hysteria, obsessional neurosis,
perversion, or psychosis) as opposed to Loose’s approach of reducing addictions
to the category of the actual neuroses. Theoretical issues related to how certain
features of each diagnostic category (psychic structure/character structure) might
show themselves in addictions will be expounded upon in the theoretical
chapters and highlighted through the case studies. I will emphasize, for
instance, how an addiction in an obsessional neurotic is very different from an
addiction in a psychotic.
Throughout the chapters I will place particular emphasis on the drive,
jouissance, repetition compulsion, and desire—concepts closely associated with
Lacanian analysis and well suited to thinking about and working with
addictions. To make those ideas clearer and to indicate how they show
themselves clinically, I will focus heavily on clinical examples—detailed case
studies—from my own past work with patients.3 Fundamentally, I will take up
these clinical examples to show how a Lacanian approach to clinical work might
have a transformative impact on addictions.

3

My data will come from therapy notes written during or immediately after sessions and also from my own
memory of what happened in sessions.
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Chapter 2, simply titled “The Drive,” is a detailed theoretical chapter on
the drive which lays much of the theoretical groundwork upon which many of
the ideas that I explore in more detail throughout the other chapters is built.
Although this chapter addresses how both Freud and Lacan conceptualize the
drive, I place greater emphasis on the latter, insofar as Lacan’s ideas about the
drive are the primary focus of this project. I explain how Lacan’s theorization of
the drive includes ideas about the partial drives—oral, anal, scopic, and
invocatory—though he in many ways generalizes the concept of the drive. That
is, later in his career Lacan focuses less on partial drives and more on “the drive”
or “jouissance” itself. Nevertheless, I will suggest that Lacan’s later work on
jouissance can be reconciled with his earlier work on the drive—his ideas from
the 1950s and 60s about the drive’s connection to the subject taking a position in
relation to the Other’s demand. I will highlight ways in which the subject can try
to either satisfy or refuse to satisfy the Other’s demand and that the subject’s
drive-related activity can take shape in relation to how he or she takes a position
in relation to the Other’s demand or remains “stuck” or fixated on it, so to speak.
My most central argument in this project is that addictions are
experienced in very different ways depending not only on the subject’s structural
diagnosis but also on the particular ways in which the subject goes through
castration or Oedipalization.
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As for the way in which addictions differ with regard to diagnostic
structures, I will argue that in neurosis, castration or Oedipalization (or the
imposition of the paternal metaphor, as Lacan also puts it) symbolically installs a
kind of loss. That is, by way of primal repression through the operation of the
paternal function, the subject imagines that a kind of supreme jouissance has
been lost to him or her. That generates a drive to recover some jouissance.
Moreover, the way in which that loss occurs is particular to each subject, and
results in the subject’s particular attempt to recover some of that lost jouissance.
That is precisely what I will explore through the case studies.
Whereas neurotics undergo castration and emerge as lacking subjects who
then experience a drive to recover some jouissance they imagine has been lost,
psychotics do not undergo castration. While neurotics experience the drive as
attempts to recover some jouissance—which they often seek to do through
addictions—psychotics do not experience that loss of jouissance by way of
castration and therefore, I will argue, their drive manifests itself in a completely
different way. That is, psychotics do not experience a loss of jouissance, and so
the drive for psychotics often takes the form of something closer to a kind of
overwhelming experience of unregulated drives, impulses, and sensations—not
reigned in by the castration process. Psychotics then seek not to recover some
lost jouissance but rather seek ways of defending against and forming limits,
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barriers, or forms of protection against the drive. These are complicated ideas
that will be explained in much more detail throughout the theoretical chapters
that follow and then illustrated by way of clinical examples.
In sum, the most overarching argument in this project is that the subject’s
relation to the drive is established, on a structural level, by how the subject
proceeds through the castration complex or becomes Oedipalized (or doesn’t, as
is the case with psychotics) and how the subject takes a position in relation to the
demand of the Other. Desire and drive get structured by those events or logical
processes within the subject’s development. Since the way in which castration
operates for each subject is very particular, the subject’s relation to the drive is
also very particular. By extension, that also means that each subject’s addiction
is particular. In this chapter I focus on the drive as it relates to neurosis and then
take up psychosis in more detail starting with Chapter 5.
My examination, from a clinical perspective, of the relation between
neurosis and addiction begins in Chapter 3, in which I present a case study of
Buck—an obsessional neurotic patient who abused multiple substances. I focus
on how Buck’s drive to recover some jouissance associated with his mother—a
jouissance that he imagined as having been lost—manifested through some of his
more “oral” addictions. That chapter includes a discussion of those many
manifestations of Buck’s self-described attempts to find satisfaction by putting a
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whole host of objects in his mouth—from soda to paperclips—which
fundamentally had to do with his experience of himself as lacking and his
attempts to overcome that lack, by filling it with some object. I also discuss how
Buck’s more “anal” manifestations of the drive took shape in relation to what he
interpreted as the Other’s (his father’s) demand that he succeed in college and
make good use of his educational experiences. That is, Buck derived a great deal
of jouissance, or drive satisfaction, from his refusal to satisfy his father’s demand.
This strategy included pushing his father to yell at him. In discussing the role of
the obsessional’s relation to the drive as it was manifested through Buck’s
addictions, I also highlight how he maintained his desire as impossible, which is
a key feature of obsessional neurosis according to Lacan.
Chapter 4, “The Color of Emptiness: Re-enacting the Paternal Metaphor—
From Darkness to Light—In an Attempt to Transform ‘Mamajuana’ into
Ordinary Marijuana,” contains a case study of a different obsessional neurotic
patient: Phil. In that chapter I describe how Phil’s addiction to marijuana took
two forms. One experience of smoking marijuana was pleasurable and limited
(within the bounds of the pleasure principle) while at other times he experienced
smoking marijuana as incredibly anxiety-inducing and painful (beyond the
pleasure principle). The latter was what led him to seek treatment, and I relate
this painful addiction to the way in which his addiction manifested as a drive-
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related activity associated with recovering or reexperiencing some jouissance
associated with a kind of primal fusion with the mother. He achieved an almost
lethal immersion in the mother by his suffocation and aphanisis through
smoking. I describe his interpretation of his mOther’s demand as being
something like “fuse with me and die.” I also detail the precedents within the
family narrative that led him to form that interpretation of the Other’s demand
and I describe how he lived out that demand to suffocate himself and lethally
fuse with his mother through the cycles of his addiction. Within that chapter I
also call attention to technical interventions that were focused less on meaning
than nonmeaning—that is, interventions that involved attending to the letter of
the patient’s speech and working between meaning and nonmeaning to modify
jouissance.
Chapter 6, “Psychosis and the Drive,” is a presentation of my own
theoretical conceptualization of a Lacanian way of understanding psychosis and
the drive. This chapter thus also establishes the groundwork for my
conceptualization of the relation between psychosis and addiction. This is not
something that was theorized by Lacan, and so what I present in this chapter and
the two cases of psychosis which follow it is my own attempt to make use of
some of Lacan’s ideas. As those are not brought together by Lacan, I thus draw
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my own conclusions and put forward my own formulations that involve a
Lacanian way of understanding the psychotic’s relation to the drive.
In Chapter 7, “A (W)hole Feeling: Filling in and Creating Holes to Modify
the Drive,” I present a detailed case study of Nadia—a psychotic patient whose
addictions included drive-related behaviors involving cutting, bulimia, and
drinking and writing. I will discuss how her relation to the drive involved her
turning to her various addictions as attempts to form defenses against
experiences of invasions or jouissance. That is, Nadia’s addictions were attempts
to regulate the drive—which, because of her psychotic structure was not
regulated or limited—by either filling in or creating holes. Through her cutting
and her bulimia she tried to create holes or lack, primarily in jouissance itself in
an attempt to delimit it. Through her drinking and writing she tried to plug up
various kinds of anxiety-inducing holes (such as a question for which she could
find no answer) by which she felt overwhelmed and consumed. These will be
explained in greater detail through the presentation of the case.
In Chapter 8, “Working Within and Reorganizing a Delusional Structure:
The Case of the Woman who Believed she was Jesus Christ,” I present the case of
Janice—a psychotic woman who had a full-blown delusional structure in which
she believed she was Jesus Christ. I discuss her alcohol addiction and writing as
being wrapped up in her delusional structure and as attempts to regulate and
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defend against her experience of the drive. I center my discussion of Janice’s
experience of the drive around her having felt invaded by command auditory
hallucinations which told her to hurt or kill her daughter. Since she did not feel
very capable of resisting those commands (which I also describe as a psychotic
form of the demand of the Other), she turned to drinking and writing as ways of
trying to defend against that manifestation of the drive through the voices and
their commands to commit acts of violence.
Throughout Chapters 7 and 8, I present further thoughts about how the
drive as the subject’s position in relation to the Other’s demand might still be
operative within psychosis, even though the psychotic’s relation to the Other is
very different from the neurotic’s. Also, in both of the cases of psychosis, I
emphasize that the addictions Nadia and Janice struggled with were symptoms,
loosely speaking, of a much more all-encompassing problem—their difficulties in
regulating and forming defenses against the drive. I thus call attention to the fact
that the modification of the patients’ addictions—and thus the modification of
their relations to the drive—followed from work being done not so much directly
on the addictions but rather on a much more structural level. That is, it involved
modifying, within their psychotic structures, what was causing the addictions,
just as my work with Buck and Phil involved modifying the drive-related aspects
of their addictions as they had to do with their neurotic structures.
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In Chapter 9, the concluding chapter of the dissertation, I discuss the
results of my findings, limitations of my project, and implications for future
research.
Overall, I believe an approach that weaves together the theoretical and the
clinical while also offering an in-depth exploration of a particular clinical
problem is important for a few reasons. First, as I indicated, there is precious
little scholarship in English on Lacan from a clinical perspective. Indeed, we
need more clinical contributions. As Stephen Friedlander (2000), in his essay
“Lacan and the Clinic,” argues:
The reason that American analysts and other clinicians have little
familiarity with Lacan and little appreciation for its relevance to
their work is that the bulk of the writing in English on Lacan is
devoted to theory. Clinical case studies in English are in decidedly
short supply. Relatively few clinicians present their own work and
show how the theory applies to phenomena that other clinicians
encounter in the framework of their own practices. (Friedlander,
2000, p.137)
Work that can begin to bridge the gap between theory and practice is thus
very important for the development of Lacanian scholarship and clinical work.
So too will it be important to the development of the study and treatment of
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addictions. My hope is that this approach will begin to deepen that field and
shed further light on some important features of addictions, while perhaps also
illuminating particular elements of Lacanian theory that have not yet been
explored. For instance, although Lacan placed a strong emphasis on the role of
the drive (and jouissance), no one has yet produced any scholarship on the
important role of (and how to work with) the drive in Lacanian clinical work. In
offering a theoretical formulation and pairing it with vignettes of case material,
my work lays the foundation for further work on addictions from a Lacanian
clinical perspective.
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Chapter 2
THE DRIVE
A subject, through his relations with the signifier, is a subject-with-holes (sujet troué).
These holes came from somewhere
(Lacan, 1964/1981, p. 184).

In the previous chapter I noted that in this project I would examine
addiction through the lens of Lacan’s concept of the drive. There I provided a
brief gloss that the drive was closely related to jouissance—a kind of painful
enjoyment beyond the pleasure principle—and the repetition compulsion. Lacan
even defines jouissance as “the satisfaction of a drive” (Lacan, 1959-1960, p. 209).
Jacques-Alain Miller further clarifies that the drive is “an activity related to the
lost object which produces jouissance” (Miller, 1996, p. 425). In this chapter I will
take up and unpack these ideas by offering a careful exposition of Lacan’s
conceptualization of the drive.
Most generally, “the drive” and jouissance are practically synonymous,
the latter being the satisfaction that characterizes the former. Moreover, the
subject’s position in relation to jouissance (and thus the drive) is very particular.
That is, the subject can either seek to recover some lost jouissance (more
characteristic of neurosis) or seek to defend against or attempt to limit jouissance
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(more characteristic of perversion and psychosis). The way in which some
enjoyment comes to be retroactively determined to have been lost (or comes to be
something the subject seeks to defend against or limit) is thus very particular for
each subject, which means that the subject’s experience of the drive is very
particular. This will have consequences with regard to how subjects can
experience addictions in very unique ways, depending both on their psychic
structure (within Lacanian structural model of diagnosis—neurosis, perversion,
psychosis) and the particular events that come to constitute castration, or how
they enter language and experience some loss of jouissance. I am briefly
introducing these ideas here in order to set the stage for what is to come, but
these ideas will be explained in more detail throughout this chapter (as they
relate to neurosis) and in Chapter 5 (as they relate to psychosis).
As I will explain, the drive can alight on various objects and can involve,
even if by way of their logical structure, different erogenous zones. Freud
suggests that there are partial drives (which correspond to a source/erogenous
zone and an object), such as the anal drive (anus, feces) and the oral drive
(mouth, breast). Lacan adds to that list the scopic drive (eyes, gaze) and the
invocatory drive (ears, voice). Later in this chapter I will emphasize the
importance of not getting bogged down in theorizing the drive according to any
strict connection to erogenous zones.
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Overall, it is important to note that Lacan often generalizes his concept of
the drive—and therefore refers more broadly to “the drive” rather than
individual “drives”—in order to refer to the subject’s structural relation to
jouissance.1 Moreover, while in the 1950s Lacan theorizes the drive in terms of
its connection with the demand of the Other (the drive being precisely an
articulation of the subject’s relation to the Other’s demand, which I will discuss a
bit further on in this chapter), later in his career his emphasis shifts slightly and
he begins to accentuate the concept of “jouissance” itself. Nevertheless, I believe
jouissance and the subject’s position in relation to the demand of the Other are
closely connected in important ways.
For these reasons, throughout this project I will refer most often to “the
drive” and only sometimes discuss more specific partial drives. Overall, I will
emphasize the grammar of the drive and how each drive relates to the subject’s
response to the Other’s demand. That is, I find it more useful, as will be reflected
in my approach to this project, to focus on how the structure of the drive operates
for each subject—referring to its logical, formal, and grammatical structure as
that which governs how the neurotic subject attempts to recover some lost
enjoyment, or how the perverse or psychotic subject tries to get limits set on or to

1

Lacan often refers to “jouissance” in general without always restricting his theorization by specifying a
particular kind of jouissance (e.g., Other or phallic). Similarly, he also often refers to “the signifier” in
general, which indicates his focus on the signifier’s role, structure, and function.
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defend against some experience of jouissance. That is, I will examine the
structure of the drive and thus the structure of jouissance itself.
Before examining, through detailed case studies in the chapters to come,
the relationship between the drive and addictions, and how to work with drives
clinically to have an impact on addictions, it is first necessary to take a theoretical
detour through Lacan’s work on the drive. This is by no means a simple task, in
that the drive is one of the most notoriously complex of Lacan’s concepts and one
would be hard pressed to find any clear and sustained exposition of it within
existing Lacanian scholarship (clinical or theoretical). Nevertheless, I will
highlight some of what I understand to be the main features of Lacan’s theory of
the drive.2 I will do this with the case studies in mind, by thus highlighting not
only general elements of Lacan’s work on the drive but also by paying particular
heed to the elements that will feature most heavily in the cases that I present in
the chapters to come. What follows is, of course, my own reading of Lacan’s
ideas, and no doubt other readings would be possible. In this chapter I will focus
on the drive in general and as it operates within neurosis. My thoughts on the
specificity of the drive in perversion and psychosis will come later in this project.

2

Some of my readers may find my exposition to be overly complex, and some may find it to be a reduction
or oversimplification of what are certainly very complicated and multivalent theoretical constructs. My
intention in this chapter is not to say it all—Lacan certainly emphasizes the impossibility of that!—but to
highlight the aspects of Lacan’s work on the drive that I find to be most relevant to my own theorization
about addictions. Furthermore, I am making an effort in this chapter to explain, as clearly as possible, a
number of Lacan’s symbols and mathemes because these will come up again in the subsequent chapters.
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The difficulty that comes with attempting to make sense of Lacan’s
concept of the drive is not simply due to Lacan being abstruse or supposedly
elliptical in his theorizing (though those can certainly play a role at times!) but
rather has to do with the nature of the concept of the drive itself.3 Freud himself
even acknowledged how difficult it is to not only think about drives on a
theoretical level but also to recognize, grapple with, and work with drives in the
clinic: “In our work we cannot for a moment disregard them, yet we are never
sure that we are seeing them clearly” (Freud, 1932/1964, p. 95).
Another way to frame the difficulty inherent in getting a handle on the
concept of the drive is to highlight the fact that the drive cannot be thought
outside of its psychical representatives. On that point, Lacan agrees with Freud:
I am indeed of the opinion that the antithesis of conscious and
unconscious does not hold for drives. A drive can never be an object of
consciousness—only the idea that represents the drive. Even in the
unconscious, moreover, it can only be represented by the idea. If the drive

3

One of the difficulties inherent in reading Lacan’s work—any of it—is that it is a work-in-progress, an
ever-changing open system in which he constantly revises his thinking and builds upon and reworks
previous ideas. This is certainly true of his work on the drive. Sometimes his terms seem to mean one
thing at one stage of his career and then take on a different meaning at a later stage of his career.
Nevertheless, I believe there is a thread that can be followed which connects Lacan’s thoughts about the
drive across their various reworkings throughout his teachings. Furthermore, it is not surprising that it is
hard to get a handle on and grasp the drive, since the structure of the drive is in and of itself elliptical! Just
as attempts to formulate the drive seem to circle around something only to give the impression of never
fully capturing something, this is indeed the very structure of the drive, as I will explain a few pages further
on.
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did not attach itself to an idea or manifest itself as an affective state, we
could know nothing about it. (Freud, 1915/1991, p. 126)
Lacan extends Freud’s concepts and takes up the idea that the drive can only be
known through language. Lacan is in many ways agreeing with Freud but
pointing out that Freud didn’t take seriously enough his own claim that drives
can only be represented by ideas or by psychical representatives. Lacan’s
position is that Freud didn’t formulate that connection between the drive and the
symbolic well enough and that this is partly owing to his flawed
metapsychology.
Lacan focuses on the fact that the unconscious is not composed of
repressed affects but rather repressed drive representatives. This means that one
cannot understand the drive without the symbolic, the signifier, as I will
elaborate a bit further on. In a way, Freud already knew this as he described the
fact that there are no unconscious affects as there are unconscious ideas (Freud,
1915/1991, p. 127). However, as Lacan seems to imply, Freud does not
adequately formulate the relation between language and the drive. Instead,
Freud relies on a metapsychology that is fundamentally ill-suited for the concept
of the drive.
This is the case precisely because the idea of a build-up and release of
tension which Freud presents through his hydraulics model—beginning with his
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1895 Project for a Scientific Psychology—focuses on an unclear and imprecise
notion of libido/energy/affect which lacks grounding and according to Lacan
does not put the emphasis where it should be: on the role of the signifier and the
structure of language. That is, Freud’s hydraulic model and motif of energetics
only obfuscate the reality of the unconscious (as a linguistic unconscious,
governed and structured by the logic of the signifier and instated by way of the
subject’s entry into language, as I will touch on a bit further on). For Lacan, the
primary focus of psychoanalysis is the unconscious. Affects do not form the
structure of the unconscious. Affects are not repressed; ideas (signifiers) are
repressed. Lacan questions the utility of a focus on energy, as in Freud’s
hydraulic model, and dryly dismisses it, saying that “Libido, in Freud’s work, is
an energy that can be subjected to a kind of quantification which is all the easier
to introduce in theory as it is useless” (Lacan, 1964/2006, p. 722).
Instead, Lacan wishes to save Freud from the entanglements of his flawed
metapsychology by re-reading Freud through his own lens. Lacan’s famous
“return to Freud” is a linguistic one. It was his attempt at illuminating that
which Freud himself did not see in his own work—that which was perhaps
implicit but not fully theorized: the importance of speech and language. Freud’s
hydraulic model and efforts to formulate “energy” and “libido” rely on motifs
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from nineteenth-century physics. Lacan strives to use models more appropriate
to psychoanalysis, more in keeping with the true nature of the unconscious.
Lacan steers things away from a science of hydraulics and instead towards
a science of the unconscious: “If psychoanalysis is to be constituted as the
science of the unconscious, one must set out from the notion that the unconscious
is structured like a language” (Lacan, 1964/1981, p. 203). This notion of the
unconscious being structured like a language will become clearer a bit further on.
For now it is important to keep in mind that Lacan tries to create a model that is
different from Freud’s, more in keeping with the true nature of the unconscious,
and that means using the model of linguistics. For Lacan, the drive needs to be
formulated within the context of his theory of the signifier.
In order to begin examining Lacan’s ideas about the drive by way of his
theory of the signifier, it must first be noted that it is precisely because Lacan
emphasizes the role of language in the construction of the drive that he separates
psychoanalytic notions of the drive from biology or instinct. Lacan implores his
audience that psychoanalysis is, of course, not biology: “Freud is not a biologist .
. . we analysts have contributed nothing to anything whatsoever that resembles
biology” (Lacan, 1962-1963, Class of December 12, 1962). Lacan emphasizes what
he believes Freud already knew: that for the human subject the pressure of the
drive is constant and thus differs from, for instance, biologically-driven mating

42

patterns in the animal kingdom, in which there are distinct patterns, identical for
each member of a species, and biologically-caused mating seasons in which
animals are in heat. Lacan notes that the drive’s constancy “forbids any
assimilation of the drive to a biological function, which always has a rhythm.
The first thing Freud says about the drive is . . . that it has no day or night, no
spring or autumn, no rise and fall. It is a constant force” (Lacan, 1964/1981, p.
165).
Lacan takes pains to clarify that the drive “has nothing to do with
instinct” (Lacan, 1964/2006, p. 722). It is generally accepted that James Strachey,
the translator of Freud’s Standard Edition, mistranslates Trieb as “instinct.”
Whenever one encounters the word “instinct” in Strachey’s translation, it should
be read as “drive.”4 Laplanche and Pontalis provide a helpful clarification of the
difference between instinct and drive. They note that instinct (“Instinkt”) is “a
hereditary behavior pattern peculiar to an animal species, varying little from one
member of this species to another and unfolding in accordance with a temporal
scheme which is generally resistant to change and apparently geared to a
purpose” (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973, p. 214). By contrast, drive (“Trieb”)
“retains overtones suggestive of pressure (Trieben=to push); the use of ‘Trieb’
accentuates not so much a precise goal as a general orientation, and draws
4

For this reason, I have replaced any instances of the word “instinct” with the word “drive” in all citations
of Freud’s work in this project.
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attention to the irresistible nature of the pressure rather than to the stability of its
aim and object” (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973, p. 214).
If Lacan is rejecting the notion of biological cause, the next question is:
Where does the drive’s “pressure” or “constant force” come from? How and
why is that generated? That takes us to Lacan’s theory of the signifier. And, like
most psychoanalytic stories, that begins with the mother.
For both Lacan and Freud, the mother is the first object of the drive. In his
Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, Freud notes that the aims of the drive stem
from the individual’s early experiences (Freud, 1905/1953, p. 184). We can
extend this primarily to early experiences with the mother. In the beginning the
child is helpless and dependent upon its mother or caretaker. Note also that
when Lacan refers to the mother he is essentially talking about the maternal
function, insofar as the primary object for the child could be anyone who
provides this kind of care and attention (any caregiver who fills this role in
relation to the child, and not necessarily just the biological mother). The young
child who is dependent upon the mother is fed, washed, embraced, touched, and
held by her, and this is not a neutral experience for the child.
Lacan describes the child as a kind of brute subject at this point, a subject
without lack (which can be represented by a symbol: “S” to designate an
unbarred, uncastrated subject). Lacan designates the castrated, lacking subject
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with the symbol “S/ ” (to be read as “the barred subject”), but this will be
addressed in more detail a bit further on. The infant’s body at this stage (as a
brute subject prior to castration) is full of jouissance. It could be argued that at
this point the child experiences drives in the real.
Early in his career, Lacan describes the real, at its most basic, as “what
resists symbolization absolutely” (Lacan, 1953-1954/1988, p. 66). We can think of
this experience of drives in the real in terms of the child’s body being a jumble of
disparate sensations and impulses that lack symbolic representation at this stage
(thus they are drives in the real, outside the symbolic/symbolization). These
impulses and sensations are attended to by the mother, and the child thus
experiences these drives in relation to an Other (the mOther). For the baby who
lacks the ability to distinguish boundaries between self and other, self and world
(such that, for instance, there is no distinction between the baby and the mother’s
breast), we might say that it cannot ascertain whether these impulses and
sensations—these drives in the real—are coming from itself or the mother. As
for the latter, that would indicate that the mother’s desire and jouissance get read
through her touches, her various forms of contact with the child, and her ways of
regulating the child’s needs and impulses. What is problematic is that Lacan, to
the best of my knowledge, does not clearly formulate what kind of drive might
be associated with the stage prior to castration. What I am presenting here is my
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own attempt to grapple with that problem and suggest possible ways of thinking
about that, though some of the terminology is problematic.
Nevertheless, I think an argument can be made for referring to the
experience of drives prior to castration as a form of jouissance of the Other (la
jouissance de l’Autre). 5 Lacan sometimes also refers to the jouissance of the Other
as the Other jouissance. This is so in several senses. In the French grammatical
form in which la jouissance de l’Autre is framed, the subjective and objective
genitive, la jouissance de l’Autre can refer to the Other’s jouissance or the
jouissance of the Other (loosely put: jouissance of—as in enjoying the Other—or
as in belonging to/coming from the Other, with the Other doing the enjoying).
Following this logic, the experience of real drives considered from the
perspective of the jouissance of the Other could indicate the mOther’s enjoyment
and/or the child’s enjoyment of the mOther.
That is jouissance in the real—real drives—because those drives lack
symbolic representation; they are not yet attached to representations (“psychical
representatives,” for Freud). This point will become important in Chapter 5, 6,
and 7, in which the status of jouissance in the real will be explored as it featured
in two cases of psychosis. The drives lack symbolic representation at the pre5

To refer to them as forms of Other jouissance is problematic. In Seminar XX Lacan suggests that
although men experience only phallic jouissance, women experience Other jouissance as well as phallic
jouissance. In using the term “Other jouissance” here to refer to drives prior to castration, which in Chapter
5 I will attempt to situate with respect to psychosis, I do not mean to suggest that all women are psychotics.
This point will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 5.
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Oedipal stage because that is a stage prior to the subject’s entry into language
(prior to symbolic castration). Accordingly, the drives are also asexual at that
time. For at the pre-Oedipal stage, prior to castration, the subject has not yet
taken a sexual position.
They are real drives in the sense that they lack symbolic representation
but also because, for Lacan, in the real, nothing lacks. Lacan says that the real is
full. That relates to the retroactively determined fantasy in neurosis that there
once existed a perfect dyadic relation between mother and child, before the
father and language intervened, supposedly ruining everything. This is a
fantasy of a sort of golden age in which everything was blissful: a hypothetically
perfect jouissance.
Lacan formulates the mother’s status prior to the subject’s castration and
entry into language by way of Freud’s concept of “das Ding” (“the Thing”). For
both Freud and Lacan, das Ding is the maternal object. Lacan describes “the
maternal thing, the mother, insofar as she occupies the place of that thing, of das
Ding” (Lacan, 1959-1960/1992, p. 67). Das Ding is the mother at the pre-Oedipal
stage which is associated with the fantasy that there was a perfect dyadic relation
prior to castration and the father’s intervention. That is why, according to Lacan,
“das Ding, which is the mother, is also the object of incest, is a forbidden good”
(Lacan, 1959-1960/1992, p. 70). As I already indicated, the fantasy of the pre-
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Oedipal, uninterrupted relation to the mother is connected with real drives,
which Lacan attests to by stating that “What one finds at the level of das Ding . . .
is the place of the Triebe, the drives” (Lacan, 1959-1960/1992, p. 110).
I will now address what, for Freud and Lacan, happens to the status of das
Ding and the real drives once the subject comes under the operation of castration.
Freud describes the father coming onto the scene to issue a castration threat,
prohibit incest, and thus separate mother and child. The father bars the child’s
unmediated access to the mother. The father conveys to the child, “you can’t
have your mother all to yourself; she is mine.” That is a truncated, simplified
version of Freud’s account of castration—with the literal, flesh-and-blood father
being the bearer of castration. That is also a childhood developmental model.
Lacan follows Freud in associating castration—and thus the child’s
separation from the mother—with the father, but Lacan slightly resituates the
idea of castration by putting a linguistic spin on it (by taking it up by way of his
theory of the signifier). For Lacan, the focus is less on the flesh-and-blood father,
as it was in Freud’s account, and more on the father as a function. To emphasize
the difference between the flesh-and-blood father and the operation of castration
which gets represented by the father, Lacan refers to the “paternal function”6 and
the “Name-of-the-Father.” He describes the paternal function in terms of
6

Sometimes also referred to as the “phallic function,” which will be described within the next couple of
pages.
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someone or something coming to intervene between mother and child to
separate them. This can be thought of in the sense of a prohibition and in the
sense of a recognition of and naming of the fact that the mother has other
desires—desires outside of the child. The symbolic functions of prohibition and
naming are best captured through Lacan’s French term for the Name-of-theFather, which is written as “Nom-du-Père.” Because of the French homophony,
“nom” can refer to both the “no” of prohibition and the father’s “name,” or to the
name or designation of the mother’s desire as beyond the child.
In sum, through the instating of the paternal function the child gets the
impression that he or she is not the mother’s entire world—that the mother’s
desire also lies elsewhere. Another way of putting that, using more of Lacan’s
terminology, is that the child is no longer identified with the imaginary phallus
of the mother—meaning that the child is not what can fully complete and satisfy
the mother or totally fill her lack. Implicit in Lacan’s work is the idea that the
paternal function can be carried out by someone other than the biological father,
even the mother, in a sense, if the mother expresses that she has other desires
besides the child. The paternal function can operate in that way because, at its
most basic level, the paternal function is the naming of the mother’s desire as
outside of the child. Another way to conceptualize the same structure is that the
father gets named as the object of the mother’s desire—as what the mother seems
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to want and have an interest in beyond the child—insofar as he stands as a kind
of answer constructed within the child’s mind to the question of what the mother
wants. This again shifts the focus away from a literal castrating father and
towards a function.
Regardless of the particularities of how the paternal function gets imposed
for each individual, it is always unique and takes place within the family
narrative or what Lacan refers to as the neurotic’s individual myth.7 It is at this
point—after the imposition of the paternal function—that things are no longer
complete; there is a structural lack. Castration creates a hole. Another way to
think about castration is in terms of a shift from a whole to hole. Moreover, by
way of castration, both the subject and the mOther are lacking.8 The subject—no
longer the brute subject in the real which was represented with the symbol “S”—
is now lacking, which Lacan represents with the symbol “ S/ ” to indicate that the
subject is struck through, in a sense, and is incomplete, divided, and lacking.
This is the barred subject who is split, lacking, and castrated. So too is the Other
lacking, which Lacan represents through the symbol “A
/ .” This symbol is to be
read as “the barred Other” (the symbol is an “A” with a line through it because
the French word for Other is Autre).

7

See Lacan’s (1953/1979) “The Neurotic’s Individual Myth.”
A bit further on, I will explain this in more detail and then address some of the consequences/effects of
the subject’s constitutive lack. I will then connect that with aspects of addictions.
8
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The paternal function thus effectively interrupts the child’s hypothetically
complete and unmediated access to das Ding—that is, the paternal function
brings das Ding into existence by prohibiting access to it. By logical extension,
the paternal function sets limits on the jouissance in the real which I have
described as a form of Other jouissance. The result of the paternal function is
that das Ding—cancelled out and prohibited, rendered impossible—becomes the
primally repressed. This is what Lacan means when he draws a connection
between das Ding and the structuring of the unconscious: “Das Ding is a
primordial function which is located at the level of the initial establishment of the
gravitation of the unconscious Vorstellungen [representations]” (Lacan, 19591960/1992, p. 62).
To return again to emphasizing Lacan’s linguistic model and thinking
about castration by way of his theory of the signifier, it is important to note that
the Name-of-the-Father is a kind of first signifier. Lacan represents the
imposition of the paternal function through what he refers to as the formula of
the “paternal metaphor.” In providing this formula, Lacan explains that he is
making use of the general structure of metaphor itself, in which one term gets
cancelled out and replaced by another. He adds that the formula for metaphor is
thus about “signifying substitution” (Lacan, 1959/2006, p. 464). Here is Lacan’s
formula of the paternal metaphor:
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Figure I9

To simplify things, suffice it to say that the most basic way to read this formula is
to say that it depicts in a formula what I described previously. That is, the first
half of the formula demonstrates that the Name-of-the-Father cancels out das
Ding and represents the mother’s desire being named as beyond the child. The
latter half of the formula indicates that the Name-of-the-Father comes to signify
what is then lost to language as the phallus.
Lacan even directly associates the Name-of-the-Father not with the
presence or absence of the biological father, as I explained, but with the
“presence of the signifier” (Lacan, 1959/2006, p. 465). With the institution of the
paternal function, the presence of the signifier means that something is also, in
one fell swoop, lost to language: das Ding and the real jouissance prior to
9

From “On a Question Preliminary to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis,” by J. Lacan, 1959/2006, in
Ecrits: the First Complete Edition in English (B. Fink, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton & Co., p. 465.
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castration. The word kills the thing. Put another way, language acts as a barrier
and protects the child from an excessive, in some ways dangerous, unmediated
relation to the mother. It is dangerous insofar as the unmediated relation to the
mother exists beyond the pleasure principle and kills desire, leaving no room for
the individual to have a space of desire—breathing room—and to become an
autonomous desiring subject. The symbolic intervenes upon, limits, and protects
against the real.
To add one more symbol to this discussion: the symbolic phallus—
indicated with the symbol “Φ”—stands for everything that is lost through the
subject’s entry into language, through the process of symbolic castration. Lacan
puts it bluntly: “the phallus is a signifier” (Lacan, 1958/2006, p. 581). The phallus
represents what is lost. For that very reason, the paternal function is also
referred to as the “phallic function” (Lacan, 1972-1973/1998, p. 59).
I noted previously that castration involves limits being set on jouissance. I
described how, by way of the paternal function, the father represents the first
inhibition of the aim of the drive. Castration thus involves a shift from a
seemingly unlimited and perfect jouissance prior to castration (jouissance in the
real or real drives associated with das Ding) to what Lacan refers to as “phallic
jouissance” (castrated, limited jouissance). Jacques-Alain Miller also takes up the
topic of differences on the level of jouissance:
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[P]rohibition, the well-known incest prohibition, translates above all as
the prohibition against satisfying desire for the mother (désir de la mère),
and Lacan had already mentioned in Seminar VII that that is but a
metaphor for the prohibition expressed in signifiers (l’interdit signifiant)
of jouissance. The incest prohibition means: Thou shalt not have access
to that which is your supreme jouissance. (Miller, 1996, p. 423)
The subject cannot have the full (“supreme”) jouissance of das Ding, but he or she
can have some jouissance. This little bit leftover is phallic jouissance. The phallic
drive10 involves the subject’s attempts to recover some of the jouissance imagined
to be lost through castration.
The loss of das Ding is the precondition for the phallic drive. That is, the
loss of das Ding generates the phallic drive’s attempts to recover something of
that which had been lost. What is more, the loss itself generates repetition. This
is the case because attempts at refinding what was imagined to have been lost
will always have to be repeated—cycles or circuits of repetition that, in fact, never
succeed in refinding the lost object, precisely because it is irrevocably lost.
Immediately after he introduces his formula for the paternal metaphor, Lacan
addresses the connection between repression and repetition. When he describes
repression and the signifier, he notes that it “persists there in a repressed
10

Lacan implores us to keep in mind, given the meaning of these concepts as I have been describing them,
that the phallus is not the penis. Since both men and women undergo castration—neurotic ones, at least—
both sexes have an experience of the phallic drive.
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(verdrängt) state, and insists from that place so as to be represented . . . by means
of its repetition automatism” (Lacan, 1959/2006, p. 465).
Now that this theoretical groundwork has been laid, we can bring
together three concepts: 1) primal repression; 2) Freud’s notion that the drives
can only be known by way of ideas or “psychical representatives;” and 3) the
question of the constancy or pressure of the drive. The paternal metaphor results
in primal repression. The signifier that cancels out and names das Ding via the
imposition of the paternal function and the repression that this signifier produces
institutes what Lacan refers to as the “Other” and what Freud refers to as the
“other scene.” As I described earlier in this chapter, Lacan tells us that the
unconscious is structured like a language. This is similar to the structure of
metaphor—one signifier stands in for (replaces) another that is repressed. The
drive’s striving towards refinding something that has been lost is thus directly
related to the structuring of the unconscious. This is why Lacan says that “The
drive . . . is constructed by Freud on the basis of the experience of the
unconscious” (Lacan, 1964/2006, p. 722). The loss of das Ding—which is
operationalized in the formula of the paternal metaphor—generates the pressure
of the drive to refind something of the jouissance imagined to have been lost.
Lacan notes, “The activity in the subject I call ‘drive’ (Trieb) consists in dealing
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with these objects in such a way as to recover from them, to restore to himself,
his earliest loss” (Lacan, 1966/2006, p. 720).
The phallic drive is the subject’s attempt to refind and hold on to
remainders of jouissance. That will become important in my discussion of the
relation of the drive to addictions, later in this chapter. I noted previously that
for Lacan, the phallus stands in for all that has been lost to language: Φ. The
way in which the loss occurs—by way of primal repression through the
operation of the paternal function, with the Name-of-the-Father coming to
signify the phallus, all that is lost to language, with das Ding and the correlative
jouissance having been lost due to castration—is particular for each subject. That
is, this loss occurs uniquely for each subject, and within the context of the
neurotic’s individual myth: the particular way in which the entry into language
and the structuring of the unconscious occur for each subject. The structure of
the paternal metaphor, though it can be generalized and reduced to a formula as
in Lacan’s formula of the paternal metaphor, is unique for each subject. It
logically follows that the way in which each subject seeks to recover, through the
activity of the drive, that which has been lost, is also particular. This is precisely
what I will explore through the case studies I present in the upcoming chapters.
The particularity of the subject’s entry into language also means that the
subject’s relation to the real—and thus the drive’s attempts to refind that which
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had been lost—is symbolically structured. This can be likened to Freud’s
description of symptoms having a real core around which there is a symbolic
structure: “like the grain of sand around which an oyster forms its pearl” (Freud,
1953/1905[1901], p. 83). The symbolic and the real are intertwined in a complex
relation, which relates to Lacan’s ideas about the structuring of the unconscious,
as I described. The relation between the real and the symbolic in the
construction of the drive is also alluded to in an essay entitled “The Unconscious:
A Psychoanalytic study,” by two of Lacan’s students, Laplanche and Leclaire,
who note poetically that “the birth of the unconscious . . . stems from the capture of
instinctual energy in the web of the signifier” (Laplanche and Leclaire, 1972, p. 167).
Although the loss of das Ding is irrevocable, and one can never access the
impossible jouissance imagined to have been lost, it is through the phallic drive’s
attempt to hold on to some remainders of jouissance that the subject is able to
access some jouissance—caught in the web, so to speak.
Lacan’s account of the imposition of the paternal metaphor is about the
subject’s entry into language. This entry, as I explained, occurs by way of one
signifier entering the scene and making a kind of cut. That cut represents the
castration threat, the prohibition of incestuous jouissance with the mother, and
the “cancelling out” or barring of the mother. Lacan brings together Freud’s
childhood developmental model and Oedipal narrative with his own ideas about
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the child’s entry into language and the unconscious being structured like a
language. This is the case because Lacan aligns the idea of the father barring the
mother with the idea of the signifier making a cut and limiting jouissance. As
Lacan notes, “the signifier is what brings jouissance to a halt” (Lacan, 19721973/1998, p. 24).
Through the operation of castration, the signifier makes a kind of cut
through which it also carves up the body. The signifier’s limiting function
inaugurates phallic jouissance. That is, through castration the drive becomes
limited and focused around the body’s erogenous zones. Lacan describes the
signifier’s action as a “cut. . . by which the function of certain objects . . . is
determined” (Lacan, 1966/2006, p. 719). This means that castration and the
phallic drive result in the carving out of erogenous zones. Through castration,
limits are set on the imagined total jouissance associated with the mother/child
dyad. Jouissance, in being limited, is drained away from the body as a whole
and is evacuated from all but the erogenous zones (holes, orifices of the body—
sites of interaction with the Other). The modification of the drive results in a
shift from a whole to holes. Lacan describes this as a process of the drive
“isolating” erogenous zones through castration: “The very delimitation of the
‘erogenous zone’ that the drive isolates . . . is the result of a cut that takes
advantage of the anatomical characteristic of a margin or border” (Lacan,
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1960/2006, p. 692). The drives thus become limited, hierarchized, and organized
around the erogenous zones.
However, to strictly relate the “anal drive” to a literal bodily orifice can be
problematic. Lacan seems to affirm this in that he rejects the notion of a
progression of developmental stages (e.g., that an oral stage would be followed
by anal, phallic, and genital stages). He notes that the process by which the
libido or drive comes to be “must not be referred to some natural process of
pseudo-maturation” (Lacan, 1964/1981, p. 64). This is not about a progression of
biologically predetermined maturational stages that one reaches at certain points
in development. That is why Lacan states that “There is no natural
metamorphosis of the oral drive into the anal drive” (Lacan, 1964/1981, p. 180).
For Lacan, this is about dialectical stages. It is useful to think of them in
connection with the role of the Other’s demand, which I will discuss in more
detail within the next few pages. That is, it is more useful to think of the “stages”
as times when the Other makes a demand of the subject in which the subject can
either say “yes” or “no.” Accordingly, the “anal drive” can most usefully be
thought of in terms of ways of relating to the Other—and the Other’s demand—
which are marked by withholding or giving. What is at stake has much less to
do with a bodily orifice than language and a relation to the Other that takes place
within the structure of language. Moreover, that demand can go in both
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directions—for the subject or the Other—and follows a grammatical structure.
For instance, the “oral drive” can take the form of a demand to eat, to be eaten, or
to get oneself eaten. Thinking about the drive with regard to stages or erogenous
zones is meaningful only insofar as we can think of them as taking place in
language and in response to language. Lacan reminds us of this when he says
that “drives are the echo in the body of the fact that there is a saying” (Lacan,
1975-1976/2005, Class of Wednesday, November 18, 1975). Insofar as the Other’s
demand implies lack, and touches on the structural function of lack, these ideas
further highlight the important role of emptiness in the drive.
The loss of das Ding—and everything that I have been addressing that
goes along with that operation—fundamentally results in emptiness, absence.
What Lacan refers to as “object a” (objet petit a) comes to stand in for the loss of
das Ding. Lacan addresses the relation between object a and the emptiness that
results from the loss of das Ding thusly: “this object . . . is in fact simply the
presence of a hollow, a void, which can be occupied, Freud tells us, by any object,
and whose agency we know only in the form of the lost object, the petit a” (Lacan,
1964/1981, p. 180). The loss of das Ding creates the subject as lacking or desiring,
and object a stands in the place of that lack.
This touches on the very complex relation, within Lacan’s work, between
desire and drive, of which I will not give an exhaustive account. What is most
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salient is that Lacan characterizes object a as both cause of desire and object of the
drive: the “object that is the cause of desire is [simultaneously] the object of the
drive—that is to say, the object around which the drive turns” (Lacan, 1964/1981,
p. 243). That is the case insofar as the phallic drive circles around object a as
what stands in for the loss of das Ding.
The castrated subject is lacking, and lack is the precondition of desire. We
can only desire or want because there is something that we lack—something that
we do not have. Still, the lacking subject does not simply accept lack and remain
stagnant in that position; the subject tries to recover some of the jouissance that
was lost. The desiring/lacking subject’s relation to the lost object, the subject’s
position in trying to recover and hold on to some piece of lost jouissance, is
articulated in what Lacan refers to as fantasy, which he represents in a formula:

(S/ ◊ a). This can be read most simply as: the lacking subject’s relation to
object a.
For Lacan lack is constitutive, structural. The Lacanian subject—
specifically the castrated, neurotic subject11—is fundamentally a subject of lack.
When Lacan refers to “the subject” he is fundamentally referring to the split
subject (lacking, divided, or barred). The split subject is indicated by an “S” with
a line through it (“ S/ ”) to indicate that the subject is split between conscious and
11

As I will address in Chapter 5, 6, and 7, psychotics are technically not considered lacking subjects, as
they have not undergone the castration that constitutes lack.
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unconscious and that the subject is lacking the object.12 As I explained, the
subject comes to be lacking or desiring by way of the operation of castration.
Lacan affirms, “What analytic experience attests to is that castration is what
regulates desire” (Lacan, 1960/2006, p. 700).
I mentioned earlier that the subject and the Other come to be lacking at the
same time, so to speak. This indicates that the subject’s desire comes into being
in relation to his or her interpretation of the Other’s desire:
the condition of the subject . . . depends on what unfolds in the Other, A.
What unfolds there is articulated like a discourse (the unconscious is the
Other’s discourse [discourse de l’Autre]), whose syntax Freud first sought
to define for those fragments of it that reach us in certain privileged
moments, such as dreams, slips, and witticisms. (Lacan, 1959/2006, pp.
458-459).
Moreover, Lacan explains that “the neurotic . . . is the one who identifies the
Other’s lack with the Other’s demand” (Lacan, 1960/2006, p. 698). He goes on to
describe how the neurotic subject’s interpretation of the Other’s lack comes to
structure his or her fundamental fantasy and experience of the drive. Lacan
explains that “the Other’s demand takes on the function of the object in the

12

There are also other ways to understand the subject to be lacking—as in the idea of the subject lacking a
signifier or being divided between signifiers—but these are beyond the scope of this work and will not be
explored here. For a fuller account of Lacan’s many ideas about the divided subject, see Fink’s The
Lacanian Subject (1995).
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neurotic’s fantasy—that is, his fantasy (my formulas make it possible to realize
this immediately) is reduced to the drive: (S/ ◊ D)” (Lacan, 1960/2006, p. 698). For
example, in Chapter 4, I present a case study of Phil, an obsessional neurotic
patient who interpreted his mOther’s demand as: “die.” That is, he imagined
the Other’s demand as being for him to suffocate, fuse with the mother, and die.
He then took marijuana as his object and in fantasy positioned himself as
smoking to the point of feeling suffocated and seemingly fused with his mother,
symbolically dying by being fused with or absorbed into her.
The idea that the drive is a relation to demand also relates to the notion
that a demand is always a demand for something. That is, since demand seems to
be for something, for some object, the subject confuses separation from the object
for separation from desire. As Lacan explains, “the drive divides the subject and
desire, the latter sustaining itself only by the relation it misrecognizes between
this division and an object that causes it. Such is the structure of fantasy” (Lacan,
1964/2006, p. 724). It is thus due to a kind of primal confusion that subjects think
that an object is what will satisfy them. Subjects then try out objects, with
varying levels of satisfaction, and it is because demand is always demand for
something that subjects try to plug objects into the object a slot in fantasy. I will
discuss these ideas further—as well as Lacan’s related idea of the grammar of the
drive, its “grammatical artifice” (Lacan, 1960/2006, p. 692)—in the case studies.

63

At this point, it should also suffice to note that we are beginning to address the
important idea that the drive has less to do with a phenomenal object—for no
object can satisfy the drive—than the way in which the subject is oriented in
relation to its own and the Other’s lack (or what the neurotic identifies as the
Other’s demand).
Lacan makes it clear that the objects of the drive stand in for absence and
that any number of objects can therefore come to occupy the place of lack. He
notes that the object “is in fact simply the presence of a hollow, a void, which can
be occupied, Freud tells us, by any object” (Lacan, 1964/1981, p. 180). As Lacan
indicates, Freud too stresses the drive object’s contingency. Freud asserts that
there is no such thing as a “natural” object choice, no fixed one-to-one relation
between drive and object:
It has been brought to our notice that we have been in the habit of
regarding the connection between the sexual drive and the sexual object
as more intimate than it in fact is. Experience of the cases that are
considered abnormal has shown us that in them the sexual drive and the
sexual object are merely soldered together—a fact which we have been in
danger of overlooking in consequence of the uniformity of the normal
picture, where the object appears to form part and parcel of the drive.
We are thus warned to loosen the bond that exists in our thoughts
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between drive and object. It seems probable that the sexual drive is in
the first instance independent of its object; nor is its origin likely to be
due to its object’s attractions. (Freud, 1905/1953, p. 147-148)
Lacan declares, “[a]s far as the object in the drive is concerned, let it be clear that
it is, strictly speaking, of no importance” (Lacan, 1964/1981, p. 168). Lacan and
Freud, though they take slightly different angles, both emphasize the drive
object’s absolute contingency.
The concept of the contingency of the drive object has very important
implications for the psychoanalytic study and treatment of addictions, as I hope
to demonstrate in this project. In Chapter 5, for example, I will discuss a patient
whose addiction, when he first came to treatment, had already transferred from
cocaine to shopping. Although the contingent object his addiction centered on
had changed, the structure of his addiction was still very much intact at the time
when he was seeking therapy.
Given the drive object’s contingency, it is important to expand our
framework to consider the drive object as something other than a phenomenal
object (an actual object, or object in the world). That is the case also because the
positions the subject takes with regard to desire and drive are governed by
structural relations. What is more, the place of the object is marked by a
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structural lack. This is why the drive object is not only contingent but also
displaceable, as metonymy is based on lack.
Although the drive object is something other than a phenomenal object,
and the drive object can be considered contingent and displaceable, there are
subjects who do develop an addiction to one specific substance (one particular
kind of alcohol or drug, for instance). As such, their drive object seems very
fixed (not contingent or displaceable). In Chapter 3, I discuss this issue through
the presentation of a case study of Buck, a patient who drank massive quantities
of one particular brand of alcohol. This kind of addiction, in which the subject
becomes addicted to one unique substance, is a fixation of the drive in which the
subject believes that the object is anything but contingent. Nevertheless, as I will
address in Chapter 3, even that had less to do with the phenomenal object itself
than with the signifier. I will make the perhaps controversial argument that in
that case, the patient was relating through his addiction not to the alcohol itself
but to its name, the specific brand name of the alcohol he drank excessively. In
that case, the subject’s addiction had a very clear and unmistakable symbolic
structure.
Although addicted subjects often seem to operate according to an illusion
that they have found an object that brings full satisfaction, no phenomenal object
could ever satisfy the drive. Lacan addresses that important point in his
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discussion of the difference between an object of need and an object of the drive.
He uses the oral drive to illustrate the point: “no food will ever satisfy the oral
drive, except by circumventing the eternally lacking object” (Lacan, 1964/1981, p.
180). The object is, in Lacan’s words, “eternally lacking”; it cannot be recovered.
To think that it could be recovered, and that there could be a concrete object that
would satisfy the drive, is a fantasy, a misrecognition. Lacan doesn’t mince
words: “no object of any . . . need, can satisfy the drive” (Lacan, 1964/1981, p.
167).
He goes on to clarify that, beyond the fact that the drive is not satisfied by
an object of need, satisfaction actually doesn’t come from any object at all. Lacan
explains that “[e]ven when you stuff the mouth—the mouth that opens in the
register of the drive—it is not the food that satisfies it, it is, as one says, the
pleasure of the mouth” (Lacan, 1964/1981, p. 167). Something around the object
gets satisfied. In the example he offers of the oral drive, Lacan indicates that
there is pleasure in the very filling of an orifice of the body, an erogenous zone.
It gives one the temporary illusion of fullness, in all senses of the term implied by
his example. Lacan is making the case that in the drive, satisfaction is not about
the object, but about something that is satisfied in the drive.
Lacan offers the following as a formulation of the drive’s satisfaction: “la
pulsion en fait le tour” (Lacan, 1964/1981, p. 168). One way to understand that is to
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say that the drive “moves around the object” or “circles the object”—takes a tour
or trip around the object. Lacan defines the drive as satisfied by its very circling
around the object: a satisfaction inherent in the “circuit of the drive” (Lacan,
1964/1981, p. 178).
The satisfaction at stake in the drive can be thought of as a kind of trick in
a few different ways. First, in the sense of a magic trick, like an optical illusion:
Even though the phenomenal object does not and cannot satisfy the drive, the
subject sometimes harbors the illusion that it can. That illusion is sustained by
the object. Moreover, as I described previously, although the initial object of the
drive—as das Ding or the pre-Oedipal maternal object—can never be recaptured,
the drive’s attempt, in circling around the objects a, to recapture something of
that lost jouissance, brings its own satisfaction. Something is satisfied in the very
circuit of the drive. Some jouissance is caught in the web. The paradox of the
drive—a trick—is that even though something is missed and not attained,
something is satisfied (there is some satisfaction). The drive is a one-trick pony:
it is stupid and knows nothing but its circling around the object. It does nothing
but go in circles, repeatedly. Nevertheless, the drive succeeds every time, even
in failing to attain the object or to fill one’s lack. Lacan describes the drive
succeeding in being satisfied in not attaining or “snatching” the object by noting
that “[b]y snatching at its object, the drive learns in a sense that this is precisely
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not the way it will be satisfied” (Lacan, 1964/1981, p. 167). The more one strives
to attain satisfaction in a direct way, through a concrete object, the more one
misses it, and the more one loses one’s way. The drive, however, is what
succeeds even in missing the object. That’s the trick.
In “Drives and their vicissitudes,” Freud suggests that the aim of the drive
simply is satisfaction itself: “the aim [Ziel] of a drive is in every instance
satisfaction” (Freud, 1915/1957, p. 122). Jacques-Alain Miller echoes this with a
more Lacanian accent: “The drive follows its own bent and always obtains
satisfaction. . . . The drive never comes to an impasse” (Miller, 1996, pp. 423,
426). Although, as Miller indicates, the drive always succeeds, always satisfies
itself, the object itself always fails.
Indeed, Lacan states that “[t]he object is a failure (un raté). The essence of
the object is failure” (Lacan, 1972-1973/1998, p. 58). For Lacan, the object always
fails because, fundamentally, object a is not das Ding. As such, object a is out of
synch, not what the subject sometimes imagines or hopes it to be: “There is . . .
always an essential division, fundamentally conflictual, in the re-found object,
and, in the very act of its re-finding, there is therefore always a discordance in
the re-found object in relation to the object sought after” (Lacan, 1956-1957/1994,
p. 53).
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Even though the drive always succeeds, the object’s failure results in one
experiencing the jouissance obtained through the drive’s circuit as a kind of
letdown. Lacan describes a difference between the jouissance that is actually
obtained and the jouissance that the subject hopes for: “’That’s not it’ is the very
cry by which the jouissance obtained is distinguished from the jouissance
expected” (Lacan, 1972-1973/1998, p. 111). Why is there a letdown? Lacan
continues to explain:
Structure, which connects up here, demonstrates nothing if not that it is
of the same text as jouissance, insofar as, in marking by what distance
jouissance misses—the jouissance that would be in question if ‘that were
it’—structure does not presuppose merely the jouissance that would be
it, it also props up another. (Lacan, 1972-1973/1998, pp. 111-112)
Lacan suggests that the fantasy of “more jouissance” is propped up by the
structuring function of lack for the subject. The subject, as a castrated, lacking
subject, operates according to a retroactively determined fantasy that he or she
has lost a supposedly perfect jouissance associated with das Ding. This sustains
the subject’s illusion that “that’s not it”—that the jouissance obtained is a rip
off—and that there must be more. The subject who gets caught up in futile
quests for a mythical and impossible jouissance, seeking “more” jouissance, is
truly tricked or deluded!
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An addict who uses increasing quantities of drugs in an attempt to reach
ever higher highs exemplifies someone who acts in accordance with that fantasy
of “more” jouissance.13 As such, addiction often involves jouissance beyond the
pleasure principle. That striving is sustained by the neurotic’s fantasy that it
might be possible to fill lack and overcome castration. Since demand is
experienced as demand for something, the subject takes objects in an attempt to
fill lack, which, as I explained, cannot work. Lacan describes the kind of
satisfaction at stake in jouissance as “paradoxical” and notes, “the drive has for
me no other purpose than to put in question what is meant by satisfaction”
(Lacan, 1964/1981, p. 166). That relates to “la pulsion en fait le tour” as the formula
of the drive’s satisfaction and also to the way in which jouissance can be
associated with a kind of painful enjoyment beyond the pleasure principle, that
is, a kind of painful enjoyment that is generally ego-dystonic. Freud alludes to
the way in which jouissance is unacceptable, even horrifying, to one’s ego when
he describes the Rat Man’s reaction to the idea of the infamous rat torture:
“horror at pleasure of his own of which he himself was unaware” (Freud,
1909/1955, p. 167).
Jouissance is therefore associated with excess and with a paradoxical kind
of satisfaction. Freud indicates as much by noting that “patients derive a certain

13

The names given to many drugs—especially ecstasy and heroin (“heroine”)—supports this fantasy!
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satisfaction from their sufferings” (Freud, 1909/1955, p. 183). Moreover, attempts
to attain “more” jouissance involve the fantasy of a satisfaction for which, Lacan
tells us, suffering subjects “give themselves too much trouble” (Lacan, 1964/1981,
p. 166). Nowhere is this more evident than in addictions.
Addicts are often tricked by their drug of choice—the object they pursue
according to the fantasy that through such phenomenal objects they could truly
satisfy or fill their lack (and/or reach an impossible jouissance). Such efforts are
destined to fail, however, because, as both Lacan and Freud insist, the object is
never it. The addict being duped by the fantasy of what his or her drug object
could be or could bring is similar to what Lacan describes in an anecdote of a
voyeur being duped by an illusion: “What the voyeur is looking for and finds is
merely a shadow, a shadow behind the curtain. There he will phantasize any
magic of presence, the most graceful of girls, for example, even if on the other
side there is only a hairy athlete” (Lacan, 1964/1981, p. 182). Behind the veil of
the addict’s fantasy, which sustains the illusion that his or her drug is truly “it,”
is a reality that is very different and sometimes agonizing and horrifying.
Addicted subjects often try to reach something they imagine would perfectly
satisfy their lack and provide a kind of supreme jouissance—like hoping to
access the beautiful woman imagined by the voyeur in Lacan’s example—but
they go too far in their pursuit of jouissance and instead encounter, through the
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misery of their addiction, nothing but a “hairy athlete”—a major
disappointment.
Lacan emphasizes that the analyst intervenes not with drugs but with
words (Lacan, 1973-1974, Class of May 21, 1974). That is particularly meaningful
in the analytic treatment of addictions. The goal of analysis is to transform the
subject’s position in relation to jouissance. That occurs via words, the talking
cure, even as the process of analysis is often poised between the symbolic and the
real. It is to this that I will now turn by presenting several case studies. These
cases will detail how Lacanian analytic interventions can have a transformative
effect on addicted subjects’ relation to the real of jouissance through speech—that
is, by “treating the real by the symbolic” (Lacan, 1975-1976/2005, Class of January
20, 1976).
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Chapter 3
ADDICTION AND OBSESSIONAL NEUROSIS
Buck’s Addictions: As Oedipal as it Gets

Introduction
In this chapter I will present a case study of “Buck”—an obsessional
neurotic patient who was addicted to multiple substances, most predominantly
coffee and a specific brand of vodka. His addictions were severe and had been
going on for a few years already at the time when he sought treatment. He told
me during the initial consultation that he regularly drank between six and seven
pots of coffee per day, in addition to consuming several other sources of caffeine
on top of that, such as caffeinated soda. His hands would often tremble, he had
an almost constant facial tic, and his skin constantly felt irritated to him as his
caffeine intake had led him to be dehydrated and unable to perspire. He also
drank huge amounts of alcohol—so much so that he would sometimes pass out
and lose consciousness. He even got kicked out of college during his freshman
year due to alcohol poisoning (and underage drinking).
I will describe the overarching structure governing how Buck related to
the multiple objects of his addiction. I will also emphasize that, contrary to Rik
Loose’s argument that addictions are not symbolically structured, which I
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reviewed in Chapter 1, Buck’s addiction did have a very clear symbolic structure.
Moreover, multiple layers of Oedipal dynamics were inherent in his addictions.
I will describe how his longing for a lost enjoyment connected with his mother,
as well as his anger towards his father, were wrapped up in his addiction as it
related to the oral and anal drive, respectively. In order to provide a context
within which those dynamics can be more fully understood, I will first discuss
the primary features of obsessional neurosis according to Lacan.

On Obsessional Neurosis
Lacan essentially proposes three diagnostic categories: psychosis,
perversion, and neurosis (hysteria and obsessional neurosis being the two
“types” or “dialects” of neurosis). Whereas the diagnostic schema in the DSM-IV
primarily establishes symptoms as determinative of diagnoses, Lacan’s
diagnostic system instead looks at subjective positions and views differences in
psychic structure as being determinative. Lacan further specifies that the three
diagnoses correspond to and are caused by three forms of negation: repression
in neurosis, disavowal in perversion, and foreclosure in psychosis. In this
chapter I will touch on the mechanism of repression in neurosis, and I will
reserve a discussion of disavowal and foreclosure for the chapters on perversion
and psychosis.
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Repression constitutes neurosis. Although repression is not directly
tangible, one can glean how repression has been operative by listening carefully
to the neurotic subject’s discourse and paying attention to the return of the
repressed through his or her symptoms. While repression is the primary,
governing feature of neurosis, there are also a number of other commonly
associated features. For instance, in addition to repression and the return of the
repressed, the following elements are characteristic of neurosis:
[T]he instating of the paternal function, the assimilation of the essential
structure of language, the primacy of doubt over certainty, considerable
inhibition of the drives, . . . the tendency to find more pleasure in fantasy
than in direct sexual contact, . . . the return of the repressed from within
. . . in the form of Freudian slips, bungled actions, and symptoms, . . .
uncertainty about what it is that turns one on, [and] considerable
difficulty pursuing it even when one does know. (Fink, 1997, p. 112)
Although these are features of neurosis in general, Lacan also suggests that the
two forms of neurosis—hysteria and obsessional neurosis—substantially differ
from one another.
For instance, while the hysteric is hyper-attuned to other people and their
desires, the obsessive concerns himself primarily with neutralizing them. That is,
the obsessive attempts to annul the Other, and refuses to see himself as
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dependent on the Other. These dynamics make for a therapeutic relationship
that is very different from the kind one is likely to encounter in working with a
hysterical client, in that the obsessive is often, particularly at the outset of
therapy, blissfully unconcerned with what his therapist says to him or seems
interested in. Accordingly, the clinician must make significant attempts to make
herself present to the obsessive and to be recognized by him. Lacan refers to this
as bringing about a kind of “hysterization” of the obsessive.1
With regard to the obsessional’s position in relation to desire, the
obsessional maintains an impossible desire. As Fink puts it, “Desire is
impossible in obsession, because the closer the obsessive gets to realizing his
desire (say, to have sex with someone), the more the Other begins to take
precedence over him, eclipsing him as subject. The presence of the Other
threatens the obsessive with what Lacan calls ‘aphanisis,’ his fading or
disappearance as subject” (Fink, 1997, p. 124).
For instance, Buck’s obsessional style of maintaining an impossible desire
involved significant self-sabotage: making it impossible for him to get what he
wanted. When he had opportunities to perform well academically (which to
Buck would have meant finally winning the love and approval of his father) he
would repeatedly sabotage his efforts (for instance, by getting kicked out of
1

In Chapter 4, I will describe how another obsessional patient, Phil, became hystericized at a certain point
in the treatment.
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school because his drinking problems led him to flunk all of his classes). That
style of self-sabotage therefore made it impossible for him to get what he wanted
but it also made it impossible for him to give his father what Buck believed he
wanted.
That is, Buck positioned himself as constantly refusing to satisfy the
Other’s demand—his father’s demand that he succeed in school—and he
retentively withheld what his father demanded. Buck’s addictions were situated
within this refusal in that his addictions—his alcohol addiction most
particularly—sabotaged almost everything in his life, particularly his education,
and thus any chance at success. Indeed, his alcohol addiction got him kicked out
of one school, as I will describe later in this chapter, and at the time of treatment
it was posing a serious threat to his academic status in the school to which he
transferred—the dean was threatening him with expulsion.
Furthermore, aphanisis might have taken the form of his father, while
giving him recognition and approval, becoming all too present to Buck. That is,
if his father gave the sought after approval, it would turn him into a suffocating
presence or one who Buck believed would then want more and more of him,
metaphorically devouring him with infinite expectations or desires. Alternately,
Buck also experienced his mother as a suffocating presence whom he imagined
he might get absorbed into and as associated with an enjoyment that he had lost,
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which left him with a kind of hole that he tried to fill through some of the
substances of his addiction. Before discussing the dynamics of Buck’s addictions
in more detail, I will first review some of his history so as to provide a context
within which the roots of his addictions can be understood.

Case History: Buck
Clinical background.
Buck, a twenty-one year old college student, originally sought treatment
because he felt he was “falling back into” some of his “addictive behaviors.” He
said he felt he had an “addictive personality” and also wanted to work on
breaking his cycles of depression and procrastination. As the therapy
progressed, it became clear that his addictions, depression, and procrastination
were interwoven.
During the initial consultation, Buck also told me that his mother was
“dead-set against” his coming to our clinic. She wanted him to find someone to
work with under her insurance, so that she could pay for and be “more
involved” in his therapy. His father supposedly disapproved of therapy of any
sort and suggested that Buck “try a little self-help.” Buck told me that he felt it
was important to him to come to our clinic and “do this on [his] own.”
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Overview of Buck’s addictions.
Buck told me during the initial consultation that he felt his most
predominant current addiction was to caffeine. He told me that he drank
between six and seven pots of coffee per day, not to mention vast amounts of
caffeinated soda. He explained that he felt his parents “did it to [him]”—made
him susceptible to caffeine addiction—because of how they “medicated” him
with soda, coffee, and sugar when he was diagnosed with Attention Deficit
Disorder (ADD) at eight years old. He said that instead of giving him
prescription drugs for his ADD, which he felt was merely overactivity and
attention-seeking behaviors, they chose that kind of “home remedy.” Buck
intimated that he believed his parents medicated him in an attempt to suppress
his anger towards them. Indeed, Buck was given these “home remedies”
precisely at a time in his childhood when he became somewhat rebellious and
began to speak out against his parents. That suppression of rage seemed to have
lasting effects for Buck, which will become evident a bit further on.
Around that time in Buck’s childhood, the family also went out to dinner
almost every night of the week. Buck told me that at the time he felt it was “a
huge waste.” Ironically, however, he reacted by trying to waste his family’s
money even more! When they ate out at the restaurants, he would order “glass
after glass after glass” of soda, and he would stuff himself with whatever he
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could snatch from the bread basket at the table, some appetizers, a full adultsized meal usually consisting of a pricey cut of meat, and, to top it all off, the
most expensive dessert he could find on the menu. He described how his little
eyes would secretly scan the menu for the most expensive item from each meal
category and that those would be his picks. Buck seemed to do for himself what
his parents had done to him. His parents were stuffing him with sodas and
sugary foods to treat his ADD, but he obviously took it to an extreme. In
addition to this connection, Buck might have been taking out some of his
resentment towards his parents, by wasting their money,2 while nevertheless
feeling indignant about how they were wasting the family’s money by going out
to dinner so often. It was clear that for Buck, resentment and wasting seemed to
be quite strongly connected. As Buck wasted his family’s money, his waist also
grew. He told me that during his childhood he had been quite thin until his
parents started their “home remedy” for his ADD and that he started putting on
weight from then on.
Buck’s resentment towards his parents continued throughout high school.
Buck told me that during high school his parents were very strict with him and
never let him experiment with any drugs or alcohol, a restriction he came to

2

Buck would have accomplished a bigger waste of their money if he had simply left the food on the plate.
However, he said he felt more “satisfaction” and also “power” through ordering and eating and drinking
excessively. “I made sure I got something—a lot—out of it,” he said.
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resent quite a bit.3 His parents were obviously not able to watch him constantly,
and Buck snuck around to experiment with drugs and alcohol. He seemed to
derive a great deal of jouissance out of sneaking around and supposedly doing
things behind his parents’ backs, but he actually did them right under their
noses! Regardless, Buck told me that he felt if only his parents had been less
“hands-on,” he wouldn’t have developed so many problems with drugs and
alcohol during college. Buck speculated that perhaps if his parents had let him
experiment during high school, he might have learned how to “handle” himself.4
“My biggest problem is that I have parents who love me too much,” Buck said
dryly.
Buck told me that during college, he rebelled and became immersed in
drugs and alcohol. During his very first day at college, he began drinking. He
said that when he met his roommate, things were very “awkward” and he
became uncomfortable in their new social situation of having to live together in
spite of “immediately disliking one another.” That night, Buck and his
roommate drank vodka to the point of extreme inebriation, a pattern which
continued almost nightly thereafter. Indeed, supposedly to deal with the
feelings of social awkwardness, Buck drank with his roommate and his

3

Note the neurotic stance of blaming the other.
There seemed to be something important about the recurrence of Buck’s references to hands. Although I
am uncertain of their exact meaning—as that did not get elaborated in the treatment—I might speculate
about a possible connection between masturbation and punishment.

4
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roommate’s friends, and always the exact same thing: Banker’s Club vodka.
Buck said that the first time he took a sip of vodka, “it felt natural.” With a look
of bliss on his face, he explained, “It tasted like heaven to me.” He also began
drinking heavily with his rowing teammates, but with them he also sometimes
drank beer. He described the “frat atmosphere” of their drinking together, and
again noted that drinking seemed to ease tension for him when he felt he didn’t
quite belong in the group. Nevertheless, vodka seemed to be of greater
importance to him. What is more, a little jingle was often sung by Buck and his
roommate’s friends when they drank together, something along the lines of, “Be
a part of the club, the banker’s club.”
Given that Buck drank only one very particular kind of vodka, and in
such large quantities, it is important to consider the possible meaning of the
specificity of the object. First, Buck’s father was a banker. Moreover, Buck never
felt he could bond with his father—he was never really part of his father’s
“club,” metaphorically speaking. According to Buck, Banker’s Club vodka is
also very inexpensive. I described previously Buck’s complaints about how his
parents wasted their money—for instance, by going out to dinner so often during
his childhood. Eventually, Buck’s drinking reached such an extreme during his
first year of college that he was hospitalized twice for alcohol poisoning. At that
point, he said, “everything went to shit.” As he said that during the session, he

83

had a little anal slip of flatulence, though he pretended not to notice. As a result
of his hospitalizations for alcohol poisoning, he lost his sports scholarship and
had to leave the university. Perhaps that took on the value for him of wasting his
parents’ money, through wasting his scholarship, and exacting some sort of
revenge on them, though the exact cause of that possible desire for revenge is
uncertain.
During Buck’s first year of college, his use of soda and caffeine increased
exponentially. He also began abusing several other substances, including
Tylenol PM, cigarettes, and Adderol (a medication commonly prescribed for
ADD). More often than not, he mixed several of those substances together.
Buck’s abuse of those substances resulted in self-destructiveness of different
kinds: procrastination, expulsion from school, and the production of agonizing
physical symptoms. That is, abusing those substances played into his selfdestructive cycles in similarly masochistic ways. He even allowed himself to
become so dehydrated from excessive intake of caffeine (and refusing to drink
water to rehydrate himself) that he actually became unable to perspire. That
caused him great discomfort, and even pushed him to the point of curling up in a
ball on the shower floor, crying because his skin was burning but would not
perspire. Nevertheless, in spite of the intense agony he was in, he still would not
drink water, which underscores the severity of his masochistic tendencies.
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When Buck’s parents then made him move home and transfer to a nearby
university, he became resentful that they kept him under their watch and didn’t
trust him. He said he still continued with many of his addictions, but that he
simply did so more covertly. For instance, he described sneaking out of his
parents’ house to chain smoke, and then sneaking back in late at night after they
were asleep, and doing laundry to wash his clothes so they wouldn’t smell the
cigarette smoke on his clothing. “It’s like living a double life,” he explained. He
complained about the situation, but it was clear that he was also getting off on
that secret addiction. The jouissance he got from this sneaking around is
suggested by Buck’s comment that the sneaking around “creates twice as much
stress as the cigarettes treat.” When I asked Buck about that sneaking around,
and keeping things from his parents, he referred in particular to the impact
finding out about it would have on his father, noting: “it would kill him if he
found out.” “Is that what this is all about, killing your father?” I ventured. “All
of these addiction patterns are a big ‘fuck you’ to my father,” Buck replied. As
we talked more about how those addictive behaviors might have been a way of
him saying “fuck you” to his father, we noted that they nevertheless were very
much directed at himself. Buck affirmed this idea as we were talking about his
chain smoking and other addictions, noting, “It’s a self-defeating cycle, like my
entire life.” Perhaps, then, defeating himself was tantamount to defeating his
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father. In order to better understand Buck’s addictions, it is important to more
closely examine certain aspects of his history.

Highlights of Buck’s history.
From our first meeting, it seemed to be important to Buck that he address
his family history in some detail. He described how his family had a rather high
social status and that they came from “old money.” Buck told me that the family
fortune came from his great-great-great-grandfather on his father’s side of the
family, who had invented a new kind of building material. The stories of his
family being from old money were quite dramatic and often comical. Indeed,
Buck offered quite a few rather Gatsby-esque stories. He described lavish family
parties with people who were clearly of some importance but also quite quirky
and even odd. For instance, Buck described a rather dramatic grandmother who
made a show out of refusing to eat but “constantly smoked like a chimney” and
spoke with an affected snooty accent (which Buck enjoyed imitating); details of
men philandering while their wives seemed to be indifferent or even relieved;
and women histrionically making a show of hiding things from their husbands
in spite of their husbands being completely unaffected by their displays. Drama
of various sorts seemed to have characterized much of Buck’s family history.
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Buck explained that for the first four years of his life, he grew up in a very
upper-crust area of Great Britain. Buck told me that the family moved there
because his father, who was a major player in international banking, was
transferred there for work. Buck described “rubbing shoulders with the elite of
England,” a description which suggests that the young four-year-old Buck might
have seen himself as bigger than he really was, either at the time or in hindsight,
being figuratively on the same level as the British elite.
Indeed, Buck characterized these early years in England as a sort of
“golden age.” In one sense, it was a golden age because those years were
marked by great wealth and a lavish lifestyle. Buck’s descriptions of those years
also suggested childlike fantasies of rolling in piles of dollar bills or swimming in
a pool of gold coins. Richness and surplus characterized those years, and so too
did the privilege of status. That is, Buck was supposedly hobnobbing with the
crème de la crème, enjoying all of the privilege of status while, as Buck commented
with some pride, his father’s employer paid for everything.
That lifestyle supposedly ended when the family left England. Indeed,
Buck’s “golden age” seemed to end after the family moved back to the States.
When a subject looks back on something that has been lost, it is often viewed
through the lens of nostalgia as a sort of paradise lost. It isn’t particularly
important whether such a time actually was so perfect—how could it be?—and
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characterized by abundance; what is important is the value it later takes on for
the subject. This is similar to the way in which the subject imagines that he or
she has lost a golden age of a more perfect jouissance—a jouissance fantasized to
be associated with das Ding and a jouissance prior to castration, as I described in
Chapter 2. For Buck, the golden age in England certainly took on the value of a
gold nugget of his childhood that was taken from him. How did he react to that
loss? Primarily with anger, resentment, and attempts to recover and hold on to
(retain) what he imagined he lost.
Buck described feeling like an outsider when the family moved back to the
States when he was four years old.5 He said he had a strong British accent and
spoke “proper English” (the Queen’s English, I suppose). To Buck his British
accent also carried with it a stamp of elevated social class, much like the affected
Boston Brahmin accent marked one’s belonging to a certain social and economic
echelon. Buck spoke disparagingly of the other children and their mothers,
whom he encountered when he went to school in the U.S., noting that he felt
they looked down on him and made fun of him for his manner of speaking. He
commented with derision, “They made fun of me for speaking proper English.”
Buck felt like an outsider, but to him being an outsider took on qualities of being
both privileged (special) and very devalued (rejected). That may have

5

Roughly an Oedipal age.
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established a structure that carried throughout Buck’s life: of imagining that he
occupied the role of an exception, but as the simultaneously golden and
denigrated one.
Buck’s own way of describing his sense of occupying the role of exception
or outsider was that he was never “group-minded.” He gave numerous
examples of how, throughout elementary school and high school, he made
deliberate attempts to do the opposite of whatever was popular. For instance, he
told me he would often fantasize about a World War III in which the Soviet
Union would win. Another example that he mentioned on several occasions,
suggesting its multivalent importance to him, was that when all of the other kids
rooted for Luke Skywalker, he rooted for Darth Vader. A consistent theme
underlying all of the stories he told about how he was not “group-minded,” and
how he deliberately went against the grain, was that he always did so for “no
particular reason.” Nevertheless, he might have wanted a victory of socialism
over capitalism (represented as his father as a banker) and also of the father—
Darth Vader—over the son. These fantasies may have retroactively structured
the “outsider” stances that he took. In Buck’s account, there was nothing
particularly or inherently appealing about liking the opposite of what the others
liked, other than the fact that it was precisely the opposite of what others liked.
That allowed Buck to take a position against them, in opposition to them. Taking
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a position that was the direct opposite of the position taken by others meant that
Buck never really took a position of his own at all. Since he blindly did whatever
was the direct opposite of what the others found appealing, he did not have to
look within or call his own desires into question. His desire was thus formed in
direct opposition to the other’s desire, in a decidedly neurotic style.

Gender relations, gender trouble.
Adopting a stance in direct opposition to the other also resonates with the
structure of some of Buck’s familial relationships. For instance, he described
being in many ways “the opposite” of his sister. Rachel, six years Buck’s senior,
was his only sibling. Buck made a point of telling me during the initial
consultation that the family nickname for his sister used to be something like
“Raging Rachel,”6 which he said he related to her gender: assuming that what
made girls different from boys was that they were angry. He described Rachel as
“mainstream,” and clarified that while she was interested in “practical things”
like “hard sciences” and math, he was more interested in “ethereal things” like
languages and philosophy. He noted, with an air of superiority, that those are
subjects that most people are not interested in. Explaining more about how he
and Rachel were opposites, he told me that everything seemed to be easy for

6

This is, of course, a pseudonym, but I have preserved the flavor of Buck’s sister’s actual nickname.
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Rachel, who apparently had always excelled at work or academics without
putting forth much effort, while Buck felt as though nothing had ever been easy
for him, even when he put forth considerable effort. Buck also commented that
although his sister had always done whatever their parents wanted her to do, he
had not always been so acquiescent. Buck felt his parents always compared
them to one another, and that while his father had a clear preference for Rachel,
Buck always felt he was his mother’s favorite.
Regardless, perhaps partly because of them competing for their parents’
attention, Buck described his relationship with his sister as always having been
contentious. He recounted numerous verbal arguments and physical fights they
had gotten into. Buck seemed to have been the one initiating the physical fights,
while Rachel seemed to have been the one initiating most of the verbal
arguments and teasing. Buck gave the example that when they were children,
Rachel would often put snails all over her body and then do a little dance in front
of him, attempting to frighten him. It worked. According to Buck’s account, that
would “freak [him] out” and he would “scream and cry like a girl and run
away.” Buck told me he felt his sister has always had the “upper hand” in their
relationship.
Questions of gender identification and sexual position came up not only
with regard to his relationship with his sister, but also within several other
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contexts. Take, for instance, the rather odd image that Buck reported when I
asked him to describe his first memory. He told me that the first thing that came
to mind was a video of him as a two-year-old, in which he was dressed up in one
of his mother’s long shirts, which was cinched around his waist with an army
belt, and that he was also carrying a “fake sword” and wearing a fireman’s
helmet that he always thought resembled a crown. In many ways, Buck seemed
to identify with his mother more than his father (and that meant that his phallic,
masculine status was in question). He described his father as “too rigid” and as
someone who didn’t “care about ethereal things” and had a “wooden mind.” In
relation to that phrase, note that, as I described earlier, the family fortune came
from something about building materials, and that Buck seemed to oppose his
father’s “wooden,” practical, and financial interests to his own “ethereal”
interests, things more in line with languages and philosophy. The phallic
references inherent in describing his father as “wooden” are also obvious. Buck
complained of his father’s “faux machismo,” which Buck felt represented his
attempt to portray a rather flimsy façade of being an alpha male—someone
interested in sports, politics, and business. Buck seemed to consider those
merely stereotypical markers of masculinity, hence his accusation that his father
displayed “faux machismo.”
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Buck described his relationship with his father as alternately “distant” and
“explosive.” Buck told me that for the most part, he simply avoided interacting
with his father. On the occasions when they did interact, usually when there was
something important to be discussed, such as Buck’s status in school, their
relationship became explosive and verbal arguments inevitably ensued. Buck
said he felt he had “power issues” with men in general, most particularly his
father. (I will address Buck’s relationship with his mother in more detail in a
later section of this chapter, in which I address the oral drive, and I will also
return to Buck’s relationship with his father in a section on the anal drive.)
Gender and sexuality seemed to have been particularly problematic for
Buck during high school. He told me that during that time he began to worry
that he might be gay. He said he saw the other boys beginning to take an interest
in girls but that he did not share their curiosity, which led him to think that there
might be “something wrong” with him. Eventually, he said, the other kids tried
to “use that against” him—knowing that he was sensitive to issues about his
sexuality—and make fun of him, telling him that everyone “knew for sure” that
he was gay. Buck told me that he became very “defensive” and tried to deal with
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his insecurity by putting up a front and telling everyone, very angrily, that he
would “beat the gay out of [his] own son.”7
During his senior year of high school, Buck became interested in Maureen,
a girl who always sat in the bleachers during his sports practices. Although he
had admired her from afar for several months, he had never spoken to her at all.
He finally asked one of his teammates to approach her to find out if she might be
interested in dating him. Apparently Maureen rejected him on the spot, which
Buck characterized as a major narcissistic wound for him. He said he became
“enraged”8 and then began “stalking her,” following her around school and
watching her when she didn’t know he was there. At the time of treatment,
Maureen was dating one of Buck’s closest friends, and Buck continued to
maintain an impossible relationship with her, asexually admiring her while
knowing he couldn’t have her because she was someone else’s girlfriend. That is
also a feature of obsessional neurosis—the other man’s desire for a woman
generates his desire, precisely as an impossible desire.

7

Buck referring to the idea of having a son of his own some day, and one who might be homosexual,
suggests a possible underlying fantasy that his father would beat any signs of homosexuality out of him.
Buck stating that he would “beat the gay out of” his son is thus faux machismo covering his fear of being
homosexual.
8
Later in this chapter I will address some possible connections that might have existed on an unconscious
level for Buck regarding rage and sexuality. For now, I’ll raise the following speculations: Did he refuse
to seek out relationships with women on a sexual or even romantic level because he might perceive their
sexuality to be “raging?” Perhaps it would mean he would be eclipsed? Would it take on the value of
annihilatory fusion?
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Buck also told me that his history of relationships was extremely limited.
He said he had only ever gone on three dates with someone—a girl whom he
dated about a year prior to starting therapy. He said he broke things off with her
when she began to give him the impression that she wanted to move towards
having a sexual relationship with him. He told me that he became “intimidated”
by the fact that she was much more sexually experienced than he was and that
she wanted sexual contact from him (which he hadn’t been giving her). He said
he eventually broke up with her due to those issues, and he added that he never
even knew what to do doing during kissing. Was Buck identifying with his
father? He had described his father as “the most asexual person” he had ever
encountered and reported that his parents literally never touched one another, at
least as far as he had seen. Regardless, even in the way in which Buck
approached Maureen during high school, it was clear that he frequently set
himself up for failure. It should have been obvious that she was attending every
sports practice due to her being either interested in or dating another boy there,
which could hardly have escaped Buck’s notice! Indeed, setting himself up for
failure had become a major motif in Buck’s life, which was also evident in his
addictions, which I will now address in more detail.
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“Gaping holes” and the role of emptiness: Orality and the drive.
The clinic in which I was treating Buck required the administration of
psychological assessment measures within the first few sessions of a new case. I
chose to give Buck a Rorschach test. Many of his card responses were
interesting, in that he kept seeing what he referred to as “gaping holes” in many
of the inkblot images, as well as images suggestive of either annihilatory or
symbiotic fusion. I will touch on a few of these to highlight what light they shed
on the role of emptiness and the oral drive in some of his addictions.
Indeed, the most predominant theme that came up over the course of
Buck’s Rorschach had to do with feeling engulfed. Linked with that dynamic
was the recurrence of his apperceptions of holes and open mouths in the blots.
For instance, Buck said he felt one blot was “either Darth Vader or a woman”
(which we can easily see as being suggestive of parental figures), and in both of
those responses he focused in particular on how the character’s mouth was open
and seemed to him to be a “gaping hole.” Similarly, in his response to another
card, Buck again focused on a mouth detail and said that the blot appeared to be
an image of a “grandmother with no teeth.” He said she had a weak chin and
that because she had neither teeth nor dentures, she must have had an over- or
underbite such that her mouth was “always a little bit open.” He then said that
he had another thought about what else that blot image could be: the jaws of a
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shark. He noted in particular the structure of what he imagined was a chin and a
“strong looking link” at a certain place where the upper and lower portions of
the jaw met. Again he commented that what he saw was an open mouth,
“another gaping hole.” There seemed to be an interesting shift across those two
apperceptions for that card. The first—the grandmother with no teeth—seemed
to be associated for him with weak figures (perhaps weak parental figures,
fantasized or real) who would not pose to him any threat of engulfment. The
second—the shark jaw—was in stark contrast to the first one, and seemed to
radiate for him a feeling of being threatened with engulfment. In response to
another card’s inkblot, Buck noted the “scary” feeling he got from the image, and
talked about his sense that the image was of a mouth or head descending on
someone and eating his or her head and upper body.
I asked Buck to tell me more about the times when he felt engulfed, and
he told me that he often felt that way around his parents. He lamented that his
parents didn’t understand him and wanted to be very involved in his life, which
he found “invasive.” He complained that since they didn’t trust him they kept
him trapped in their house like a prisoner or a child—“holed up.” What is
evident in all of this is an interesting connection between the role of the oral
drive for Buck and his experience that when the Other became present to him—
had a role in his life and claimed to want something of him—he felt suffocated
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and devoured. Imagining the Other’s desire to be obliterating is a radical form of
the obsessive’s experience of aphanisis, to be sure!
In considering the possible role of the oral drive in Buck’s case, it is
important to more closely address Buck’s relationship his mother. That is
particularly important in light of my hypothesis that many of Buck’s addictive
patterns had to do with attempting to defeat the father by attempting to defeat
himself. My sense was that his addictions were Oedipally-structured symptoms
by which he was trying to hold on to a piece of lost enjoyment associated with
the mother (and with the “golden age” of the family’s stay in England) and
through which defeating the father would take on the value of winning the
mother.
In speaking about the history of what he himself referred to as his “oral
fixation,” Buck described often feeling compelled to put “anything at all” into his
mouth. He described getting satisfaction from putting a whole host of things
into his mouth, such as pens, paperclips, food, cigarettes, alcohol, and Mountain
Dew. Buck also said that whatever he put into his mouth became a “pacifier.” I
punctuated that by echoing his word choice back to him with the inflection of a
question—“Pacifier?”—and I asked him what came to mind. He told me that
when he was a young child he used to wrap the fingers of one of his hands
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around his mother’s curls9 while sucking the thumb of his other hand. He told
me that later he would fall asleep by sucking the thumb on one hand and
touching the fur on his teddy bear with the other hand, which is of course an
interesting variation on the original configuration with his mother. His excessive
consumption of alcohol, food, and cigarettes can be understood as attempts to
recover a lost enjoyment connected to his relationship with his mother.
Coincidentally enough, Buck also described himself as “obsessive” about
how he put things into his mouth, particularly in reference to his drinking. He
said he felt the primary function of his drinking was not so much to get drunk,
per se, but rather to pass the time. He said he often felt the need to do
something, to put anything at all in his mouth, in order to pass the time. Perhaps
this can be likened to the obsessional’s relation to time (and issues of
procrastination in Buck’s particular case)—in the logic of waiting for the
father/master to die in order to then live. Perhaps Buck’s experience of time
within the context of the oral drive had to do with an attempt to recover a little
leftover jouissance in the meantime—akin to a mere pittance of the pleasure of a
golden age.
The connection between Buck’s experience of the oral drive and his
longing for a sort of golden age also related to his passion for coffee. Indeed,

9

Note that just as the drive circles around a hole, so too does a curl encircle a hole or emptiness!
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coffee was very serious business to Buck. “I love coffee like some people love
wine,” he declared. As he leaned back against the couch and stared off into the
distance, he began telling me about his passion for coffee. As he did so, I was
reminded of how the character of J. Peterman on Seinfeld acts when he begins
telling stories of his exotic adventures in far-off lands, with extremely poetic
descriptions that he then includes as copy in his catalogue to sell eclectic and
creatively named products such as “The Urban Sombrero” and “The Himalayan
Walking Boot.” Buck began telling me about his love of dark roast coffee above
all the other roasts. “You can taste the earth, where it came from,” he cooed.
Appearing to conjure up a sense memory of how coffee profoundly transported
him somewhere, he described in minute detail the characteristics of a particular
kind of roast that gets left out on the ground somewhere in the heart of Africa for
several weeks. He described how in the process of the beans laying atop the
African soil, they became exposed to the elements—they were rained on, “kissed
by the wind,” and “pressed up tight against the soil, all cuddled up.” Buck also
described how the coffee beans were also on top of animal manure in some
places and absorbed some of that as well. He commented on how “perfect” it
seemed to him that the coffee beans that were exposed to manure became,
through the process of time passing as the beans were exposed to the elements,
the most delectable ones. Seeming fascinated by the process, he noted:
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“Everything goes into everything else.” He continued: “It’s beautiful, symbiotic,
everything becomes one in perfect harmony.” Buck fell silent for several
moments, staring off into the distance with his lips slightly apart.
While the idea of a sort of fusion towards One was evident in Buck’s
homage to coffee, it is worth considering the relation between wholes and holes.
Buck characterized his relation to coffee in terms of wholeness and plenitude, but
there was also another way in which he took in all of his oral objects—running
the gamut from soda, to alcohol, to paperclips—excessively and repeatedly in
response to his experience of a hole, and of being lacking. That is, he was trying
to fill a hole and overcome his lack. For instance, in speaking of his impulses to
devour large quantities of food or drink, Buck recounted a time when he forced
himself to finish a gigantic hamburger and a towering pile of fries even though
he wasn’t actually hungry at the time. When I asked him about why he ate
everything in spite of not being hungry, he had a slip of the tongue and instead
of saying “Because I want it to be empty” (he told me he meant to refer to
wanting the plate to be empty) he said “Because I wanted to not be empty.”
As I described in Chapter 2, Lacan formulated that the drive circles
around an emptiness—a void or a hole—and that the subject takes objects in an
(impossible) attempt to fill that emptiness. Jouissance and an attempt at
recovering it is what is at stake. Buck’s pattern of taking in oral objects certainly
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relates to some jouissance associated with the scene of sucking his thumb while
touching his mother’s hair. While the structure of Buck’s relationship with his
mother seemed primary with regard to orality and the drive, turning now to the
question of the role of anality and the drive will return us to Buck’s relationship
with his father.

“Piles and piles of shit”: Anality and the drive.
It is high time (pun intended, as we will see) that Buck’s anger is
examined in more detail. During the initial consultation, Buck warned me that
he had gotten into a number of verbal and physical altercations10 in his day and
announced with decidedly flat affect: “I am a very angry person.” Indeed, when
he was in elementary school and was resentful of being made fun of by the other
kids, he literally wrote up a list of people that he wanted to kill—a more extreme
form of a mental “shit list,” to be sure! Apparently, that list became the subject of
several PTA meetings.
Later in the therapy Buck also told me about his resentment about having
been rejected by his top-choice university, which I will refer to as “Golden
University.” He said he believed that if only he would have submitted college
applications one year earlier, he would have been accepted into Golden

10

Interestingly enough, the physical altercations seemed to be limited to his relationship with his sister.
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University. He said he was sure that he was only rejected because that school
raised the SAT score requirements the year he applied, which resulted in him
falling just short of being accepted—falling just below the newly-raised bar.
Buck told me how “insulted” he was by that rejection and how much of an
impact it had on him when he then had to go to what he felt was a less desirable
school, which I will refer to as “Crap College.” Having to enroll in Crap College
took on, for Buck, the meaning of being rejected by the academic big Other—not
being seen as valuable or worthy, and thus cast out like a little turd. Reacting in
his typical style, Buck became resentful and depressed—angry at the Other but
also angry at himself, two gestures which for him were never easily separable.
Nevertheless, instead of expressing his anger directly or doing something more
constructive with his feelings, he acted out in his self-destructive patterns—
drinking, smoking, using various substances, and procrastinating with his
academic work to the point of compromising his academic career—which might
be understood as bearing anger towards himself and others in one fell swoop
(anger at others being turned around on himself).
When Buck moved back home after losing his scholarship during his
freshman year at Crap College, his parents became watchdogs, much to Buck’s
dismay. They didn’t trust that he wouldn’t fall into his addictions again, as he
had done at Crap College, and they also wanted to keep a close eye on his
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academic progress at his new university, where his parents wanted him to be,
which I will refer to as “The University of the Other’s Desire.” Indeed, Buck’s
father was the primary figure who nagged him about his academic work. That
was not entirely unfounded, in that during his sophomore year at The University
of the Other’s Desire Buck took incompletes in four of his classes and managed
just barely to pass the others. He was sent a letter by the Dean warning him that
his status at the University was precarious and that disciplinary action would
ensue if he didn’t get his grades back on track.
Once Buck’s father got wind of that letter, he began to “nag” Buck and to
insist on getting weekly updates from him about his academic progress. Buck
responded by becoming even more angry and resentful and by procrastinating
even more. As Buck complained about his father’s invasiveness and his own
procrastination, he said, referring to his father, “He sees my education as his. I
can’t do any work . . . because it’s for him!” Buck’s education became something
his father was so “invested” in—both in terms of his concern and also in footing
the entire bill for his schooling—that on some level, for Buck, his education
became his father’s. Buck thus perceived his education to be a little turd/gift that
he retentively didn’t want to hand over to the Other. Buck exclaimed, “An
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education should be yours!”11 He continued, railing against his parents, “They
see it as an investment so they feel they can intervene and intrude at any time.
But they should just leave me alone!” Buck’s procrastinating and keeping
himself on the verge of getting kicked out of school was, in fact, a way of wasting
his father’s money, and really making him pay. That seemed to be yet another
example of Buck’s pattern, which started early in his childhood, of wasting
things. Nevertheless, although he complained about his father badgering him
about his academics, Buck’s procrastinating and wasting his education was a
way of keeping his father quite actively invested and invasive. Perhaps it was a
way of keeping him alive while perpetually—and angrily—waiting for him to
die, to “go.”
As Buck complained of his parents’ invasiveness and their excessive
“investment” in his education, he said, “They want to help me but I wish they’d
just let me go.” Wishing they would let him “go” might have a double
meaning—wishing that his parents would let him be separate and autonomous,
and also wishing that they could let him “go” (experience “relief” such that he
would no longer be angry and retentive/withholding). Buck’s retentiveness kept
his anger directed at himself and kept him unable to “produce” anything.
Moreover, as Buck described the connection between his parents considering his
11

Buck’s use of the “general you” in that statement can be thought of as a slip. Rather than saying
something like, “An education should be one’s own,” he said “yours”—the Other’s.
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education to be theirs and his procrastination and inability to take action to
resolve his academic situation, he said, “It puts me in a hole.” He said he reacted
by becoming depressed and wanting to “sleep and do nothing.” In that sense,
Buck became identified with feces, withdrawn into a death-like dark anal lair.
Indeed, during a later session Buck declared that thinking about his academic
debacle made him feel “like a piece of shit.” As he reflected on how he felt
overwhelmed by what seemed to be an endless hole that he might not be able to
get out of, he slowly sunk deeper into the couch as he gestured with his arms
above his head, in a pose like Atlas, saying, “It feels like I’m under piles and piles
of shit.” A connection between Buck’s procrastination, depression, and addiction
suggests itself in Buck’s pattern of becoming depressed about his academic
situation, for instance—then procrastinating even more, and then turning to
alcohol or drugs to help “pass the time,” which only exacerbated his situation of
perpetually and passive-aggressively waiting. Buck had to keep his father alive
in order to have an enemy/rival and yet he also wanted to kill his father.
Nevertheless, an important question is: what was Buck waiting for? His
self-destructive patterns seemed on the one hand to be inverted attempts to
destroy the father, but ones that were very strongly directed at the self. Perhaps
that was an example of the classic feature of obsessional neurosis—waiting for
the master/father to die. Still, it is equally plausible that Buck’s perpetual
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waiting actually had the function of keeping the master/father alive. For
example, not finishing his course work certainly kept his father angry and
involved. Perhaps in making his situation worse and worse he was
unconsciously waiting to be punished by his father. That is, perhaps he was
trying to get himself yelled at by his father—note the grammatical form of the
drive—and was deriving jouissance from that.
I already described how Buck often suppressed his anger, but there were
also times when his anger emerged—explosively. That is, Buck’s anger
sometimes exploded either through his mouth or through his bowels. At times
he had angry verbal outbursts with his father, which often followed long periods
of avoiding his father—that is, periods during which his anger built
incrementally (excrementally?) and then eventually reached a peak and erupted
in a volatile argument. Buck even described experiencing “an adrenaline rush, a
high” when he was very angry and also when he saw that his father was very
angry. Being angry with his father seemed to bring both Buck and his father to
life. Interestingly, Buck was, regarding his choice of substances, more inclined
towards uppers, which further indicates that there was an excitement value—
jouissance—he experienced in getting himself wound up to a certain explosive
point. That explosiveness was not only verbal but also physical at times. For
instance, his mixing of substances and his excessive consumption of coffee
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during his freshman year at Crap College affected his bowels; he would be
flatulent and severely constipated for days before switching over to diarrhea.
Perhaps those explosive moments—of anger expressed through a verbal
altercation or explosive diarrhea—were precisely the moments when Buck felt
most alive.

The end of therapy: How Buck ultimately “went.”
Although Buck seemed to be enthusiastic and engaged in therapy, and
even said that he felt he should have come to the clinic a long time ago, his
attendance, like other aspects of his functioning, was irregular. He also began to
accumulate a debt with the clinic as a result of falling behind with his session
payments. He was holding on. Moreover, whenever we had a particularly good
or productive session, he would invariably miss the next one and begin
backtracking from the initial progress we had made.
His unwillingness to pay his bill, in spite of numerous attempts to address
this with him from different angles, became one of the primary “obstacles” to the
therapy. I got the impression that he was pushing me to become angry with him,
perhaps even to threaten him or terminate the therapy entirely. He told me that
he could not pay his bill in spite of our having agreed upon a very low session
fee so that he could manage to pay it on his own. I had the sense that he was
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repeating with me the same situation he put his parents in: pushing them to
anger and perhaps even threats, which I pointed out to him, and drew a
connection between that and the dynamics of his relationship with his father and
his professors, but to no avail. In hindsight, perhaps the fee should have been set
at the price of a bottle of Banker’s Club vodka!
During what became one of our last sessions, Buck told me that he wanted
to stop coming to therapy. He said he wanted to do so in order to “focus all of
[his] energy” on his academic work and on raising his grades so that he would
not lose his scholarship, which is what his Dean had threatened. He thanked me
and said that the therapy had helped him to “feel much better” and that he felt a
lot of “relief.”
However, Buck discontinued the therapy prematurely, in my opinion, as I
felt there was more that could have been worked on. I’m reminded of Buck’s
complaint about his parents: “They want to help me but I wish they’d just let me
go.” Perhaps, in a way, I let Buck “go” (though I encouraged him to stay) within
the therapy itself, in a way that brought him some relief—that is, he no longer
had to hold on to all of his anger, including how it was wrapped up in his
addictions, and instead his anger was given verbal expression. Although the
therapy was certainly not as “productive”—according to my definition,
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anyway—as my other cases, perhaps what Buck wanted to “produce” was
something a bit different and he had found enough relief.
It is possible that Buck’s decision to stop treatment coincided was a shift
such that, in choosing to focus on his academics, he no longer wanted to waste
his father’s money (by risking flunking out of school) and provoke such anger in
him. It is possible that by the end of treatment Buck’s jouissance was a bit less
wrapped up in that circuit. Buck’s drinking did reduce, though only somewhat.
He drank a bit less excessively than he had at the beginning of treatment and he
drank mainly beer—no longer did he mention Banker’s Club vodka. However,
he continued to smoke cigarettes excessively (seeming to derive quite a bit of
jouissance out of sneaking around to smoke) and continued to drink quite a bit of
coffee, by anyone’s standards, though he reduced his consumption by about
half.12 At the end of treatment he was not using any drugs, to the best of my
knowledge.
Perhaps those marked minor shifts with regard to Buck’s position in
relation to the drive. His jouissance linked to his father and the Banker’s Club
vodka was somewhat less pervasive but I felt his drive-related attempts to regain
and hold onto a jouissance associated with his mother remained unchanged.
Perhaps there was a shift of emphasis from father to mother. The therapy did

12

Three pots of coffee per day still seems excessive!
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not go far enough to effect more substantive change with regard to the drive. I
had the sense that the early phase of the work, which involved calling attention
to and highlighting the signifiers related to his addictions and patterns of drive
satisfactions, could have progressed, if Buck had remained in treatment, into a
later phase which might have had more of an impact on the drive roots of his
addictions. Buck stayed long enough to work on the level of the symbolic but
not to experience adequate working through, which would have involved a more
substantive impact on the real drive roots of his addictions. Perhaps Buck
reached a point at which he had experienced some change but was unwilling to
part with any more of his jouissance. He certainly had a pattern of holding on.
What became clear was that Buck did at least begin viewing his education as
more his than his father’s. Ultimately, I do not know if Buck’s decision to stop
treatment and focus on his academic work resulted in his getting a better handle
on his education or enjoying wasting it yet again. I wasn’t sure if, in leaving the
therapy, he was coming or going.
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Chapter 4
ADDICTION AND OBSESSIONAL NEUROSIS
The Color of Emptiness:
Re-enacting the Paternal Metaphor—From Darkness to Light—In an Attempt
to Transform “Mamajuana” into Ordinary Marijuana

Introduction
In this chapter, I will present a case study of “Phil,” an obsessional
neurotic patient who was addicted to marijuana. I will address how Phil may
have been re-enacting the paternal metaphor through his drug use (and the
circumstances that got played out around that) in an attempt to reassure himself
of the Name-of-the-Father—that is, to reassure himself of limits against being
devoured by an incestuous jouissance associated with his mother as that
jouissance related to his smoking. I will also discuss Phil’s perception of the
Other’s demand and how his drug use related to that. I will describe how by the
end of treatment Phil’s drug use changed and he seemed to experience jouissance
differently, such that his position in relation to the drive shifted into something
much more livable.
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The Drive’s “Color of Emptiness”
In “On Freud’s ‘Trieb’ and the Psychoanalyst’s Desire,” Lacan makes a
brief reference to the drive’s “color of emptiness” (couleur de vide). Referring to
the drive, Lacan notes that
Its sexual coloring, so categorically maintained by Freud as its most
central feature, is the color of emptiness: suspended in the light of a gap.
That gap is the gap desire encounters at the limits imposed upon it by the
principle ironically referred to as the “pleasure principle,” the latter being
related to a reality which, indeed, is but the field of praxis here. (Lacan,
1964/2006, p. 722)
Although in that brief text Lacan does not unpack the multiple meanings
suggested by the concept of the drive’s color of emptiness,1 I will focus in
particular on how, as Lacan reminds us beginning in Seminar XI, and as I
described in Chapter 2, the jouissance of the drive is attributable to its circling
around an object beyond which is a semblant of emptiness. That is, there is
always a gap between the objects of the drive and the lost satisfaction for which
the subsequent objects stand in as always insufficient replacements. Insofar as it

1

Given the scope of this chapter, I will not address some of the other ways to understand the drive having a
“color of emptiness”—for instance, as in Lacan’s idea of there being no sexual relation, and that there is a
gap between the partner and the object a. Considered from that vantage point, the drive’s satisfaction thus
again takes on the color (the quality) of a gap or emptiness.
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is irreparably lost, that place of satisfaction is always empty, and the drive’s
attempts to recover some jouissance take on the color of emptiness.
As I explained in Chapter 2, the drive is not satisfied by the tangible object
itself. The satisfaction of the drive has more to do with the particular position
the various drive objects occupy and thus how they are implicated in the drive’s
circuit. It is also important to keep this in mind when we think about addictions,
in that the drive satisfaction of an addiction is often about much more than the
drug object in and of itself. Indeed, as I hope to demonstrate through the
presentation of the case to follow, a symptom such as an addiction can have a
real core, around which there is a symbolic structure. Freud describes this as
being “like the grain of sand around which an oyster forms its pearl” (Freud,
1953a/1905[1901], p. 83). Utilizing techniques that aim at working with the
symbolic structure around the real of the drive is crucial if the analytic process is
to have an effect on the real of the drive through the symbolic medium of speech.
That is the case because, fundamentally, “psychoanalysis has but one medium:
the patient’s speech” (Lacan, 1953/2006 p. 206).
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Case History: Phil
Clinical background.
A patient whom I will refer to as Phil was in his early thirties when I
began working with him. The therapy took place over the course of a few
months, until he relocated to a different state. In spite of his age, he had not yet
graduated college and had a rather low-level, low-paying job. From the first
session, Phil identified himself as an “addict” and stated that he wanted to quit
smoking marijuana “cold turkey.” He explained that over the years his drug use
had fluctuated, but that his smoking was now “out of control.” He had made at
least six separate attempts to pursue university studies in various schools across
the country, but every time his drug use would become so problematic as to
eclipse his studies, and he would wind up flunking out of school. Phil told me
that he kept trying to complete college because “that was what people did” but I
did not get the impression that he was actually trying to learn anything, enrich
his life, or reap the rewards or pride that might go along with receiving a degree;
indeed, Phil did not desire symbolic achievements. He even asserted that his
inability to complete a college degree was his way of “keeping adulthood at
bay.” Phil told me that rather than pursuing an “adult life” in which he had a
well-paying job, complete with a wife, family, and white picket fence, he had
always been much more interested in drugs, marijuana in particular.
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With regard to his drug use, Phil told me that he only smoked at night (a
detail which is important, as we will see a bit further on) but smoked quite a bit
of marijuana and felt he couldn’t stop himself. He explained that over the years
his drug use had fluctuated, but that, by the time he decided to seek treatment,
his smoking had gotten “out of control.” Phil told me that he smoked a
substantial amount of marijuana every night, even though he didn’t want to.
That is, at the end of the day, although he claimed that he wanted to resist the
urge to smoke, he felt he never could. He always found himself in the same
predicament of giving in to the urge, always magnetically drawn to a situation
he supposedly wished to, but felt he could not, resist. Referring to his drug use,
he stated: “It has to be stopped.” Note the passive form—“It has to be
stopped”—as opposed to something like “I have to stop smoking.” By saying “it
has to be stopped,” Phil presented himself as someone who felt helpless,
desperate, and trapped—caught within an arbitrary order that supposedly had
power over him.

On beginning the treatment.
It is evident in the grammatical form of Phil’s complaint—“it has to be
stopped”—that he positioned himself as appealing to an Other for help. As I
would soon find out, Phil often put himself in situations in which it was in fact
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someone else who might become responsible for putting a stop to his drug use.
During our first session in particular, it became clear that Phil was hoping that I
would put an end to his drug use. Indeed, he told me that prior to coming to the
clinic where I was working he had assumed that being in treatment would mean
that he would be required to stop using drugs. When I told him that this was not
a requirement, and that he would be the one to make choices about his drug use,
he was disappointed and stated that he felt he wouldn’t be able to “give it up”
unless someone else “forced” him to do so. He told me that he was going to try
to quit “cold turkey,” but that if he couldn’t handle that yet, he would at least
commit himself to not smoking on the nights prior to our sessions. Note that this
was a plan that Phil himself came up with and was, in fact, able to hold himself
to for the duration of the treatment—not once did he smoke the night before an
appointment.

From demand to desire.
When Phil asked me to demand that he stop smoking, I refused to satisfy
his demand. My choice was driven by many general reasons having to do with
establishing an analytic rather than a behavioral approach to the treatment of
addictions, which I will discuss further in Chapter 8, as well as my sense that in
Phil’s particular case I should not allow his familiar dynamic of taking a passive
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position—getting others to do things for him—to be repeated. Instead, it was
something to be analyzed.
Such reasoning was based on the particularities of Phil’s situation, but my
choices were also strongly guided by Lacan’s assertion that clinicians should not
satisfy their patients’ demands. Indeed, Lacan insists that “Demand is exactly
what is bracketed in analysis, it being ruled out that the analyst satisfy any of the
subject’s demands” (Lacan, 1961/2006, p. 535). One reason why the analyst
should not satisfy the patient’s demands is that the patient may be demanding
something he or she does not actually want: “Just because people ask you for
something doesn’t mean that’s what they really want you to give them” (Lacan,
1965-1966, Class of March 23, 1966). What is more, Lacan equates every demand,
at its core, with a demand for love. Not only was Phil making a demand, he was
demanding that I make a demand of him (i.e., demanding that I demand that he
stop smoking). Lacan clarifies that there are good reasons for sustaining and not
satisfying patients’ demands: “the analyst is he who sustains demand, not, as
people say, to frustrate the subject, but in order to allow the signifiers with which
the latter’s frustration is bound up to reappear” (Lacan, 1961/2006, p. 516). The
point is also to allow the patient’s desire to emerge—to direct the treatment
towards the patient’s recognition of the truth of his or her desire (Lacan,
1961/2006, p. 535).
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Phil’s demand for a separation from the drug was certainly not the same
as a demand for analysis2 or increased insight through therapy, and so I made an
intervention during the first session in an attempt to incite desire and curiosity—
that is, to try to create the initial conditions for beginning analytic work. I told
Phil that I would not necessarily endorse getting him to stop smoking as the only
goal of our work. I told him that I wanted the two of us to work together to
explore the various facets of what might be involved in his drug use as well as
many other aspects of his life. I emphasized that there was no direct or preset
route to him experiencing changes related to his issues with marijuana and that
therapy would involve exploring many things, not just his drug use. Essentially,
I asked him to agree to speak—and to speak not only about his issues with
marijuana, but also about things like his dreams, fantasies, and relationships. I
thus asked him to trade demand for desire and speech. I addressed all of this
and said to Phil, “Let’s explore it,” and he agreed.
My intervention also stemmed from my belief that a simple and
instantaneous separation from the drug, even if he could maintain abstinence,
would not automatically be equivalent to a modification of his position in
relation to desire and jouissance and would be more like a short circuiting of the
goals and effects of sustained analytic work. The particular way in which I
2

The hope is that patients will eventually give up their specific demands and instead pursue the open-ended
process of analysis on its own terms and by exploring questions they have about themselves.
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formulated this intervention, asking Phil to agree that we would try to “explore
it,” was deliberately ambiguous, touching perhaps on the way in which “it”
might have been as yet unsymbolized, and drawing together snippets of his own
discourse during that first session.

A jouissance crisis.
Although Phil entered treatment with a complaint about his drug use, he
reported two rather different modes of using, and it was a very specific
experience associated with one type of drug use that he wanted to bring to an
end. He told me that sometimes he would smoke marijuana and have the sense
that he was still in control of his drug use, even though he felt the amount of
marijuana he smoked was excessive. Other times, however, he felt his smoking
reached a point at which he was “no longer in control,” and it was this latter type
of drug experience that became the central focus of his complaint. Indeed, Phil
said he was seeking treatment because something about the smoking in which he
was “no longer in control” had become “just too much” and, in his account,
caused a great deal of suffering. Phil was no longer enjoying what he had once
enjoyed; his smoking had become painful. Phil entered treatment in the midst of
a jouissance crisis. Fink notes that “The moment at which someone seeks
therapy can thus be understood as one in which a breakdown occurs in that
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person’s favorite or habitual way of obtaining jouissance. It is a ‘jouissance
crisis.’ The jouissance-providing symptom is not working anymore or has been
jeopardized” (Fink, 1997, p. 9).
Phil told me that the “highest highs” of smoking actually became anxietyinducing for him. What is striking about Phil’s reported experience of feeling
anxious when he smoked and reached those “highest highs” is that something
other than or more than the drug itself seemed to be operative. He described a
viscous feeling, like “dark syrup” oozing throughout him, that accompanied
these “highest highs” and made him feel “suffocated” or “consumed.” He
described this experience of being overwhelmed by a diffuse and nebulous
darkness rather poetically, noting, “The darkness comes over me, seeps throughout
every pore of my being, like little dark cloud fingers slowly creeping through my body,
taking over, possessing me entirely: body, mind, and soul.” Phil claimed that the
drug experience associated with darkness overtaking him had become so
problematic that he felt it was urgent that it be stopped immediately, stating,
“It’s killing me.” Marijuana is generally not considered to be one of the most
addictive substances, much less a drug that kills, and so when Phil spoke of his
drug use and noted, “It’s killing me” and “It has to be stopped,” I didn’t assume
that “it” was necessarily marijuana itself. Instead, I suspended judgment and left
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room for the various possible meanings of “it” to emerge more fully throughout
our work.
The first clue came with his first slip of the tongue, when instead of saying
marijuana, he said “mamajuana.” Not surprisingly, I asked Phil to tell me about
his mother.

Intervening between the real and the symbolic.
Over the next couple of months of sessions, Phil spoke in detail about how
he and his mother had always been extremely close, and that their close bond
began when she was pregnant with him. Phil attributed this early bond to the
one thing that made his mother’s pregnancy with him different from her
pregnancy with his older brother (Phil’s only sibling): she smoked cigarettes
while she was pregnant with Phil. He explained that his mother had always
been a “chain smoker,” but that when she was pregnant with his brother, she
was able to quit “cold turkey,” as he put it. Note that this is also the wording he
used during the first session to describe how he himself wanted to quit smoking
marijuana, which, as we shall see, begins to suggest an interesting connection
between his smoking marijuana and his mother’s smoking cigarettes.
Over the course of those initial months of sessions, Phil’s discourse was
quite thick and heavy, like the dark viscosity he associated with his experience of
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the excessive “highest highs” of smoking marijuana. He spoke rapidly, said
quite a bit—in great detail—and was very anxious. Further, Phil spoke about
things in such a way that his suffering was very present in his speech. That is,
his speech was jouissance-laden—it seemed almost to carry the heaviness of his
suffering and keep him stuck there, not moving forward. He tried to make
meaning out of everything, and brought a profusion of words, but in a way that
backfired. It perhaps backfired precisely because his speech was not getting at
something (a different kind of level of meaning) and remained stuck in being a
replication of the excessiveness inherent in his suffering rather than being able to
move beyond it.
During another session, several months into the therapy, Phil spoke about
two topics: his mother’s smoking when she was pregnant with him and also the
fact that he had recently been feeling even more overwhelmed while smoking
marijuana. Phil told me his grandparents explained his mother’s inability to stop
smoking while she was pregnant with him by saying, “With you, she just
couldn’t stop it.” “She just couldn’t stop it?” I echoed. Phil said, “Well, I meant
to say that my grandparents said, ‘She just couldn’t stop.’” Sticking close to the
specificity of what he actually said,3 I said to Phil, “But you said ‘she just couldn’t

3

Lacanian analysis focuses not on what the patient “meant” to say—which would mean privileging their
conscious, egoic discourse—but rather what the patient actually said.
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stop it,’ and during our first session you said, ‘It has to be stopped,’ and ‘It’s
killing me. . . . ’” I then ended the session by saying “Let’s stop there for today.”
My impression was that Phil seemed to feel there was something limitless
about his mother’s smoking as well as his own, and that something about the
absence of limits in both of those areas was contributing to his suffering. That is,
contributing to his jouissance crisis. During the session following the one just
described, Phil reported that a great sense of relief had set in for him following
where we ended the session. Throughout the therapy, he had described going
through life always with a “dark cloud” looming right over his head, which he
felt was a mix of anxiety, depression, and a sense of impending doom. The dark
cloud also might be associated with marijuana or cigarette smoke as well as
Phil’s description of the “little dark cloud fingers” that he felt seized him when
he smoked. Smoke had also been equated with Phil’s mother and then with
himself, which I will elaborate on a bit further on in this chapter.
Phil said that after that session, the cloud seemed to be a bit further away,
and he felt he suddenly had much more “room to breathe.” He said he wasn’t
sure why he was feeling that way, but that it felt good. The intervention had
created space for him—let in air, so to speak. The intervention also affected him
on the level of his body, as it gave his body more possibility—possibility for
something different through his breathing: taking in fresh air as opposed to toxic
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smoke. That felt sense of having more room to breathe coincided with a
diminishment of Phil’s anxiety. That makes sense in light of Lacan’s notion of
anxiety as a lack of lack4 (something being too present or suffocating being what
generates anxiety). Phil began to experience more lack, more of a space of desire,
which he experienced as anxiety-relieving. Later in the therapy he told me that
since that session he no longer experienced the “dark cloud” that he had always
felt to be looming overhead. It was a crucial shift for him.
Perhaps my intervention, in splicing together pieces of his discourse and
scanding5 the session as I did, might have hit the real6 and also had an anxietyrelieving, limiting function. Something about linking Phil’s comments (“She just
couldn’t stop it;” “It has to be stopped;” and “It’s killing me”), and then ending
the session, allowed those words to resonate and created an impact. Scansion
can also be implemented in such a way as to also have an impact on the drive:
“it is insofar as the analyst intervenes by scanding the patient’s discourse that an
adjustment occurs in the pulsation of the rim through which the being that
resides just shy of it must flow” (Lacan, 1966/2006, p. 716). I hoped also to create

4

See Lacan’s Seminar X.
To “scand” is the verb form of “scansion.” “Scansion”—stemming from the French verb “scander,”
which means “to scan”—is a way in which the clinician can punctuate something or make a kind of cut,
such as by ending a session on a particular note that the clinician hopes will resonate for the patient and
have an impact (often an impact beyond meaning).
6
Fink explains that the analyst’s interpretation can “hit the real” by aiming at what the patient had been
unable to say and circling around repeatedly while also not reducing it or tying it down to any one meaning
through an unambiguous interpretation. The analyst’s intervention can hit the real by having an impact on
or shifting this cycle of circling around some piece of the real: something that had been unspoken or
unsymbolized. (Fink, 1997, pp. 47-49).
5
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something of a limit precisely where he was speaking of the suffering that the
absence of limits brought him—to demonstrate, beyond the creation of a
meaning effect, that what was supposedly killing him could be mitigated, that
there was something that could be done about “it.” Perhaps this intervention
also began to open up a space through which a process of symbolization could
unfold—a space similar to the gap that he felt had suddenly emerged between
him and the dark cloud.
My intervention went in the direction of the cause of desire, the real, and
brought an absence of meaning. That is consistent with Lacan’s assertion that “it
is not the effect of meaning that is operative in interpretation, but rather the
articulation in the symptom of signifiers (without any meaning at all) that have
gotten caught up in it” (Lacan, 1960/2006, p. 714). Affecting the drive roots of a
symptom involves shaking up, without reducing to any one meaning, the
signifiers that became encoded with the jouissance of the symptom. Lacan’s
guidelines on how to assess the value of clinical interventions thus place the
emphasis on the results or impact of the intervention, rather than something like
the patient’s ego wrapping around a new meaning. He posits that an
intervention’s “well-foundedness . . . [can only be] gauged by the material that
emerges afterward” (Lacan, 1961/2006, p. 497). Interventions are aimed at
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advancing the analytic process—spurring the work along and getting the patient
to say more.
Indeed, during the session that followed the one described above, Phil
responded by bringing not more meaning but rather a hole in his knowledge.
An important shift had occurred, which proved to be productive in that much
important material began to emerge. Phil posed two questions: he expressed
curiosity as to why his mother smoked while she was pregnant with him as well
as why he himself continued to smoke so much in spite of the distress that
resulted for him when he did.7 The emergence of a question in the early stages of
any therapy or analysis is always an important marker, particularly with
obsessional patients, signaling a hysterization of discourse, an acknowledgment
of lack (e.g., a hole in knowledge) and a relation to an Other. Lacan even
suggests that “The structure of a neurosis is essentially a question” (Lacan, 19551956/1993, p. 174). The hysteric’s question, which focuses on sex/gender identity,
is “Am I a man or a woman?” (or: “What does it mean to be a woman?”), and the
obsessional’s question, a more existential one, is “Am I dead or alive?”
Resonances of the obsessional’s question having to do with Phil’s case will be
addressed a bit further on.

7

As we will see, these indeed turned out to be related.
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Since a question implies a lack—fundamentally not knowing something,
having a lack or gap in one’s knowledge—and desire is based on lack, Phil
beginning to pose questions also marked a shift from demand to desire. Phil had
been demanding, among other things, that someone put a stop to his drug use,
but, instead, he questioned his drug use. Essentially, jouissance was questioned,
talked about, rather than just lived out in a painful cycle of repetition.
Perhaps my interventions during the previous session put a limit on Phil’s
style of thinking, which gave meaning to everything, and so his limitless
jouissance saw a limit for the first time. My intervention stopped a certain kind
of push towards the endless creation of meaning—a limitless flow of more and
more meaning that seemed to lack a stopping point. My intervention aimed less
at meaning-making than at having an impact. This is consistent with Lacan’s
claim that “Analytic interpretation is not designed to be understood, it is
designed to make waves” (Lacan, 1976, p. 35).
My intervention also allowed the symbolic to be present where previously
only jouissance had been present. That is, prior to the session of note, Phil had
used signifiers to be continually suffocated, to dwell in the toxic smoke of
jouissance. The way he spoke of his drug use and his distress was such that both
remained ever-present, unmodified, and even perpetuated by his cycle of being
overwhelmed, seeing himself as helpless and trapped in an arbitrary order that
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had power over him, and lacking an end point to that. His style of drug use also
had made jouissance continually present, involving as it did a sexualized (even
incestuous on the level of fantasy) relation to his mother. What is more, his
smoking involved a kind of imagined abuse by his mother, in that her choice to
smoke so much while she was pregnant with him resulted in Phil being born
dangerously underweight (he almost died). Those are nothing other than the
layers of the death drive. Phil’s horror at being consumed by his mother,
overwhelmed by the jouissance of the smoke that was “too much,” was the real
core of his symptom/addiction—the grain of sand—around which was a rather
elaborate symbolic structure, the oyster as in Freud’s analogy. Both the real core
and the symbolic structure of the symptom are intertwined and interventions
must target both in order to affect the drive.
Accordingly, my interventions were poised between the symbolic and the
real, between meaning and non-meaning. What followed in the sessions
thereafter was that jouissance was taken up by way of the symbolic. Jouissance
became a question for Phil. Jouissance became something that could be talked
about in a different way, and perhaps modified, rather than something that
could only be lived out in a painful way—which involved his suffocation—and
in seemingly endless, limitless, cycles of repetition. The advent of Phil’s
questions during that stage of the treatment opened the door to working on the
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fundamental fantasy. His questions touched precisely on how his drug use
related to jouissance and his relation to his mother, and thus the fundamental
fantasy itself.

“Mamajuana” and the fundamental fantasy.
The multiple resonances involving the connections between Phil’s and his
mother’s smoking became even more amplified after the session in which I lined
up Phil’s comments (“She just couldn’t stop it;” “It has to be stopped;” and “It’s
killing me”) and then ended the session. Indeed, the material that unfolded in
the subsequent sessions seemed to give voice to the multiple layers of “it,” as
both something and nothing. Over the course of several sessions, one layer
unfurled as Phil began discussing his sense that his mother’s supposed inability
to stop smoking while she was pregnant with him meant that he must have
occupied a unique role of being, paradoxically, both very strongly loved and also
very strongly hated. Obsessionals often complain that their mothers loved them
too much. One thing underlying that is an Oedipal fantasy of a privileged love
relation with the mother.
First, as for being very strongly loved, Phil speculated that the fact that his
mother smoked with him and not with his brother made him special, and made
their relationship oddly privileged from the start. Phil told me he imagined how
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he must have been such a happy baby in the womb, as he pictured himself being
encircled by his mother’s cigarette smoke. He would often joke about that,
saying that being in a smoky womb must have been quite “trippy.” He likened
that to being high at a party and losing oneself in the drugs and music: “It’s like
when you’re dancing around and you’re so buzzed and immersed in the drugs
and the music that everything melds into one—you can’t tell the difference
between you, the music, and the drugs.” His mother’s inability to quit smoking
took on the value of love in that Phil imagined that his mother’s smoke was a
liminal entity that unified them.
Phil took the idea of being united with his mother through the smoke as
evidence of his mother’s love but also of her hatred. That is, precisely because
she couldn’t “stop it,” and smoked so much during the pregnancy, Phil was born
dangerously underweight and quite frail; he almost died. Phil concluded that his
mother’s intense love/hate for him, manifested in her smoking while she was
pregnant with him, was quite literally almost lethal.
Phil may have interpreted his almost dying as an infant—which he
attributed to his mother’s excessive smoking during the pregnancy—as what his
mother desired or even demanded. That takes us back to Lacan’s ideas about the
role of the Other’s demand in the drive. In Chapter 2, I explained Lacan’s notion
that neurotics often mistake the Other’s desire for demand. One possible way to
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interpret Phil’s perception of his mother’s demand is: “Fuse with me in the
smoky womb and suffocate: die.” Since the neurotic takes the Other’s demand
as the object in fantasy, Lacan aligns his formula of the drive (S/ ◊ D) with his
formula of fantasy (S/ ◊ a). The Other’s demand determines the drive object,
which is taken up in the structure of fantasy. Phil’s fundamental fantasy might
be read as something like: to be suffocated by (fused with, devoured by)
someone or something associated with his mother (and thus smoke and
darkness).8 In that manner, Phil’s fantasy can be written in a formula as
something like:
(S/ ◊ “Mamajuana”).
Instead of being positioned in relation to object a as cause of desire, Phil was
positioned in relation to something that went beyond the pleasure principle: a
more toxic jouissance that he was steeped in.9 That was a relation based on
jouissance rather than desire, such that his status as a lacking/desiring subject
was eclipsed, a more correct depiction of which might be:
(S ◊ “Mamajuana”).

8

Within the next few pages, I will describe Phil’s attraction to women with “dark” features.
It could be objected that Phil situated himself as object a for his mother’s jouissance, in that he imagined
her to be a mother who enjoyed suffocating her child. That would indicate a hysterical structure.
Nevertheless, I believe what is most operative in his case is the structuring role of his perception of the
Other’s demand and how, through his smoking, he repeated for himself a kind of satisfaction—though
experienced sometimes as suffering—that involved his imagined experience of recovering or
reexperiencing some jouissance he imagined to have experienced with his mother prior to the imposition of
the Name-of-the-Father. That, along with all of the other features of obsession within the case, in my
opinion places Phil within the category of obsessional neurosis.
9
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Phil’s fantasy was reduced to the Other’s demand, and thus to the drive.
Although Phil felt his mother’s smoking was evidence of her love and her
hatred, jouissance was also a central factor. That is, she couldn’t stop smoking
because she enjoyed it so much, and was hooked. Since he imagined that the
smoke became continuous with him in the womb, Phil logically aligned himself
with the substance his mother enjoyed—if she enjoyed the smoke, and he was
unified with the smoke, then she enjoyed him. “It went from her mouth to all
around me,” Phil said of the smoke. Note that this is a rather striking reversal.
In Phil’s own associations and language, it works both ways: smoke as him and
his mother, and smoke as evidence of both his mother’s love and his mother’s
hatred. In the therapy, Phil provided the two terms of the syllogism: 1)
mom=smoke, and 2) Phil=smoke, and in the work I drew the conclusion: then 3)
Phil and mom are one. That was a kind of overcoming of repression: reinstating
the broken thought connection10 which had been severed but re-enacted in the
drive circuit of his addiction. As Lacan attests, “The neurotic symptom acts as a
language that enables repression to be expressed. This is precisely what enables
us to grasp the fact that repression and the return of the repressed are one and
the same thing, the front and back of a single process” (Lacan, 1955-1956/1993, p.
60).

10

As I described earlier, Freud formulates repression as a severing of affect and thought.
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Resonances of the oral drive predominated in Phil’s case. That was
evident in Phil’s fantasies of being incorporated by the mother from the start
(fused with her in the smoky womb). The oral drive was also manifested
through Phil’s drug use: inhaling and thus incorporating something associated
with the mother through his smoking marijuana later in life, fearing being
devoured or overtaken by it. Note that I am referring to the oral drive not just
because Phil’s smoking involved his oral cavity, but principally because the
logical (and grammatical) structure of what we refer to as the oral drive—
devouring and being devoured—operated in the case.
What is more, Phil’s oral drive manifested as a death drive. That was due
to the close association of the jouissance of his excessive smoking—
“mamajuana”—with fantasies of being absorbed in the mother’s womb. Further,
it tipped into a death drive because of Phil’s interpretation of the Other’s
demand as being: “die.” The obsessional’s question—“Am I dead or alive?”—
thus took on a very particular meaning in Phil’s case in that the drive satisfaction
of his addiction aimed at a lethal immersion in das Ding, so to speak, and thus at
his own effacement.
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Dark.
I have been laying the groundwork to elaborate on several points of
connection between three key elements in the case: Phil’s mother, darkness, and
jouissance. First, recall Phil’s description of the darkness he felt overtook him
during the “highest highs” (the excessive jouissance) of smoking: “The darkness
comes over me, seeps throughout every pore of my being, like little dark cloud
fingers slowly creeping through my body, taking over, possessing me entirely:
body, mind, and soul.” His description of the drug-related high associated with
darkness (marijuana/ “mamajuana” smoke) strongly resonated with the
enjoyment he imagined he derived from being unified with his mother in the
dark and smoky womb.
During his childhood, Phil’s mother made him watch horror films with
her in the darkness of their living room when his father was away on business
trips. With a gleam in his eye Phil told me that as they watched horror films, he
and his mother would engage in “intimate touching.” The jouissance associated
with the excitement of his intimate embraces with his mother in the dark recalls
his description of the darkness that overcame him when he smoked. His
mother’s nicotine-stained fingers—memories of which he described numerous
times throughout the therapy—that touched him in the dark were represented
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through his account of marijuana use in which “dark cloud fingers”—fingers
simultaneously associated with darkness and smoke—possessed him.
Another event in which darkness, jouissance, and Phil’s mother were
featured was a primal scene in which Phil caught sight of his mother’s naked
body as she left her bed. He said he was able to decipher the outlines of her
breasts, but that what he saw of her pubic area was “darkness.” He said he was
able to see “everything and nothing.” That can be heard a bit differently:
“Everything there was to see but no thing.” The scene thus related to Phil’s longstanding fear of the dark but also may have contributed to his developing a
specific attraction to women with dark features.
In fact, Phil was attracted only to women who had dark features. The
condition for finding women sexually exciting was that, physically, something
about them had to be dark, such as having dark hair, eyes, or skin. His finding
darkness compelling in women thus took on a rather fetishistic character,
although dark features became more of an object a for Phil than an actual fetish
in the proper sense of the term. This is also an important issue in terms of a
differential diagnosis—this was a case of obsession with perverse features, and
Phil did not, in my opinion, have a perverse structure. The object is symbolically
determined—determined by the signifier—and in Phil’s case it was linked to the
“darkness” associated with the mother’s smoky womb and the “dark cloud
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fingers” associated with his mother’s embraces. Even for Freud, the libidinal
object often has more to do with the signifier than a tangible object in the world.
As he discussed in his “Fetishism” essay, the example of the fetish of Glanz auf
der Nase (shining on the nose, glance at the nose) is grounded in a linguistic
transformation, via an error of translation (Freud, 1927/1961, p. 311).

Between darkness and light: Re-enacting the paternal metaphor.
Although Phil found women with dark features sexually exciting, his
relationships with them never lasted very long. Those relationships were shortlived because he would frequently argue with the women and push them to
break up with him. This also played out in the transference, which is not
surprising—not only because through the transference relationship with the
therapist the subject repeats important dynamics but also because I have dark
hair and eyes. Phil sometimes seemed to experience an erotic transference,
finding something about his relationship with me and/or our work exciting. He
would then sometimes become agitated—excited or even anxious—and push me
to end the treatment. For instance, he would say that everything that was
happening in the therapy was clearly “too much” and that maybe I couldn’t
“handle it,” couldn’t help him, and that I should just end the treatment. More
grist for the analytic mill.
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One way to interpret Phil’s pattern of pushing girlfriends to break up with
him is that perhaps Phil was trying to get the women to lay down the law—to
say no to his verbal abuse and enact a sort of mini-castration by breaking up with
him. If that were applicable to what Phil was doing with the women—getting
them to lay down the law—that might have been more indicative of a perverse
structure. However, although Phil pushed the women’s buttons, he was usually
the one who ended the relationships. Perhaps, then, through his repeatedly
breaking up with women with dark features, Phil was trying to act as his own
Name-of-the-Father and set limits on the maternal figure (the women being
associated with his mother). Phil was repeatedly trying to re-enact or prop up
the paternal metaphor.
With his drug use, too, Phil seemed to seek out and re-enact something
having to do with a limit-setting function. When he reached the anxietyinducing “highest highs” of his drug use, he sought to put an end to that
experience and to limit the excessive jouissance. Phil described his experience of
smoking as first satisfying but then suddenly so excessive that it was utterly
intolerable. As he described it, “I enjoyed it, and then it enjoyed me.” That was
aligned with his fantasy of his mother overtaking and devouring him. Thus the
active form of his position in relation to the oral drive—devouring: ”I enjoyed
it”—was followed by the passive form—to be devoured: “It enjoyed me.” That
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was also a shift from ordinary marijuana use (which had a beginning and an end
and brought a pleasant and tolerable level of enjoyment) to the overload of his
smoking that was associated with “mamajuana” (which was anxiety-inducing,
barely tolerable, and felt limitless).
With his mother Phil shared a kind of excessive jouissance—connected
with being in her womb—through the symbolism of the smoke. In his fantasy,
both of them enjoyed the smoking, which took on a quality of excess: beyond the
pleasure principle. That was the excessive jouissance that he sought to limit,
which he experienced through the “mamajuana” form of his drug use. He
associated such experiences with the feeling of darkness possessing him.
During those “mamajuana” smoking experiences, Phil would often repeat
a sequence of events: leave his apartment, go to something like a convenience
store, and commit petty theft in a manner that made it likely, in his mind, that he
would get caught. Phil imagined that he would get caught for stealing but also
that he would get reprimanded for his drug use. That was the case because he
would smoke quite a bit of marijuana prior to going out stealing, and he
imagined that it would be obvious to onlookers that he had been smoking so
much. Phil often entertained masochistic fantasies about the police finding him
and throwing him in jail—that is, ultimately setting limits to what he
experienced as an overwhelming, seemingly limitless jouissance.
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However, Phil almost never actually got in trouble with the police and
never got caught at all for stealing or smoking. More often than not, he would
test the limits of how much he could get away with—for instance, how many
small items he could abscond with by hiding them under his clothing—but not
actually get caught or reprimanded by the police (or anyone else, for that matter).
A perverse subject would have orchestrated things in such a way as to actually
get caught by the police, as was the case with Gary, a perverse subject I will
discuss in Chapter 5. Whereas perverts live things out in action, neurotics dwell
more often in fantasy rather than action.
That begs the question: Why was Phil repeating the cycle of smoking so
much and then going out to steal, supposedly hoping to get caught for both, if
that cycle didn’t actually result in him getting caught? I already suggested that
Phil was re-enacting something having to do with a limit-setting function and
that he was attempting to get limits set on jouissance. As I described in Chapter
2, Lacan’s formula of the paternal metaphor describes how the instating of the
Name-of-the-Father results in limits being set on das Ding and an incestuous
jouissance with the mother. While I considered Phil to be structurally neurotic—
the Name-of-the-Father was instated for him—he had traces of perversion, as I
have been describing. That may have been attributable to the Name-of-theFather having being imposed in a fragile way—perhaps through things like
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getting the impression that no father was around to separate him from his
mother’s “intimate touches” as they watched horror films in the dark—such that
what he lived out through the cycles of using drugs and trying to get caught by
the police involved attempts to reassure himself of the Name-of-the-Father. That
involved re-enacting the paternal metaphor, which in his particular situation
involved seeking light to cut into darkness and hoping limits would be set to
“mamajuana,”11 which is akin to the signifier making a cut in jouissance through
the operation of the paternal function. The particular form Phil’s re-enactment of
the paternal metaphor took can be reduced to its simplest form and depicted
schematically as:

Light/Name-of-the-Father
________________________
Dark/“Mamajuana”

Reassuring himself of the Name-of-the-Father by way of his re-enactments
of the paternal metaphor also meant reassuring himself that “mamajuana” could
be limited—that there was something that could prevent him from being
devoured by “it.” Lacan describes the Name-of-the-Father as precisely what
intervenes and offers protection against being devoured by the mother, as in a
fantasy of a passive form of the oral drive in which the mother is a voracious
11

Mama wanna: mama wants to be with Phil, fuse with Phil and suffocate him.
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crocodile whose gaping maw threatens one with the ever-present risk of being
devoured:
A huge crocodile in whose jaws you are—that’s the mother. One
never knows what might suddenly come over her and make her shut her
trap. That’s what the mother’s desire is.
Thus, I have tried to explain that there was something reassuring.
. . . There is a roller, made out of stone of course, which is there,
potentially, at the level of her trap, and it acts as a restraint, as a wedge.
It’s what is called the phallus. It’s the roller that shelters you, if, all of a
sudden, she closes it. (Lacan, 1969-1970/2007, p. 112)
Perhaps a fantasy is also evident in Phil’s seeking punishment by the
police (symbolic Others as representatives of the law) after experiencing, through
the “mamajuana” form of his smoking, what he equated with an incestuous
jouissance associated with his mother. This is a variation on the obsessional’s
fantasy of believing himself to be deserving of the father’s punishment for a
privileged relationship with the mother. The way in which Phil gave meaning to
his experiences and lived out cycles of setting limits on an excessive jouissance
supported that fantasy, sustained it. As such, that fantasy had very real effects.
Working with the drive means also working with the fundamental fantasy.
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Nevertheless, the particular ways in which Phil aimed to get limits set to
his drug use revealed ways in which he was re-enacting the paternal metaphor to
reassure himself of the Name-of-the-Father. That was all the more poignant
given the ways in which something about “light” and “yellow” related to
something about Phil’s actual father, which I will discuss in the following
section.

The light of sublimation.
Phil’s frequent fantasies of being caught and punished by the police
always involved a very particular element that came up in several of his
fantasies, dreams, and, as we will see, his creative writing: a yellow light. For
instance, he imagined that the police who would catch and reprimand him for
his drug use would have bright yellow flashlights. Phil even reported a dream in
which he was smoking in a dark basement and then was startled out of his drug
haze by what he described as police outside a basement window, shining the
yellow light of their flashlights into the basement. The yellow light cutting into
darkness also featured in a number of poems he wrote, particularly ones about
the rhythmic flashing of the yellow light of a lighthouse. The yellow light in
these examples took on the value of that which might make a cut in jouissance,
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and set limits to it, perhaps in the style of a paternal function—that is, to cut
through and delimit the overwhelming darkness.
Yellow also seemed to have struck a chord with Phil as he told me during
one session about his favorite song, entitled “Yellow.” He was compelled by the
fact that the songwriter wrote the song with gaps—unfinished lines of lyrics—
within it. He told me that the songwriter knew there was something
fundamentally missing from the song because of that, but that he couldn’t come
up with the right word to end each unfinished line. The songwriter was sitting
at a desk, struggling to figure out what was missing from the song, and looked
over and noticed the phone book next to him: the Yellow Pages. He then
decided to insert the word “yellow” into each of the incomplete portions of the
lyrics and to make “Yellow” the title of the song, to boot. Phil told me that this
delighted him because there was no inherent meaning to the word yellow or
why it was in the song, but that it simply completed the song. He called it “an
example of pure creativity.”
What makes Phil’s preoccupation with yellow even more striking relates
to a way in which it is connected with a name associated with both his father and
himself, in their native tongue. As such, something about “yellow” might have
functioned as a signifier that could establish a place for Phil, albeit a fragile one,
within a paternal lineage, in that it was associated with both his father and
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himself. For Phil, “yellow” became associated with desire and a name of his
father, while “dark” became associated with jouissance and his mother. Perhaps,
then, “yellow” represented something akin to a signifier acting as support of
castration, something like a version of a Name-of-the-Father.
Furthermore, both “yellow” and “dark” came together in the structure of
Phil’s addictions and drive satisfactions. This was so in that Phil sought to limit
the excessive jouissance that for him was often associated with “darkness” of
various sorts, with indications of “yellow” or light. For instance, the incestuous
jouissance associated with his mother’s caresses in the dark and the feeling of
dark cloud fingers possessing him or dark syrup oozing throughout him during
his “highest highs” of smoking marijuana became limited, whether in fantasy or
action, through maneuvers like trying to get caught by the police, whom he
associated with the yellow light of their flashlights. Even the highly charged
arguments with women with dark features, during which he would become so
angry that he felt he would “black out,” were a way he tried to get limits set, by
pushing the women’s buttons, test the limits of the relationship, and ultimately
breaking up with them. That is, Phil sought breathing room, space, like shining
light into darkness.
A number of Phil’s artistic productions also reflected an attempt to
symbolize something about “dark” and “yellow.” For instance, the flashing

145

yellow light of a lighthouse became a recurring theme in many of the poems he
wrote. The yellow light of the lighthouse is similar to many of the other
instances of “yellow,” such as the yellow light of the police flashlights. Such
representations may suggest the symbolization of an invocation to the Other, a
wish to re-enact the paternal function, tantamount to asking for someone to be
able to shine a light into the darkness of jouissance with his mother during the
horror films, and set limits to it, thus creating breathing room and a space
wherein his own desire might come to the fore. The repetition of the coming and
going of the beam of the lighthouse even parallels the coming and going of Phil’s
father, with his frequent traveling, throughout Phil’s childhood. Like his writing
of poetry, the analytic work, through a process that includes opening up a space
of symbolization, can create an effect of sublimation. Over the course of our
work, Phil’s anxiety and drug use reduced significantly. Indeed, speech can
bring a bit of light to darkness.

A modification of jouissance: From “mamajuana” to ordinary marijuana.
Although the treatment was cut short due to Phil moving to a different
state, substantial improvements had already been made. By the end of the
treatment, Phil was generally much less anxious, felt “freer,” and had more
“room to breathe.” He was in far less mental and physical distress overall.
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As I described earlier in this chapter, after the session in which I linked
Phil’s comments about “it”—“She just couldn’t stop it,” “It has to be stopped,”
and “It’s killing me”—and then ended the session at that point, he reported that
a significant impact had been made. Part of that involved no longer experiencing
the “dark cloud” looming overhead, as I described earlier.
Such interventions operate not on the level of clear and unequivocal
meaning-making, but rather on the level of utilizing equivocation and the
polyvalence of the signifier as a way of reorganizing multiple levels that coalesce
in a symptom, such as an addiction, and having an impact on it. I have seen such
analytic techniques create these oddly transformative effects on a number of
occasions with a variety of patients. Lacan insists that interpretations that
attempt to reduce symptoms to specific meanings miss the opportunity to shake
up the drive roots of the symptom, which lie not in sense but in the clustering of
signifiers invested with jouissance. Further, we should keep in mind Lacan’s
insistence that “it is only through equivocation that interpretation operates.
There must be something in the signifier that resonates” (Lacan, 1975-1976/2005,
p. 17, as qtd. in Fink 2007) and that “analytic interpretation is not designed to be
understood, it is designed to make waves” (Lacan, 1976, p. 35).
That highlights an important difference between Freud and Lacan
regarding clinical technique. Freud argues that “therapy works by transforming

147

what is unconscious into what is conscious” and that “as soon as the unconscious
processes concerned [in symptom formation] have become conscious, the
symptom must disappear” (Freud, 1916-1917/1963, p. 347/346). Lacan has a
different take:
It is false to think that an analysis comes to a successful denouement
because the analysand consciously realizes something. . . . What is at
stake is not a move from an unconscious level . . . to the conscious level,
the seat of clarity, by some mysterious elevator. What is at stake is not,
in fact, a move to consciousness but, rather, to speech . . . and that speech
must be heard by someone. (Lacan, 2001, p. 139-140, as qtd. in Fink 2007)
That is, putting things into words isn’t enough; work must also target the level of
the signifier’s “’literating’ structure” (Lacan, 1957/2006 p. 424) and thus attempt
to fundamentally reorganize the subject’s position in relation to the drive.
Indeed, the ways in which Phil’s drug use changed over the course of
treatment suggest that his position in relation to the drive might have been
modified. Phil did continue to occasionally smoke marijuana. However, he
eventually no longer experienced the sense of being overwhelmed, in a kind of
anxious agony that led him to seek limit-setting through his re-enacting the
paternal metaphor (going out stealing and hoping to get caught, as I described).
He no longer felt overtaken or devoured by what emerged for him through
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smoking. For Phil, “mamajuana” became what I will refer to as “ordinary
marijuana.”
I believe that marked a shift within the structure of how he was living out
the drive, such that there was a shift from oral to phallic jouissance. By that I
mean to refer to the logic of the drive and its structure. That is, the oral drive
relates to fantasies of devouring and being devoured, and seems limitless and
overtaking. The phallic drive, on the other hand, relates to an experience of
jouissance that is more limited and has a beginning and an end—a start and a
stopping point, like tumescence and detumescence, or like the Name-of-theFather as a stopping point, a fundamental marker of limit.
At the beginning of this chapter I referred to a passage from Lacan’s “On
Freud’s ‘Trieb’ and the Psychoanalyst’s Desire,” in which Lacan describes the
drive having a “color of emptiness: suspended in the light of a gap. That gap is
the gap desire encounters at the limits imposed upon it by the principle ironically
referred to as the ‘pleasure principle’” (Lacan, 1964/2006, p. 722). One way in
which the ideas inherent in Lacan’s reference apply to Phil’s case is in terms of
his re-enacting of the paternal metaphor, which involved the alternation of
“dark” and “light” and was his way of trying to reassure himself of the Name-ofthe-Father. To do so was to seek a space or gap of desire, and light, and to shift
from a painful jouissance beyond the pleasure principle to something more
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manageable, more livable. Ultimately, that is what he was able to accomplish
through the process of the treatment itself, but through language, through
speech. Indeed, the treatment involving working with, and having an impact on,
the signifiers that were invested with jouissance for Phil, and in so doing created
both more of a space of desire and also a modification within his experience of
the drive, as I described.
It seems fitting to conclude by referring to Freud’s example of a child who
was afraid of the dark and said, “If someone speaks, it gets lighter” (Freud, SE
XVI, p. 407). Although the child in Freud’s example longs for his mother, the
light Phil longed for seemed instead to be associated with a father, perhaps a
reassurance of the Name-of-the-Father. Accordingly, the jouissance or drive
satisfaction at work in Phil’s addiction took on its color from, and fell somewhere
in the gap between, the play of “dark” and “light,” and indeed in the alternation
between them.
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Chapter 5
ADDICTION AND PERVERSION
A Thief is Being Beaten

Introduction
In this chapter, I will present the case of “Gary,” a structurally perverse
subject who had a history of drug and alcohol addiction which then shifted to a
kind of addiction to shoplifting, according to Gary’s description. Although he
was clean at the time when he sought treatment, I viewed the structure of his
addiction to nevertheless be fully intact. I will describe how his shoplifting and
criminal activities functioned as attempts to enact castration and bring the Other
into existence, and to metaphorically (and sometimes literally) get himself
beaten. In describing the latter, I will rely on Freud’s ideas from his essay “’A
Child is Being Beaten’: A Contribution to the Study of the Origin of the Sexual
Perversions.”

On Perversion
Since there are so few cases of perversion written from a Lacanian
perspective, I hope the case presentation in this chapter will highlight certain
important features of the perverse structure, while also paying heed to the
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specificity of the structure as it shows itself in Gary’s addictions. In turning now
to the case, we should also be attentive to Lacan’s reminders that “Perversion is
indeed something articulate, interpretable, analyzable, and on precisely the same
level as neurosis” (Lacan, 1959/1982, p. 16) and also that “Perversion does not
appear as the pure and simple manifestation of a drive, but it turns out to be
related to a dialectical context which is as subtle, as composite, as rich in
compromise, as ambiguous as a neurosis” (Lacan, 1957-1958/1998, p. 230-231, as
qtd. in Nobus, 2000).
To move on now to a brief consideration of Lacan’s structural diagnostic
category of perversion, note that while neurosis is governed by the mechanism of
repression, the essential differential feature of perversion is that it is governed by
the form of negation that Freud and Lacan refer to as disavowal. Simply put,
whereas the neurotic initially accepts or takes in some thought, experience, or
portion of reality only to repress it and put it out of mind later on (and Lacan
specifies that this has to do with a thought about the subject’s own drives), the
pervert instead disavows or denies some aspect of reality. Freud puts this in
terms of a disavowal of a perception of the female genitals (and a belief in the
maternal phallus), which we can understand as leading to issues around sexual
difference. Lacan formulates disavowal as the perverse subject’s denial or
refusal to accept a paternal castration threat (indeed, that threat is often never
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posed at all in perversion). The paternal function has not been fully instated for
the perverse subject—the father has not fully intervened between or separated
mother and child. The mother’s lack is thus not symbolized, and the child who
comes to develop a perverse psychic structure is taken as her imaginary phallus,
or that which can satisfy her and fulfill her needs. The result is that the perverse
subject can be prone to experiencing anxiety (Lacan formulates anxiety as a lack
of lack) and generating anxiety in others (perhaps trying to push the other
person to bring about a mini-castration and thus bring relief of anxiety to the
perverse subject).
Since the father’s role as symbolic separator (the paternal function or
Name-of-the-Father) needs shoring up in perversion, the perverse subject
engages in attempts to bring the law into being—to get the law laid down—as a
way of making the Other exist, thus propping up the paternal function. This
often manifests itself, as was the case for Gary, in frequent instances of
shoplifting or getting into trouble with the law, thus getting himself sanctioned
by judicial Others. Fink articulates the pervert’s disavowal and the dynamics
and behavior that result from it:
I know full well that my father hasn’t forced me to give up my mother
and the jouissance I take in her presence (real and/or imagined in
fantasy), hasn’t exacted the ‘pound of flesh,’ but I’m going to stage such
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an exaction or forcing with someone who stands in for him; I’ll make
that person pronounce the law. (Fink, 1997, p. 170)
The pervert has not fully undergone a sacrifice of jouissance, which results in
later attempts to act that out by getting the law laid down (bringing the Other
into existence).
Given these dynamics, a clinician working with a perverse subject should
anticipate that the patient is likely to cause anxiety in the clinician and flaunt his
crimes and seedy behavior as an attempt to get the clinician to symbolically
castrate him, to bring the Other into being by getting the Other to lay down the
law. In working with Gary, being attuned to and anticipating such dynamics
enabled me to direct the treatment so as to avoid being pushed into the position
of symbolic castrator, and instead to begin drawing Gary into the analytic
work—for instance, by exploring myriad unconscious formations. I focused in
particular on how Gary’s addiction fit into his pattern of trying to enact
castration, to get the law laid down. Before addressing how his addiction
manifested itself through variations in the grammatical structure of a beating
fantasy (which I will use Freud’s work on “A Child is Being Beaten” to explicate)
I will first review some of Gary’s family history and trace the development of his
addiction.
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Case History: Gary
Clinical background.
Gary, a Caucasian man in his mid-forties, sought treatment because he
was feeling anxious, depressed, and suicidal. Although he had a long history of
addiction to cocaine and alcohol (as well as other drugs on occasion), at the time
of treatment he had been clean for several months. Nevertheless, he was in a
great deal of distress. During the initial consultation, he told me that he was
seeking treatment because he wanted to “locate the emptiness the drugs once
filled.”
At the beginning of treatment, Gary was single and living with his
mother. He had had one long-term but unsatisfying relationship with a woman
(with whom he had a daughter, who was generally not in contact with Gary) and
several sexual relationships with men. He was unemployed and, due to having a
criminal record, had been having trouble finding work. A few months into the
treatment, Gary disclosed that he had been imprisoned on two or three
occasions, for the sexual assault of a child as well as various other crimes.
For about a year and a half, Gary and I met twice-weekly for sessions.
Our work ended when I left the clinic and referred him to another clinician.
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Overview of Gary’s addictions.
At the beginning of the treatment, Gary told me that although he was
currently not using any drugs or alcohol, he had a very severe and long-standing
history of addiction. During the initial consultation, Gary declared that the last
time he used cocaine he wound up hospitalized and almost died.
Gary endorsed alcohol, cocaine, and heroin as his substances of choice.
He told me that his first experience of inebriation dated back to when he was
eleven or twelve years old. As a teenager, he continued to drink very heavily
(primarily hard alcohol), even to the point of losing consciousness on several
occasions. He also began using cocaine as an adolescent and heroin as a young
adult. His drinking and drug use continued in its severity throughout his
adulthood and ceased only when he was incarcerated (between his mid- to latethirties and early forties) and no longer had access to drugs or alcohol. He was
able to maintain his sobriety after he was released from prison; nevertheless,
when he began treatment with me I considered the structure of his addiction to
be fully intact in spite of the fact that he was not using drugs or alcohol.
The central element that Gary played out through his cycles of drug and
alcohol addiction was trying to get caught by the police or punished by various
male authority figures, or symbolic Others. Once he was no longer using drugs
or alcohol he simply reenacted that very same structure through shoplifting.

156

That is, he felt unable to stop shoplifting and derived a great deal of jouissance
from the excitement of trying to steal and risk getting caught by the police (the
same dynamics that he lived out through his drug and alcohol use). Gary
sometimes even referred to himself as a “shopaholic” and was able to recognize
that his addiction shifted from drugs and alcohol to shoplifting. Gary told me
that he would steal at least one item each time he went into any kind of store or
even newspaper stands, and that he stole myriad items such that there did not
seem to be any particular meaning behind what he stole. What was most salient
was that he would shoplift whenever he could and that he kept pushing the
limits of what he could steal and how many of each item he could steal, to the
point of getting into trouble with the police for his shoplifting.
An important diagnostic difference between Gary and Phil (whose
addiction, as I described in Chapter 4, functioned as an attempt to reassure
himself of the Name-of-the-Father) is that although Phil pushed limits to risk
getting caught and punished by the police, he never actually allowed things to
reach that point. Gary, on the other hand, did, and even wound up in jail for
multiple crimes. As I stated in Chapter 4, Phil was neurotic but was trying to
reassure himself of the Name-of-the-Father through the specific patterns he lived
out with his addictions. Gary, however, was structurally perverse and was
trying not to reassure himself of the Name-of-the-Father (indeed, it was never
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fully instated at all) but rather to enact castration and bring the Other into
existence.
For Gary, getting into trouble with the police for his drug or alcohol use or
other crimes, which ranged from petty theft to much more serious crimes such as
sexual assault (which occurred while he was using), took the form of
symbolically being beaten by a father figure. This is central to his perverse
structure, in that through his addictions—whether alcohol, drugs, or
shoplifting—he lived out a drive pattern such that he got himself beaten, got the
law laid down, and enacted castration. I will describe this in more detail a few
pages further on, when I discuss the course of treatment. For now, it is
important to note that for Gary, becoming a “thief” was quite overdetermined. A
review of several important aspects of his history will illustrate that.

Family history.
Gary grew up in a household comprised of his mother and several sisters.
Gary’s father was generally not in the picture. Gary told me that he never felt
like a part of the family, and he often referred to himself as an “appendage of the
family.”1 Gary described his mother as “cold” and “harsh.” He said his mother
treated him very differently than his sisters and would treat him as “a slave,”

1

This, along with other details of Gary’s childhood, suggests an identification with the imaginary phallus.
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yelling at him constantly and forcing him to do arduous chores but never asking
his sisters to help out around the house. Gary told me that his mother always
said to him, “I have to love you, but I don’t have to like you.”
At some point in his childhood, Gary was told that his father allegedly
killed someone on the day that he was born and that he had been incarcerated
for several years because of that crime. Gary stated that his earliest memory,
dating back to when he was approximately four years old, involved waiting for
his father to come home from jail. Gary told me that he recalled witnessing an
“upsetting” scene when his father came home that day, which was the only day
his father was actually present during his childhood. Gary described his mother
“shuffling” him, along with his sisters, from the first floor of the house to the
basement. Gary said his mother must have done that because she had
anticipated that “something bad was about to happen.” Gary said that his
paternal grandfather, who was visiting the family that day to welcome Gary’s
father home from jail, followed them into the basement and chased Gary’s
mother with a butcher’s knife. Gary said his father then chased both his mother
and grandfather with the butcher’s knife. Gary then wasn’t sure where his
mother went but noted that his father then pushed his grandfather to the floor
and began “beating or assaulting” him. Gary said he hid behind a pillar while
that was occurring but peeked several times, frightened yet enthralled by what
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was occurring. As the story goes, the police were called and his father went right
back to prison.
Gary reported another childhood memory, his description of which
paralleled the memory just described with regard to a few details. Gary told me
that when he was approximately seven or eight years old, he was sexually
molested by his uncle. He said that although he loved to go to the movies, his
mother never took him there, and so he would frequently visit his cousin because
his uncle would take them to the movies. Gary said his uncle would get him
alone and then “push [him] down” and molest him. He said he didn’t know it
was “bad or wrong” until one day his cousin walked in on them—he knew by
his cousin’s face that what was happening was “bad” and he felt “ashamed”
thereafter. “I prostituted myself to go to the movies,” he said.
Later in his life, Gary’s addictions were stuck in a cycle of repetition that
encompassed several details from these scenes, including various kinds of
assaults, getting caught/beaten, and attempting to bring the Other into existence.
This was particularly relevant given the relative absence of a symbolic Other
during his development. Although Gary’s father was not present for the
majority of his childhood, he existed through his mother repeatedly telling him
that his father’s nickname for him was “Thief.” Gary’s mother told him his
father called him that on the day when he returned home from jail, and that he
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continued to refer to Gary as “Thief” whenever he spoke with his mother when
she visited him in prison. Gary’s mother took this a step further and frequently
said to Gary, “You’re a rotten thief, just like your father.” Throughout his life,
and by way of his addictions in particular, Gary became a thief who tried to get
himself beaten.

Course of treatment and results.
An important focus of the treatment was tracing and unpacking the
several staves of the beating fantasy as it functioned for Gary. That is, Gary’s
addictions were intertwined with attempts to get the law laid down. Properly
speaking, it was the latter to which he was truly addicted. His addictions were
caught in repetition because it was through them that he attempted to enact
castration and bring the Other into existence.
In his essay “A Child is Being Beaten,” Freud addresses masochism, the
origin of the perversions, and the prevalence of beating fantasies. He notes that
“It is surprising how often people who seek analytic treatment for hysteria or an
obsessional neurosis confess to having indulged in the phantasy: ‘A child is
being beaten’” (Freud, 1919/1955, p. 179). He outlines the multiple levels and
transformations of the beating fantasy in which, on an unconscious level, beating
and loving are equated. As will become clearer through my discussion of the
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case of Gary, beating fantasies in perversion are different from how they function
in neurosis. In perversion they take the form of something actually lived out
through action—often by way of criminal activities through which the pervert
tries to get himself caught by the authorities—which functions as an attempt to
enact castration. I will make use of Freud’s ideas to address how I formulated
and attempted to work with Gary’s addictions insofar as they were linked with
incurring punishment. That is, through his addictions he got into trouble with
the law and thus metaphorically got himself beaten and punished. Making
himself into a thief and a criminal who would get punished took on the value of
getting himself punished by a paternal symbolic Other, and thus bringing the
Other into existence.
Gary lived out his addictions in a way that was directly related to his
perverse structure in which castration was not fully operative. That is, he
engaged in attempts to complete castration, which took the form of getting high,
engaging in criminal acts, and then metaphorically getting himself beaten
(punished or caught) by the police (symbolic or judicial Others). Moreover, the
jouissance at stake in such patterns was evident in Gary’s description of how he
felt when he got high and then got caught or punished: “like sticking your finger
in a socket or plugging something in and getting an electric shock.” Gary
sometimes literally got himself beaten (he provoked other men until they beat
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him up) and also metaphorically got himself beaten, as in the examples just
described. Freud even emphasized that “punishments and humiliations . . . may
be substituted for the beating itself” (Freud, 1919/1955, p.186).
In the therapy we worked on tracing all manifestations and permutations
of the beating fantasy. This included instances in which Gary tried to get himself
beaten and also, though less often, instances in which Gary tried to
metaphorically or literally beat others. This exemplifies the grammar of the
drive. That is, Lacan finds it useful to conceptualize the drive as having a
grammatical structure, such that beating fantasies can be in the active, passive, or
reflexive voice (to beat, to get oneself beaten, etc.). In that, Lacan relies on
Freud’s indications that the beating fantasy can manifest itself according to
different permutations:
beating-phantasies have a historical development which is by no means
simple, and in the course of which they are changed in most respects
more than once—as regards their relation to the author of the phantasy,
and as regards their object, their content and their significance. (Freud,
1919/1955, p. 184)
An example of how Gary lived out a beating fantasy was that for several
years he engaged in a sexual relationship with a man in which he became the
man’s “sex toy.” Gary allowed him to have rough and often quite violent sex
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with him and let the man literally beat him during sex. During the therapy we
made a connection that that man lived on the same street where Gary, when he
was a child, once saw his father drive up to the house, pause for a second, and
drive away. Other than the day when his father came home from jail and began
“beating or assaulting” his grandfather, that was the only other time Gary saw
his father. Gary’s father’s existence was thus inextricably linked with beatings or
assaults, such that Gary’s sexual relationship with the man just described might
have taken on the meaning of getting himself beaten by his father.
The exploratory work of the therapy allowed Gary to recognize that he
was “setting [him]self up for pain.” Gradually, that was rendered less necessary
and his tendency to metaphorically get himself beaten and to engage in criminal
behaviors, most notably shoplifting, decreased. This went hand-in-hand with
Gary coming to recognize that his addictions were not about what he thought
they were about, insofar as they were really about trying to get the law laid
down. What is more, through the therapeutic work we explored connections
between the structure of those behaviors and the details of the memories
(perhaps screen memories) about Gary’s father “beating or assaulting” his
grandfather and about Gary having been sexually molested by his uncle. Gary
came to acknowledge that through the structure of his cycles of addictions, he
was “punishing himself.” Although given his history of having assaulted a child
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he had very good reasons to punish himself (which, though I am choosing to not
focus on that in this chapter, given its scope, was by no means ignored in the
treatment itself) his larger pattern of seeking punishment predated the child
molestation and related to overarching difficulties on the level of his perverse
structure.
Within the therapy itself, working on the issues around his cycles of
addictions also involved my not allowing Gary to be a “Thief” in the therapy.
That is, when he commented on valuing the therapy a great deal (he once called
it “highway robbery” that he was able to get quality therapy at such an
affordable price), and asking to delay his payment, I insisted that he pay his bill
regularly and in full. When he reported extreme distress and suicidal thoughts
but then wanted to cancel the next session or come in but not allow those issues
to be worked on, I insisted he come in (and did not discuss his feelings with him
by phone—which would have felt like him trying to steal therapy and
sympathies—but simply encouraged him to come in for an appointment so that
we could discuss them). In this manner I did not allow him to be a thief and thus
hoped to shake up that identification for him.
While I worked to help Gary with his addictions and the other things
wrapped up in them—criminal activity, etc.—my work targeted difficulties on
the level of his perverse structure itself. Gary often complained of not having
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much of a personality or identity (he described sometimes feeling like a
“chameleon”). In many ways, that can be understood as the pervert’s inability to
assume a position. Most broadly, Gary seemed to have identified with “Thief,”
as a kind of master signifier or designator of identity, and as a way of
maintaining a link with his father. The therapeutic work aimed to dialectize the
master signifier “Thief”—to mobilize it, loosen its fixity, and make room for
other aspects of his identity or sense of self to emerge or to be created by him.
The language I used with him was chosen so as to emphasize temporality
and changeability—for instance, by using the past tense and formulations such
as, “you had been…” whenever he talked about drugs or crime. I did this to help
create more space within the present for him to come to be in a new way, and to
mobilize different identities for himself. This process also involved, as I began to
describe earlier in this chapter, putting “Thief” in relation to other signifiers,
memories, and meanings. That can be understood as a process of creating new
metaphors—breathing new life into the place where he had been identified with
“Thief” and creating space for new aspects of self to emerge.
That was confirmed by a dream he reported later in the treatment that
indicated that his identity as a “Thief” was dying. This was also interpreted in
the context of his occasional suicidal feelings. Without going into detail about
why I did not consider Gary to be a suicide risk, I will simply note that I
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interpreted his suicidal feelings as indicators of his sense that the thief identity
was dying and that he wasn’t sure who else he could exist as. Following the
sessions that focused on those interpretive moves, Gary reported that he felt
much better, was no longer suicidal, and had a newfound sense of energy and
lightness.
That shift away from his thief identity also marked a shift within the
structure of his addictions. I believe that was evidenced by the sharp decrease in
his behaviors that involved being a criminal and a thief and that involved getting
himself beaten. He shifted from being a thief to instead becoming someone who
invests, works, and earns. Even within the therapy itself, rather than stealing
sympathies, he became engaged in the more creative work of free associating,
making connections, and so on. What is more, by the end of treatment Gary
found a job and was working part-time. Many of his relationships also
improved, particularly his relationship with his friends and his daughter. He
described having a much easier time holding a conversation with people (which
had been excruciating for him prior to treatment). Additionally, Gary told me
during one of our final sessions that he was very grateful for the therapy and that
it was the first time in his life that he had hope and could envision a future for
himself. Although our work was cut short because of my departure from the
clinic, and although Gary did make notable progress through the treatment, I felt
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Gary would benefit from continued therapy. I encouraged him to continue the
work with another clinician, and I have reason to believe that he did.
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Chapter 6
ADDICTION AND PSYCHOSIS
Psychosis and the Drive

Introduction
In order to formulate the psychotic’s relation to the drive, I want first to
discuss two things: the mirror stage and Lacan’s work on the paternal metaphor.
In the cases that follow, I will then discuss how the drive functions in psychotic
patients’ addictions. Although in Chapter 2, I reviewed Lacan’s theory of the
paternal metaphor as it applies to neurosis, in this chapter I will focus on Lacan’s
ideas about how the paternal metaphor fails to operate in psychosis. That will
help us to understand several things, including the psychotic’s relation to his or
her body and the status of the psychotic’s ego. These preliminaries are necessary
in order to formulate strategies for working with addicted psychotic patients that
are different from those used with neurotics.

The Mirror Stage and Psychosis
Lacan’s work on the mirror stage is by now well known in the US. I will
review it quickly with an emphasis on the differences between how the mirror
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stage operates in neurosis and in psychosis. That will help us to understand the
status of the ego for the psychotic and the consequences that result from a nonneurotic passage through that phase of development.
In his first description of the mirror stage in 1949,2 Lacan posits that prior
to that stage a very young child experiences him- or herself as a chaotic jumble of
feelings and perceptions. The mirror image gives a unified form to this chaotic
jumble. The child experiences his or her body in bits in pieces. There is no
distinction, no separation or boundary, between the child and the world. The
whole and unified image in the mirror both organizes the child’s perceptions and
sensations and delimits the boundaries of the child’s body as distinct from the
rest of its world. It thus establishes the “me” and the “not me” (it is a first
delineation of self and other).
When Lacan reformulates the mirror stage in 1960,3 he does two things: 1)
he makes the mirror into more of a metaphor, and 2) he places greater emphasis
on the role of the symbolic order in this developmental moment or phase
(thereby putting more of an emphasis on the dimension of speech and language).
He focuses less on the mirror as a concrete object than on the mirror function that
can be carried out for the child by way of a parent figure. The emphasis shifts
from the role of the image in the mirror to the importance of the role of the
2

See “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience,” in
Écrits.
3
See Lacan’s Seminar VIII.
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Other. In this version of the mirror stage, the child acquires a sense of self by
way of the Other’s recognition. Lacan explains that the child’s image in the
mirror takes on its value or importance because it is ratified (entériné) by the
Other. The Other recognizes and approves of the child, says “yes, that’s you,”
and this allows the child to have a sense of self. Thus the image is libidinally
invested, which allows the child to internalize this sense of self received through
the Other. In this manner, the Other’s recognition and approval of the child
fundamentally contributes to the formation of the child’s ego. That is, this
process results in the child internalizing an image of itself as seen through the
Other.
Note also that in this process the child comes to perceive itself as its
parents do—or at least as the child understands its parents’ perception. This
happens through the dimension of speech and language, through what the
parents say about the child and to the child. The child assumes its parents’ ideals
and goals, and this is the process of assuming what Freud called the ego-ideal.
With the advent of the ego-ideal, there is a stable point outside of the ego that
allows the ego to cohere (the ego forms in relation to the ego-ideal as an
organizing point, so to speak). This also means that the ego holds together; the
ego-ideal keeps it from coming undone or disintegrating. This ego-ideal also
establishes one’s sense of self—a cohesive or stable ego—insofar as it stems from
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the Other’s recognition of a unified self. At this point we can see that this phase
of development involves and brings about more than an imaginary image of
wholeness giving form to a chaotic jumble of sensations; it also involves an
internalized set of symbolically expressed goals, ideals, and expectations, as well
as a relation to an Other. (This does not happen for the psychotic—we’ll come
back to this and address the consequences of this later.)
Here is the next logical step: In this manner (in the neurotic way of
proceeding through the mirror stage), the imaginary is overwritten by the
symbolic. What happens is that the imaginary order is reorganized,
restructured, by the symbolic order according to the way in which the child is
talked about by its parents, the impression or sense of self the child gets from the
way its parents talk about it and present their view of the child through
language. In other words, this symbolically-governed version of the mirror stage
is retroactively imposed on the imaginary version, such that the goals and ideals
are posited as having come from the parent who approvingly held the child up
to the mirror. The imaginary is thus overwritten by the symbolic. With this
rewriting, several things occur: the drives are hierarchized, the subject’s
relationships are not bogged down in the imaginary (the subject is not
imprisoned in the imaginary), and the subject develops a stable sense of self.
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In psychosis, however, the ego-ideal is not established, and the imaginary
is not overwritten by the symbolic. The lack of ego-ideal for the psychotic (and
lack of place within the Other’s desire, which will be discussed further in the
next section) results in a tenuous sense of self. Since in psychosis the imaginary
is not overwritten by the symbolic, and the ego-ideal does not lead to the
creation of a cohesive ego, something else needs to come into play in order to
hold the subject together. Later in his career Lacan formulates his concept of the
sinthome: something that comes to knot the three orders of imaginary, symbolic,
and real together to allow the subject to cohere. In Seminar XXIII Lacan
discusses his belief that James Joyce’s writing functioned as a sinthome that held
his psychical structure together for the duration of his life. Lacan hypothesizes
that during Joyce’s childhood the Name-of-the-Father (discussed in Chapter 7
and also discussed a few pages further on) might not have been operative, but
that his writing became something that filled in for that absence, thus stabilizing
his ego by way of supplementation or suppletion (suppléance)—a way of making
up for or filling in for a lack or deficit—and preventing him from ever
experiencing a psychotic break. In one of the case studies to follow, we will see
how a psychotic woman who believed she was Jesus Christ engaged in a writing
project which seemed to function as a kind of sinthome, insofar as her writing
functioned as an attempt to reconstitute and reorganize her ego after its
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dissolution following a psychotic break. In that chapter I will explain how her
writing was also a fundamental part of her delusional structure and that both
were attempts to reconstitute herself (her ego) after her psychotic break.
In psychosis, the instability of the ego results from the failure of the
imaginary, symbolic, and real to become organized and held together (as they do
in neurosis). We have been examining this in terms of the symbolic’s failure to
overwrite the imaginary. The result is that imaginary relations dominate in
psychosis and are often marked by competitiveness, aggression, and paranoia.
The psychotic gets bogged down in the imaginary rather than having
relationships marked by neurotic features such as striving for symbolic
recognition from authority figures, attempting to achieve, feeling guilt, and
worrying about being good enough, measuring up, and so on.
Lacan warns clinicians not to situate themselves in the position of
symbolic Other in relation to a psychotic patient because this is a position that
has no precedent for the psychotic and an encounter with someone in this
position could potentially destabilize them. Positioning oneself as someone who
might become perceived by the psychotic patient to have some sort of hidden
knowledge about them can trigger paranoia (given their problematic slippage
between inside and outside, this is potentially destabilizing). The clinician
should therefore not indicate that psychotic patients mean more than they say
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(have holes in their knowledge, and so on), because this might cause them to see
the analyst as a persecutor. The clinician risks triggering a break in a psychotic
patient should the clinician situate him- or herself “in a tertiary position in any
relationship that has as its base the imaginary couple” (Lacan, 1959/2006, p. 481).
Lacan is essentially saying that the clinician working with a psychotic patient
must situate him- or herself along the imaginary axis, because the failure of the
symbolic to overwrite the imaginary means that the imaginary is all that is there
to be worked with (and shored up). Although this way of positioning oneself is
sometimes quite risky, it is often the only position available.
Lacan alludes to the imaginary needing to be shored up, propped up,
stabilized, or supplemented in some way in psychosis when he describes how
the psychotic can often stabilize the imaginary by adopting “imaginary crutches”
(Lacan, 1955-1956/1993, p. 205). We can see how a sinthome is indeed something
like an imaginary crutch, something that shores up the psychotic’s ego and thus
the imaginary order. Sometimes the psychotic subject finds ways to take on or
build such crutches for him- or herself and sometimes this occurs through the
work of therapy. Furthermore, as we will see in one of the cases to follow,
shoring up the psychotic’s imaginary is one of the primary techniques in
working with psychotic patients. In fact, psychotics often turn to drugs or
alcohol in an attempt to regulate these breaches if the imaginary crumbles or is
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somehow compromised and reveals the hole in the symbolic that is constitutive
of their psychotic structure.
Why does Lacan warn clinicians who are working with psychotic patients
to not situate themselves along the symbolic axis, in the position of Other? For
the psychotic there is no precedent for a relationship with the big Other. To
explain why will require a brief review of Lacan’s work on the paternal
metaphor. In this chapter I will focus in particular on Lacan’s ideas about the
failure of the paternal function to be instated in psychosis and the consequences
that result from that failure.

The Paternal Function and the Other’s Demand in Psychosis
Castration, paternal metaphor, paternal function, imposition of the Nameof-the-Father—these terms are practically synonymous for Lacan. In short, these
are all ways of referring to the way in which the father comes to set limits on the
mother/child relation. As Fink explains, “the father serves a separating function:
he acts as a bar or barrier between mother and child, refusing to allow the child
to be no more than an extension of the mother” (Fink, 1997, p. 92). The father
acts as agent of prohibition and division or separation and creates a space
wherein the subject can come to be in his or her own right. The mother is then
seen as lacking, desiring, and desiring something beyond the child (the child is
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not the sole object of the mother’s desire, that which makes her complete). The
mother’s desire then has a phallic signification. Lacan represents these concepts
through his formula for the paternal metaphor:
Figure II4

The instating of the paternal function occurs in neurosis. In psychosis, however,
this does not occur. For Lacan this is the fundamental difference between
neurosis and psychosis. The psychotic does not undergo castration, which is
another way of saying that the paternal metaphor is not instated in psychosis or
that what Lacan refers to as the Name-of-the-Father is foreclosed.
We can make sense of Lacan’s formula of the paternal metaphor by
considering the family narratives we hear from our patients. Psychotic patients
often report that they were either not wanted by their parents (and were either
told that directly or simply got that impression based on how their parents
treated them) or that their parents treated them like inanimate objects, like things
4

From “On a Question Preliminary to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis,” by J. Lacan, 1959/2006, in
Ecrits: the First Complete Edition in English (B. Fink, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton & Co., p. 465.
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or like pets rather than like human beings. Either way, what this amounts to is
that they did not receive symbolic recognition. The conditions necessary for
them to come to be as autonomous desiring subjects were not present.
One way to understand this is by way of a developmental perspective that
focuses on the status of the Other’s desire and the impact that has on the
developing child. Lacan tells us that for the psychotic, the Other is not lacking.
Since the parental Other does not lack, does not desire, the psychotic thus cannot
become the Other’s lack (as in the case of neurotics) and does not have a place
within the Other’s desire. Whereas in neurosis the subject comes to be in relation
to the Other’s lack, this relation generating their neurotic fantasy, the psychotic is
left without a place.
For psychotics, a delusional structure can develop in response to this
absence of a place in the Other. What I am suggesting is that a delusion in
psychosis can take the place of fantasy in neurosis. Whereas fantasy is the
neurotic’s response to the Other’s desire, a delusional structure is a possible
psychotic response to the status of the Other as being complete and without lack
in psychosis. That is, the neurotic’s fantasy is a way of formalizing or describing
in structural terms how he or she situates him- or herself in relation to the
Other’s lack. For example, by becoming the professional football player that
one’s father wished he himself had become, the neurotic child attempts to

178

complete the Other’s lack. The structure of that relation to the Other’s lack is the
fundamental fantasy (S/ ◊ a). The psychotic’s delusion is often another kind of
narrative (a replacement for the missing family narrative that would describe
how he or she was wanted, what the Other desired or expected of him or her)
and forges for the psychotic a narrative about how he or she does have a place—
often in a very grandiose form.
As we will see in one of the cases of psychosis to follow, in which “Janice”
had a delusional structure in which she believed she was Jesus Christ, a delusion
can often give the psychotic a mission or place in the world, and often a very
privileged one at that. For instance, Janice’s delusion of being Jesus Christ and
having a “mission” to save the African-American children created for her a place
in the Other and gave her a purpose—gave her a place within a kind of imagined
lack or demand (imagined by way of the delusion itself). The delusion thus
supplements and stands in for the absence of what happens in neurosis, in which
the neurotic’s fundamental fantasy is constructed in relation to the Other’s desire
and in relation to the subject’s fantasies about what the Other wants of him or
her.
As I explained in Chapter 2, the neurotic often mistakes the Other’s
demand for the Other’s desire. The neurotic’s fantasy and position with respect
to the drive take shape in relation to the Other’s demand. I suggested that a
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delusion in psychosis can come to occupy the position that fantasy would occupy
in neurosis. A delusion does imply a relation to the world—but obviously a
delusional way of relating to the world.5 In psychosis, demand can still be
experienced as a demand for something (as I explained in Chapter 2 with regard
to the neurotic’s experience of demand). That implies that in psychosis demand
can play a similar role of muddling up the relation to objects in the delusion, by
way of the subject presuming or making the assumption that there is an object
that would satisfy, that whatever particular object of demand the psychotic
relates to might satisfy.
Nevertheless, as I will argue further in Chapter 7 through the presentation
of the case of Janice, the psychotic’s experience of demand is different from the
neurotic’s experience of demand. I am hypothesizing that psychotics experience
demand in a different register, and that this is due to the fact that their
development is different, in that they have not been Oedipalized or castrated—
have not undergone the imposition of the Name-of-the-Father. The neurotic
experiences demand as coming from outside him- or herself, by way of the
Other’s demand—as in his or her interpretation of speech coming from the
Other, an articulation of the Other’s demand coming from outside. The

5

Just as the neurotic’s way of relating to the world is fantasmatic.
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psychotic, on the other hand, experiences demand as coming from inside him- or
herself, most typically by way of hallucinations.
Command auditory hallucinations, such as the ones Janice experienced,
are a form of demand: a voice commanding the psychotic to do something. The
command hallucination for the psychotic is, like demand in neurosis, language of
the Other or speech directed at him or her, but there is a difference in register in
psychosis such that the demand is coming from another place. In neurosis the
language of the Other comes from the Other’s demand as he or she perceives it
through the Other’s speech, but in psychosis the demand comes from inside by
way of the hallucinated voice. The rub is that the psychotic’s own experience of
the auditory hallucinations is that they are coming from outside—the psychotic
doesn’t understand that the voices are coming from inside him or her and
instead attributes them to some external source or agency, often by way of
persecutory delusions and ideas of reference. The way in which some psychotics
experience hallucinated voices is also consistent with Lacan’s assertion that
psychotics, rather than inhabiting language (as neurotics do), are inhabited by
language. Psychotics who experience command hallucinations experience the
drive by way of demands expressed through imposed speech.
In neurosis the imposition of the paternal function organizes the drives
and orients and organizes them by way of the operation of repression and the
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entry into language. In psychosis, however, the failure of the paternal function
results in the psychotic lacking a means of having some distance from and being
defended against the drives. Psychotics thus sometimes escape into delusion
and/or turn to drugs, alcohol, or other forms of addictions as ways to defend
against the drive.
This means that the imposition of the paternal function has consequences
for the status of jouissance for the subject. That is, the father sets limits on the
mother/child relation also in terms of setting limits on jouissance. This is
essentially the incest prohibition. Castration means that some jouissance is given
up, sacrificed, and that limits are set on it. Accordingly, some protection against
a jouissance that is too much or is overwhelming is erected. In cases of
psychosis, instead of a wall of protection there is something more like a hole.
Whereas in neurosis the imposition of the Name-of-the-Father installs
fundamental limits and barriers, in psychosis it is absent, and instead there is
something like a hole where the Name-of-the-Father should be. Lacan also
describes how “in psychosis something hasn’t functioned, is essentially
incomplete, in the Oedipus complex” (Lacan, 1955-1956/1993, p. 201). Let’s look
more closely at how this hole left in the absence of the Name-of-the-Father comes
to be and what some of its consequences are.
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A Fundamental Hole
Part of Lacan’s unique contribution to the psychoanalytic study and
treatment of the psychoses is that he also considers them through the dimension
of language. In so doing, Lacan highlights the fact that castration fundamentally
results from the effects of the signifier. Lacan explains that in psychosis, just as
the father does not act as a barrier or agent of separation and division between
mother and child, so too, for the psychotic, language does not serve as a barrier
against the real. This is another way of saying that in psychosis there is a lack of
symbolic mediation between self and world. This means that for Lacan the
paternal function can be understood not only developmentally by way of the
mother-father-child triad, but also as a function relating to limits and lack which
has effects on language. In psychosis, the father does not set limits on the
mother/child relation. Similarly, the signifier does not set limits to jouissance.
These concepts are fundamentally linked. This is important for us to understand
because the topic of this section of my project (how addictions in cases of
psychosis relate to the particular status of the drive in psychosis) is based on my
notion that the addictions are fundamentally related to the foreclosure of the
Name-of-the-Father for psychotic subjects. That is, an addiction can often
function as a kind of sinthome for such patients, standing in for the absence of the
Name-of-the-Father, and the drug or alcohol can serve as substances psychotics
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turn to in an attempt to regulate their drives, or as a defense against their drives,
which will be discussed in more detail a bit further on.
It is important to look a bit more closely at why language does not
function in the same way for a psychotic as for a neurotic subject. For Lacan, the
foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father in psychosis leaves a hole in the symbolic.
For neurotics, the prohibition of incest and installation of the Name-of-the-Father
establish a sort of barrier of language (symbolic mediation/protection against the
real) and establish anchoring points. Lacan describes the installation of the
Name-of-the-Father as a kind of anchoring point or quilting point6 (point de
capiton). Without this, as is the case in psychosis, words and meanings are not
tied together. This is similar to Freud’s idea that in psychosis there is a
disjunction between word-presentation and thing-presentation. The psychotic’s
characteristic concreteness of language and inability to create new metaphors can
be seen to result from this.
What are some other consequences of the foreclosure of the Name-of-theFather, in terms of language and jouissance? Since the psychotic subject doesn’t
have the signifier of the father (Name-of-the-Father7), the psychotic subject is left
without a signifier to symbolize the real. The psychotic faces the real without a
signifier that would have two related functions: to symbolize and to create lack.
6

For a fuller discussion of the Name-of-the-Father as a quilting point, see Lacan’s Seminar III, pp. 258270.
7
Or signifier of the phallus, as I described in Chapter 2 and as I will explain within the next pages.
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For the psychotic subject, who has not undergone castration, jouissance is thus
experienced as an anxiety that threatens to overwhelm the subject (and it thus
stands in opposition to desire). As I explained in Chapter 2, for psychotics the
Name-of-the-Father has not been instated—das Ding and the jouissance
associated with the relation to the mother prior to castration have not been
named and limited. That is why psychotics experience drives in the real—drives
that lack symbolic representation; that are not hierarchized or organized
according to erogenous zones, or modulated (as they are by way of the instating
of the Name-of-the-Father for neurotics); and that threaten to overwhelm,
invade, or overtake the psychotic.
For the psychotic, drives are prior to castration, and relate to the mother.
As I explained, it is owing to the psychotic’s porous boundaries between self and
other, self and world—and the failure of the Name-of-the-Father to be instated—
that the psychotic has little protection against drives. Since the drives have not
been limited—barriers have not been established between the psychotic and the
maternal object or das Ding—they constantly threaten to overtake or overwhelm
the psychotic. Lacan compares the mother to a crocodile that threatens to devour
the subject:
The mother’s role is the mother’s desire. That’s fundamental. The
mother’s desire is not something that is bearable just like that, that you

185

are indifferent to. It will always wreak havoc. A huge crocodile in
whose jaws you are—that’s the mother. One never knows what might
suddenly come over her and make her shut her trap. That’s what the
mother’s desire is. (Lacan, 1969-1970/2007, p. 112)
For psychotics there is a sense of there being too much, as jouissance has not
been limited by way of castration. The psychotic is often easily overwhelmed,
and has little protection against the real.
For the psychotic, language does not create a barrier between the
individual and the outside world or between the individual and the real. One
way in which Lacan explains this is by comparing the Name-of-the-Father to a
kind of stick inserted into a crocodile’s mouth to prop it open (the idea here
being that the paternal function bars the mother, thus protecting the subject from
being metaphorically devoured by her). Lacan continues his analogy: “There is
a roller, made out of stone, of course, which is there, potentially, at the level of
her trap, and it acts as a restraint, as a wedge. It’s what is called the phallus. It’s
the roller that shelters you, if, all of a sudden, she closes it” (Lacan, 19691970/2007, p. 112). Psychotics, since the phallic function has not been operative
and the Name-of-the-Father has not been instated for them, lack that which
would have regulated their relation to the real and thus to drives or jouissance
that threatens to invade.
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Lacan says that the psychotic not having language as a barrier is due to
the failure of the paternal function. This is what he means when he clarifies that
“psychosis consists of a hole, a lack, at the level of the signifier” (Lacan, 19551956/1993, p. 201). What is lacking in psychosis (the absence of which leaves a
kind of hole) is precisely the Name-of-the-Father. Lacan also discusses the
concept of the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father in psychosis at some length
in “On a question prior to any possible treatment of psychosis” (1959). In that
work, Lacan explains that the failure of the paternal metaphor to function in
psychosis means that there is something like a fundamental hole left within the
structure of language. Lacan explains that a hole in the symbolic is constitutive
of psychosis:
I will thus take Verwerfung to be “foreclosure” of the signifier. At the
point at which the Name-of-the-Father is summoned—and we shall see
how—a pure and simple hole may thus answer in the Other; due to the
lack of the metaphoric effect, this hole will give rise to a corresponding
hole in the place of phallic signification. (Lacan, 1959/2006, pp. 465-466)
Lacan represents the resulting hole in the place of phallic signification with the
symbol “Po” in the following diagram, to allude to a kind of hole in the symbolic:
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Figure III8

What this means is that in psychosis the father does not cancel out the
mother, so to speak, as happens in the successful imposition of the paternal
metaphor in neurosis, and the mother’s desire is not signified. Instead there is a
hole, an absence of phallic signification, represented in the diagram by (Po). In
Jacques-Alain Miller’s commentary on the graphs used in Lacan’s Écrits, he
clarifies the meaning of (Po) in Lacan’s diagram pictured above:
The foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father (here Po ), which leads to the
absence of representation of the subject, S, by the phallic image . . . skews
8

From “On a Question Preliminary to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis,” by J. Lacan, 1959/2006, in
Ecrits: the First Complete Edition in English (B. Fink, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton & Co., p. 476.
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the relation among the three fields: the divergence of the imaginary and
the symbolic, the reduction of the real to the slippage between them.
(Lacan, 1959/2006, p. 862)
That is, in response to the question “what does the Other want of me?” there is a
void for the psychotic, nothing (recall that in psychosis the Other is considered to
be not lacking). The Other’s desire is not signified—there is no symbolic
inscription. Consequently, jouissance rather than desire predominates for the
psychotic. Since castration and lack/desire have not been instated, there is
jouissance. Perhaps we can think of this as a jouissance prior to castration that
stands as an overwhelming real threatening the psychotic subject with being
overwhelmed or overtaken by it, like being devoured by a crocodile.
As for the drive in psychosis, we can begin to see that the psychotic falls
under the sway of real drives that have not been subjected to the operation of
castration. For the individual prior to castration the drives are not attached to
representations (or: the signifier/the Name-of-the-Father has not established
limits on them). The psychotic’s experience of the drive can thus sometimes look
like a manifestation of tremendous anxiety, being overwhelmed by something
that seems unnamable, or feeling invaded or overtaken in some way.
The following diagram from Lacan’s Seminar 23 is instructive on these
issues:
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Figure IV9

In this diagram Lacan situates anxiety in the area where the real invades the
imaginary. Recall from our discussion of the mirror stage that in psychosis the
imaginary is not fully overwritten by the symbolic. This means that the
psychotic is left vulnerable to the real, with little protection, barrier, or symbolic
mediation against it. When the real invades the imaginary and symbolic
9

From J. Lacan, 1975-1976, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXIII, The Sinthome, (C. Gallagher,
Trans.), Unpublished, Class of Decemer 16, 1975.
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mediation is lacking, the result is anxiety. What is also located between the real
and the imaginary is the jouissance of the Other (JA
/ ). Anxiety and the
jouissance of the Other can both manifest in similar ways: as eruptions of being
overwhelmed, seemingly overtaken, and experiencing a sense of lack of recourse
to the signifier (a sense that something can’t be described, is unnamable, lacks
symbolic inscription).
We will see examples of such experiences in the cases to follow. I would
suggest that, at least in many cases of psychosis, the psychotic subject
experiences a real jouissance, or Other jouissance, that has not fully come under
the operation of the phallic function. I refer to “Other jouissance” within the
context of my discussion of the psychotic’s relation to the drive to indicate that,
as I began to introduce in Chapter 2, I am referring to a jouissance prior to
castration, closely aligned with a real that has not been delimited by the signifier,
and a jouissance that thus lacks symbolic or phallic inscription. This is also
related to the experience of (JA
/ ) in which some real invades the imaginary
without the mediation of the symbolic, which results in a manifestation of
anxiety or overwhelming on the level of the drive—a sense that there is too
much, and that lack is lacking—in the absence of the mediation of the
symbolic/the signifier. Drugs and/or alcohol then often function as attempts on
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the part of the psychotic subject to fend off, delimit, or regulate that experience of
Other jouissance, an invasion or overwhelming on the level of the drive.
Essentially, that means that the drives that are (logically, hypothetically)
prior to castration are prior to the subject’s passage through the imposition of the
paternal metaphor and the limiting function of the Name-of-the-Father. What is
at issue in psychosis, in my opinion, is a primordial jouissance prior to castration
that does not get organized and limited by the Name-of-the-Father. Strictly
speaking, prior to the imposition of the Name-of-the-Father, there are no drives
in the sense that drive is the relation of the subject to demand (S/ ◊ D), but there
is jouissance. There is a difference between symbolically determined drives and
the kind of jouissance characteristic of psychosis. Finding appropriate terms to
theorize these ideas is difficult, and that is complicated by the fact that Lacan
himself never addressed these ideas let alone provided terminology for them. To
refer to those “drives” in psychosis as forms of Other jouissance is admittedly
problematic. For instance, in Seminar XX Lacan associates Other jouissance with
women. In using the term “Other jouissance” here I do not mean to suggest that
all women are psychotic! What I am suggesting is that whereas neurotic women
go through the passage of the castration complex and emerge with two possible
modes of jouissance—phallic and Other—though neurotic men emerge with
access only to phallic jouissance, an argument which is beyond the scope of this
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project, psychotics may experience another somewhat different form of Other
jouissance. That is the case because they never go through the castration process
at all and they thus experience something other than phallic jouissance.
To emphasize the key point: the difference, though this is a problem
perhaps of semantics or terminology, is in whether or not the individual has
gone through castration. Lacan does not offer a specific term to designate the
drives prior to castration. Furthermore, I am arguing that those may be related
to the drives psychotics experience, which Lacan also does not formulate. I am
simply referring to them as either “primordial drives,” “drives prior to
castration,” or “forms of an Other jouissance” prior to castration or the
imposition of the paternal metaphor in order to emphasize that because the
psychotic does not undergo castration he or she experiences something other
than phallic jouissance.

Psychosis, the Body, and the Drive
Viewing psychosis either from the perspective of Lacan’s work on the
mirror stage—in which for the psychotic subject the symbolic does not fully
overwrite the imaginary—or from the perspective of the paternal function, in
which the Name-of-the-Father is foreclosed for the psychotic, we can see that the
psychotic subject is more vulnerable to the real because there is a lack of
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symbolic barrier against, or protection from it. The psychotic subject’s ways of
responding to this vulnerability can vary, including, to name a few, the
construction of a delusional system, a sinthome (both discussed previously), or
the development of an addiction. Those are all ways of regulating the real in the
absence of the symbolic mediation/protection that the neurotic has at his or her
disposal thanks to the paternal function having successfully been instated.
How do psychotic subjects’ lack of protection against the real relate to
their experience of the body? The neurotic’s body is a body overwritten by the
signifier—it is, in fact, a body of signifiers—and as a consequence of castration
and the operation of the signifier jouissance is generally evacuated from all areas
of the body except for the erogenous zones. Another way to say this is that for
the neurotic, jouissance has a phallic inscription, which I described previously.
As Jacques-Alain Miller notes, the neurotic’s experience of castration and the
cutting in of the signifier, or the Name-of-the-Father, involves the idea that the
“signifier penetrates the body” (Miller, 1996, p. 425).
For the psychotic, on the other hand, who has not undergone symbolic
castration as the neurotic has, jouissance is not delimited in this way and lacks a
phallic inscription. The psychotic has not experienced a sacrifice of jouissance, a
draining off of some of the real. The signifier, which would have established lack
and boundaries, and an organization and regulation of the drive, has not
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penetrated the psychotic’s body. Accordingly, that means that the psychotic’s
body is instead penetrated by jouissance—jouissance not having been drained
away and delimited by the operation of castration or the penetration of signifiers
that bring regulation of the drive. The psychotic’s body is awash in an Other
jouissance, perpetually vulnerable to invasions of unregulated drive that leave
the psychotic feeling as though he or she is being penetrated and overtaken.
I will now turn to Freud’s analysis of the memoirs of Schreber10 to pick up
this question and consider an example of bodily phenomena in psychosis. Recall
that Schreber described feeling the “nerves of voluptuousness” under his skin,
bodily disintegration, and strange sensations that he could not quite describe—
that did not have symbolic inscription or representation, we might say. Indeed,
psychotic subjects often speak of strange sensations in their bodies,11 and one
way to understand those bodily experiences is in terms of an experience of the
jouissance of the Other. Schreber’s body is inundated with, invaded by, the
jouissance of the Other, the jouissance of God. We will see in the two case
studies which follow, in Chapters 6 and 7, examples of psychotic subjects who
experienced related forms of jouissance invasions.

10

See Freud’s “Psychoanalytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia [Schreber],”
SE XII, 9-82, and Daniel Paul Schreber’s Memoirs of My Nervous Illness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1988).
11
Lacan even describes jouissance itself as a bodily substance and an enjoying substance (la substance
jouissante) (Lacan, 1972-1973/1998, p. 263).
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Owing to the often very fragile distinction between self and other in
psychosis, the psychotic is particularly vulnerable to an experience of a collapse
of boundaries, or even something that gets experienced as a sort of invasion. In
many ways such experiences can be attributed to inadequacies relating to the
mirror stage and the paternal function. In psychosis, since the image of the body
is not supported by a symbolic identification, the image remains fragile and
inconsistent. When the imaginary is compromised or collapses, the psychotic
sometimes faces a confrontation with, or an invasion of, the real—the psychotic
then experiences a jouissance invasion, an invasion on the level the drive.12
Schreber describes invading the divine agencies that he feels invade his body and
mind just as much as they supposedly invade him. Here again we are seeing
evidence of the predominance of imaginary relations in psychosis in his rivalry
with his tormentors as well as the porousness of boundaries in psychosis and
almost nonexistent distinction between self and other. Similarly, perhaps it can
be said that he enjoyed God as much as God supposedly enjoyed him—the
jouissance of the Other thus supposedly working in both directions according to
how it is experienced by the psychotic, given the psychotic’s porous boundaries
and difficulty distinguishing between self and other.

12

Just as the psychotic often experiences a lack of control in terms of jouissance invasions, so too does the
psychotic sometimes experience a lack of control over the drives which manifests in instances of violence,
etc, with a corresponding lack of guilt over their actions.
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As we have seen, since the psychotic subject does not have the symbolic as
mediator or as protection against the real, the psychotic is vulnerable to
invasions of the real (jouissance invasions). In such cases the psychotic might
use drugs or alcohol as a form of protection against the drive and against the
real. That is, the psychotic’s addiction can be used in an attempt to regulate and
modulate some overwhelming real that lacks a signifier, and that does not have
symbolic mediation. Sometimes the drug or alcohol use can fit into the psychotic
subject’s delusional structure such that the substance is actually a form of
sinthome, something that is holding the psychotic subject together.
This is why we need to understand how drugs and alcohol function for
each subject. Clinical approaches that lack theoretical grounding and that simply
reduce all addicted subjects to the same (without regard for their different
structural diagnoses, and thus the major differences in how the drug functions
for them) can be dangerous. Cases of psychotic addicts for whom their drug or
alcohol use functions as a kind of sinthome are of particular note. If a clinician
fails to recognize the way in which a psychotic addict’s drug use might be
functioning as a sinthome, as the only thing holding him or her together, and too
hastily intervenes to get such a patient to stop his or her drug or alcohol use, thus
removing the substance or very glue that has been holding the psychotic
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together, this can in fact trigger a psychotic break. I have seen cases in which this
had occurred, and with very negative consequences.
It is often the case that psychotic addicts do not really use drugs or alcohol
in an attempt to get high, but rather to set limits to some overwhelming real, or
to modulate something that lacks symbolic inscription. For instance, in Chapter
6, I will describe how Nadia’s alcohol use functioned as an attempt to come
down from some experience of an overwhelming jouissance invasion and to try
to find words for that which seemed to be unnameable, seemed to lack symbolic
inscription. In other cases of psychosis, the drug can function so as to provide a
self-induced high instead of the uncontrollable highs that come on
spontaneously, and the cycles of being affected by the drug—experiencing a
high—and then coming down from that high function as ways in which the
psychotic tries to find a pseudo-regulation for their unregulated experience of
jouissance. Often, as we will see in the two case studies that follow, drugs or
alcohol function within and facilitate some effort on the part of the psychotic to—
through things like writing or other activities, sometimes linked to a delusional
structure—translate, modulate, and potentially give words to some jouissance
experienced in the real. In many situations, the drug is all the psychotic has to
regulate the real. Let us now turn to the two cases to see examples of this and
how to work with these clinical phenomena.
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Chapter 7
ADDICTION AND PSYCHOSIS
A (W)hole Feeling: Filling in and Creating Holes to Modify the Drive

Analysis is a matter of suturing and splicing
(Lacan, Seminar of Wednesday, January 13, 1976).

Introduction
A fundamental argument I am making in this project is that neurotics and
psychotics have radically different experiences of the drive, and that this is due
to the fact that their development results in different organizations of the drive—
the neurotic goes through the castration process and the psychotic does not. In
neurosis, the operation of castration produces holes, as I explained in Chapter 2.
The drive is then oriented around those points of absence, those holes, and
circles around object a as an attempt to recover some enjoyment imagined to
have been lost. In psychosis, however, castration has not been operative, and
there is thus no creation of a hole or lack constitutive of desire and linked to the
establishment of an object a. There is, however, a different kind of hole—a radical
hole in the place where the Name-of-the-Father should have been.
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The circuit of the drive in psychosis is thus different from the circuit of the
drive in neurosis, and the former often has to do with attempts to either fill in or to
create holes. As for filling in holes, the psychotic’s experience of the drive can
involve finding ways to fill in or defend against the radical hole where the
Name-of-the-Father should have been. The psychotic often turns to an addiction
as something that, loosely speaking, stands in for the absent function of the
Name-of-the-Father, insofar as the addiction can function as an attempt at
organizing and defending against jouissance (which in neurosis the Name-of-theFather would have done).
As for creating holes, note that the psychotic has not been castrated and
thus experiences a lack of lack—since the cut of the Name-of-the-Father has not
been instated and has not created holes by way of establishing the psychotic
subject as a lacking and desiring subject, as is the case in neurosis. The psychotic
thus sometimes turns to an addiction as an attempt at creating holes—making a
kind of cut or hole in jouissance. As I will explain within this chapter, the
psychotic’s experience of the drive also relates to the status of the Other’s
demand in psychosis—and frequently involves the psychotic being positioned as
the object for the Other’s jouissance and being unable to separate from that
position (which is perhaps a kind of fixation of the drive).
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In the following discussion of a case of a psychotic woman whom I will
refer to as “Nadia,” I will examine the patient’s relation to the drive according to
ways she turned to various addictions as attempts to either fill in or create holes
(and all as ways of regulating the drive). She had a severe alcohol addiction—
drinking heavily and frequently, often even to the point of blacking out and
losing consciousness—which had begun several years prior to the beginning of
the therapy. Nadia also suffered from severe bulimia—she would binge and
purge at least once per day, often even more frequently, which had also been
going on for several years prior to the beginning of treatment. What is more, she
frequently engaged in cutting (self-injurious behavior of cutting her body with a
blade) either alone or by having partners cut her during sex. Nadia told me that
under her clothing her body was almost covered in scars from cutting.
I will focus on how Nadia’s cutting and her bulimia—both of which are
often considered to be forms of addictions—were ways in which she tried to
create holes. Another of her patterns of addiction—having to do with cycles of
drinking and writing—instead functioned as her attempt to fill in holes. Through
drinking and writing Nadia tried to manage and fill in different kinds of anxietyinducing holes that she found herself encountering and feeling engulfed by (the
imaginary no longer serving as a layer of protection or defense against them).
These will be explained in detail through the presentation of the case.
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Moreover, the patient came for treatment during a psychotic break, and as
such the imaginary had fundamentally crumbled and had been punctured by the
real. I will first address how the patient initially sought treatment, and I will
move on to discuss her history so as to outline how for her, given various
precursors in her history, she came to develop a psychotic structure such that her
imaginary was continuously vulnerable to coming undone. That is, I will explain
how for the patient the three orders of imaginary, symbolic, and real were not
knotted together in a solid way, which left her vulnerable to encountering holes
and unraveling. Because her alcohol use and writing were attempts at managing
those vulnerabilities, as I will explain, the treatment focused more broadly on
working on the level of her psychotic structure itself—including ways in which
what had been keeping her together had crumbled—and working to modify her
position in relation to the drive.
A fundamental argument I am making in this chapter (and in this project
overall) is that by working on the level of the cause of the addiction—and how the
addiction functions with regard to the subject’s psychic structure and position in
relation to the drive—the addiction can be fundamentally transformed. Working
in this way means that addictions can shift as their cause gets modified and that
some improvement or resolution of the addiction follows from the work being
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done on a much more structural level. With Nadia, I worked on the level of the
organization of the drive and jouissance itself.

Case History: Nadia
Clinical background.
Nadia is a Mexican-American woman in her mid-twenties whom I treated
in intensive psychotherapy for approximately two years. Nadia’s mother tongue
was Spanish, and so, in light of my own familiarity with Spanish, although the
treatment was primarily conducted in English, Nadia frequently cited exact
Spanish wording, idiomatic expressions and aspects of expressions that got lost
in translation, and things that were said in Spanish in her family household.
During the treatment Nadia worked part time in retail and then began nursing
school. She was single, identified as bisexual, and at the beginning of the
treatment was dating Luis, a man who she later told me had sexually assaulted
her earlier in their relationship. Nadia described herself as never having been
wanted by her parents—she had no place within the Other’s desire. She
described her father as a passive figure who did not have much of a role in her
life during her childhood. Her mother was quite ill psychologically: she was
extremely paranoid, had auditory and visual hallucinations, almost never left the
house (due to her extreme anxiety and paranoia), and insisted on keeping Nadia
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away from all men throughout her upbringing. Nadia said that her mother gave
her the impression that men would rape or murder her. Nadia has one sibling, a
brother a few years older than her, who maintained a semi-incestuous
relationship with their mother and was idealized by her. For most of the sessions
during the early phase of our work Nadia was quite paranoid, frequently edgy,
and overwhelmingly anxious. Although the majority of the treatment that I
carried out with Nadia was conducted at a frequency of three sessions per week,
for a period of several months we met four to five times per week.
Nadia was referred to me after having had a negative experience with
another therapist whom she saw for four sessions, which may have contributed
to Nadia coming to therapy in the midst of a psychotic break. In short, Nadia’s
previous therapist became a very invasive figure to Nadia and also presented
herself as the same as Nadia (both amounted to what Nadia referred to as
“boundary-violating” maneuvers). My working hypothesis was that this
experience may have led to a collapse for Nadia on the level of the imaginary.
That is, rather than having a relation to an other (let alone an Other, in the
Lacanian sense), Nadia began experiencing her previous therapist as the same as
her. Rather than having a relation of self to other (and the gap and breathing
room that comes with that relation of difference and separateness), Nadia
experienced her relationship with her previous therapist as self to self and

204

experienced that as an invasion (on a very primitive level) and a collapse of the
separateness of the self. This became clear through Nadia’s discourse in the
beginning of therapy with me.
During my first meeting with Nadia, she told me that she felt she was
“losing her mind.” She reported frequently “blanking out,” which was her way
of describing dissociative episodes in which she lost stretches of time and could
not account for how she wound up in various places (e.g., taking a bus and
winding up in the wrong town, not remembering how she got there). Nadia also
reported experiencing diffuse “panic” which she felt she could not articulate and
having the sense that she was “losing [her] grip on reality.” She also had what
seemed to be sporadic visual hallucinations that were unrecognized as such by
her.
Nadia indicated that these symptoms began to emerge after a couple of
sessions with her previous therapist. She eventually told me that she had begun
to feel “unsafe” being in the room with her previous therapist, which had
contributed to her deciding to not leave her apartment for a couple of months.
During sessions, her previous therapist supposedly spent a significant amount of
time talking to her about the time when she herself lived in Mexico (perhaps
trying to develop a rapport with Nadia, who grew up in a section of Texas close
to Mexico), and always pronounced Nadia’s name with an accent, even though
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Nadia herself did not do so. Nadia quickly began cancelling or simply not
showing up for sessions, and she began to feel unable to leave her apartment.
The last contact Nadia’s previous therapist had with her was a phone call in
which, while trying to get Nadia to return to sessions, she yelled at Nadia and
told her that if she kept refusing to leave her apartment, she would lose touch
with reality, be fired from her job, and lose her friends and boyfriend. Nadia
later called the clinic and asked to be transferred to a different therapist.
The fact that Nadia had a breakdown in the course of those few sessions
already sheds light on some things that will become clearer as more details of the
case unfold. For now, it will suffice to note the relevance of the fact that Nadia
seemed to have experienced her previous therapist’s maneuvers, wellintentioned though they may have been, as an attempt at fusion (invading her,
by presenting herself as the same as Nadia, which Nadia experienced as a
destabilizing primitive violation of the boundaries of self and other). That
seemed to trigger Nadia’s flight response—locking herself in her apartment and
terminating that therapy. This seems to have been her way of responding to an
experience of erasure in the face of an invasive presence: more specifically,
someone attempting to present herself as being the same as Nadia.
We will see that during Nadia’s childhood, the conditions for the
development of a psychotic structure were clearly in place for her, which
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resulted in the construction of a fragile ego and a predisposition to coming
undone. As I discussed in the previous chapter, the psychotic often does not
develop sturdy boundaries (between self and other, self and world). I believe
this element of her psychotic structure, on top of other experiences of feeling
invaded by others (which we will address as we proceed with the case), accounts
for why she decompensated when her previous therapist presented herself as
being the same as Nadia. Her already fragile imaginary became punctured and
began to crumble. The moment of triggering was due to a rupture of the
imaginary axis.
For Nadia the three orders—imaginary, symbolic, and real—were not
securely knotted together. This resulted in a generalized fragility and sense that
very little was cohesive or stable for her, like a patchwork quilt that kept
unraveling and coming undone in different places. The treatment largely
focused on trying to put the pieces back together.

Family History
No place.
Let us now address how Nadia came to develop a psychotic structure.
Recall first that the psychotic experiences a lack of place within the Other’s
desire, which I addressed in the previous chapter. When I asked Nadia to tell me
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about any stories she was told about her conception, she told me that her mother
stated, on quite a few occasions, that she was not wanted. Since Spanish was the
primary language spoken in the home, I asked Nadia what, exactly, her mother
had said. She told me that her mother said “Nunca le deseamos,” and I noticed
that the verb conjugation suggested she was not wanted by more than one
person (“we never wanted you”). Nadia told me that she never heard any stories
from her father about whether or not she was wanted by him, but the
connotation of her mother’s oft repeated statement also implicated him as not
having wanted her. What is more, her mother also made it quite public that she
felt having Nadia was one of the worst mistakes of her life (although there
seemed to be no further explanation of the reasoning behind this). Other family
members had also told Nadia that when her mother became pregnant with her
she entered a deep depression, which seemed never to have lifted.
From the very start, Nadia was not wanted by her parents, and she thus
had no place within their desire. As is characteristic of psychosis, the paternal
metaphor was never instated and there was no explanatory principle—no way of
having a place within her parents’ desire and no articulation that could have
provided her with a place in the world. Her brother (Paco, a few years her
senior), on the other hand, was something of a golden child—wanted and
idealized. As the story goes, when he was born her mother wanted to have a
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child, but had to go through several years of difficult and expensive fertility
treatments before Paco was finally conceived. Nadia has described the
relationship between her mother and her brother as being “creepy-weird” in that
they are so close that his mother would often get into the shower with him to
wash him and he would sometimes sleep alone with her up until he was fifteen.
Paco seems to have occupied something of a husband role for her mother, and he
was indeed the center of her world.

“La unidad” without Dad.
While Nadia’s mother maintained a very intimate relationship with her
brother, her mother also insisted that the three of them (mother, brother, and
Nadia) create at least the illusion of a united front against the father. That is, her
mother always enjoined Nadia and her brother, “We have to show your father
that we are a unity. There can’t be any tension.” (“Tenemos que demostrar a tu
padre que somos una unidad. No puede haber ninguna tensión.”) The implication of
this was that the unity of their little family of three had to be preserved at all
costs, and Nadia said this often meant that her mother wanted the children to be
“against” their father. Nadia said her mother would try, for instance, to
orchestrate things so that the children listened to her and not their father. What
is more, she said that her brother would give the silent treatment to anyone who
dared to speak against their mother. Nadia noted that both she and her father
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had sometimes been subjected to her brother cutting them off in this radical
way—Nadia’s brother didn’t speak to her at all for an entire year, in one
instance. While Nadia originally believed her brother to have been the sole cause
of this silent treatment, she later found out that her mother had orchestrated it all
along. To speak against the mother was to violate “the unity,” which would not
be tolerated. Nadia faced something of a forced choice: be a part of the unity or
essentially have no existence at all. Either way, the status and nature of her
existence was certainly precarious from early in her childhood.
Not only did her mother insist on turning Nadia against her father and
maintaining a unity (a united front) with her, but she also insisted on keeping
Nadia away from all men. For instance, Nadia once told me that when she was
younger (she couldn’t recall how old, but she said she might have been
approximately seven years old) her mother saw that the only two empty chairs at
a table of family members were between two men, and she refused to allow
Nadia to sit next to either man. She then pulled one of the empty chairs towards
a corner of the room, away from the table, and sat there with Nadia on her lap.
Nadia said she always got the impression that her mother thought men would
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rape or murder them, because her mother often spoke about that as something
that would almost certainly occur.1
To suggest a connection between Nadia’s experience of the drive—as
some jouissance that invaded and from which she had little protection—and the
Other’s demand: It is possible that Nadia took her mother’s comments about
men being dangerous as a kind of demand, such that she interpreted her mother
to be saying something like “You will get yourself raped or murdered by men.”
This could suggest a way of understanding how, as I suggested in Chapter 5 and
will describe a bit further on in this chapter, the psychotic’s experience of the
drive is, like the neurotic’s, still structured by the Other’s demand, though
Nadia, given her psychotic structure and the failure of the Name-of-the-Father to
be instated, lacked protection or defense against the drive.
The severity of Nadia’s mother’s own pathology was likely a significant
contributor towards not only the sense of fragility that characterized Nadia’s
childhood world but also the fragile sense of self that Nadia came to develop.
Her mother’s paranoia and anxiety created an environment saturated by a sense
that the world was a very dangerous and scary place, and that one had better
brace oneself against all sorts of imagined dangers. What is more, separation

1

Nadia’s mother apparently made a habit of locking herself in her house, fearing that people were trying to
come to rape or murder her. The connection that also suggests itself between this general fantasy of her
mother’s and Nadia’s own reaction of locking herself in her apartment, described at the beginning of this
chapter, is also noteworthy.
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from the mother thus took on the value of being raped or murdered.2 We can see
how Nadia got the impression that there was very little protection against threats
of danger in the outside world.
Nevertheless, unity or togetherness with the mother was also unsafe.
Nadia described childhood memories in which her mother allowed for no
pleasure and also no separateness for Nadia. For instance, Nadia described how
her mother would suddenly take away all of her toys, leaving Nadia crying and
confused. Nadia reported that her mother seemed to do this for no apparent
reason, out of the blue, and Nadia also recalled her mother often saying
something about how she herself had no toys when she was a child and saw no
need for Nadia to have any. Nadia described how her mother did these things to
stifle Nadia’s personal interests and to keep her yoked to her mother’s side. She
was relegated to staying with her mother and being berated by her rather than
playing outside by herself or with her brother. Being with her mother meant not
having pleasure and not having an autonomous sense of self, as with her
previous therapist, who collapsed her identity into Nadia’s. But being apart
from her mother meant facing the threat of being raped or murdered by men.
There was no safe place for Nadia to come to be. Furthermore, Nadia’s

2

Note that this will become relevant later in this case study, when I discuss Nadia’s abusive relationship
with Luis.
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experience of nothing being safe had deeper layers, and we can consider these
other layers of meaning by way of a primal scene.

A primal scene.
Nadia had a hard time sorting out when a particular event took place.
During one session she said this event happened when she was nine, but during
another session she said she was approximately twelve years old when it took
place. She told me that during her childhood, all four family members (mother,
father, brother, and Nadia) slept in the same bed. She said one night her father
tried to get her to stay in the bedroom, alone in the dark room with her brother.
She said she became frightened of being alone in the dark and walked out
towards the living room. Nadia said that she saw her father “fondling or trying
to have sex with” her mother on the living room couch, and that her mother
appeared to be crying or in pain.
One possible interpretation could be that this scene was taken up by
Nadia as a representation of the consequences that might result from a lack of
unity. That is, if there is separation between Nadia and her mother, even here in
the scene involving sleeping arrangements, then sex that seems like rape might
be the consequence. Another possible interpretation could be that if Nadia and
her mother were identified with one another, Nadia lacking an identity separate
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from her mother, then whatever happens to her mother metaphorically also
happens to her. Recall also her mother’s fantasy that men were out to rape
and/or kill both of them. This scene, combined with her mother’s keeping Nadia
from men according to her explanations as detailed previously, may have also
contributed to Nadia coming to identify as bisexual, turning to women for most
of her relationships. Nadia had only one relationship with a man, which was
quite violent. I will now address Nadia’s relationship history, paying attention
to how her particular relationship patterns resulted from the conditions of her
upbringing and difficulties on the level of ego development.

Relationships
One attempt at building a fragile imaginary: “I’ll never allow myself to
get like that.”
At the time of treatment, Nadia had had two relationships with women.
She did not tell me much about the first one, but she mentioned quite a bit about
Natalia, the second woman she dated. It is important to note that she described
both women as being extremely similar to her. (I have also tried to create a close
similarity between their pseudonyms here to replicate the extent of similarity
between their actual names as well, distinct by a mere syllable.) When Nadia
was in her early twenties, she dated Natalia for three and a half years. Nadia
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described that relationship as her “only certainty in life.” She said Natalia was
the only person she had ever really trusted, and that she had found great
“support” in Natalia. I think we can interpret this as imaginary support—that is,
a shoring up of Nadia’s fragile imaginary.
The one thing Nadia continuously emphasized about their relationship
was that being with Natalia kept her own eating disorder in check. Nadia had
struggled with bulimia since she was somewhere between ten and twelve years
old (see the section on symptoms a few pages further on). Natalia apparently
struggled with a fairly severe anorexia throughout their relationship, even to the
extent of having to be hospitalized on several occasions. Nadia remarked that
she was always keenly aware of how serious Natalia’s anorexia was, and that she
always told herself she would never allow her own binging and purging to reach
the extremes of Natalia’s eating disordered behavior. Nadia often commented
during sessions about how startling it was to see Natalia’s bones pressing against
her skin and to see her throw up blood.3 On these occasions she thought to
herself, “I might have problems but I’ll never allow myself to get like that.”
Nadia’s relationship with Natalia, clearly embedded in the imaginary
order (they were very much like each other, semblable to semblable,4 or ego to
ego, along the imaginary axis), may have served as an attempt at shoring up the
3

Note the references to the real of the body and her horror at that.
A “semblable” is an imaginary other—someone seen as similar to oneself. The term is also meant to
allude to Lacan’s work on the mirror stage.

4
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imaginary for Nadia. (Recall my previous explanation of how the imaginary is
often weak and fragile in psychosis, which we also saw illustrated through the
descriptions of Nadia’s early development.) In Nadia’s relationship with
Natalia, Natalia served as a sort of imaginary prop, shoring up Nadia’s sense of
self by way of this mirroring relation (a to a’). Fundamentally, their relationship
also had within it a limit, a “not me,” against which Nadia’s sense of self could
hold steady. The death drive inherent in Nadia’s binging and purging was
limited by making sure she did not reach the morbid limit/excess embodied in
Natalia. Nadia’s relationship with Natalia, thanks to the imaginary stabilization
inherent in it, served as one way in which Nadia may have formed a protection
against the real (here as in the real of the body) albeit a tenuous one. Recall how
in psychosis the imaginary is often continually vulnerable to crumbling and the
psychotic subject risks then being faced with an overwhelming real. That is, in
psychosis the symbolic does not fully overwrite the real, leaving the psychotic
subject needing other means of protection against the real. Here we see how
Nadia turned to one such attempt to form a barrier against the real by way of the
imaginary.
Natalia thus seemed to serve a stabilizing, mirror function for Nadia, but
she also served a limiting function, embodying a dangerous limit Nadia would
never allow herself to reach. In this sense, to put a slightly different spin on the
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relationship and to situate it within the context of something from her early
development, their relationship was a kind of unity, but with an element of
tension. That is, they were a unity—like one another, along the imaginary axis—
but there was also a slight difference or tension, in that Natalia also embodied a
limit for Nadia. This is in some ways similar to Nadia’s relationship with her
mother. They were similar, or something of a unity, but her mother also
represented a limit in that Nadia knew that her mother had auditory and visual
hallucinations, to which Nadia responded just as she responded to the extremity
of Natalia’s anorexia: “I might be like her, but I’ll never allow myself to become
that crazy.” Recalling her mother’s oft repeated injunction about forming a unity
and not showing any tension, we can further understand the structure of the
relationship between Nadia and Natalia as both repetition (unity) and wish
(tension).

A man who raped her.
Aspects of these dynamics were also at work in Nadia’s relationship with
Luis, the only man she had ever dated. Luis and Nadia began dating just a few
months after her relationship with Natalia ended (about a year and a half prior to
the beginning of treatment). She said that although she didn’t have particularly
strong feelings for Luis during the first few months of their relationship, at a
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certain point things shifted and she began to believe she wouldn’t be able to
“breathe or exist at all” without him. Coinciding with this shift, their
relationship began to include physical and verbal abuse by Luis, and Nadia
began to “lose [her]self” as she adopted many of his viewpoints, mannerisms,
and phraseology. When Luis would sometimes become verbally and/or
physically abusive towards Nadia, she would become overwhelmed and tell him
she needed five minutes to get away from him so that she could “collect
[her]self”—which was an attempt to establish a boundary, a form of defending
against what felt like an invasion. However, Luis would refuse to allow her to
do so, and on several occasions he would even continue yelling at her and follow
her into the shower, where she would go in an attempt to get away from him. In
this manner, Luis refused to allow Nadia to have a separate existence, an
autonomous sense of self. Accordingly, they became a “unity” (unidad).
A different way to look at this is that being with Luis seemed to have
provided her with a perspective with which to identify, a way of supplementing
her fragile sense of self and thus guaranteeing a certain (albeit tenuous) kind of
existence and point of identification. Nevertheless, the presence of abuse in their
relationship can be understood as an introduction of tension within the unity,
and another form of limit—a violent one. Here again the relationship as carrying
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both repetition and wish (as relevant to her mother’s statement about being a
unity and not showing any tension) is evident in these dynamics.
Another way to understand the structure of Nadia’s relationship with
Luis is in terms of her relationship with her father. Nadia’s father was generally
a distant and absent figure, literally and metaphorically. He hadn’t wanted
Nadia, had spent little time with the family, and didn’t have much of a role there
in any other capacities (he did not intervene to break the “unity” she supposedly
formed with her mother and brother). Similarly, Luis didn’t acknowledge Nadia
as a girlfriend for the first six months of their relationship. Unlike her father,
however, Luis had violent limits, which might suggest a wish on her part.
In addition to the sporadic verbal abuse from Luis, there was an incident
of sexual violence. Several months prior to the beginning of treatment, Luis had
beaten and then anally raped Nadia with a painful object in a manner that she
described as very humiliating. Although this experience was very distressing for
Nadia, a second, later incident seemed to have even more of an impact on her.
Some time after Luis had sexually assaulted Nadia, there was an incident in
which he beat her quite badly and took her laptop and erased everything from it,
including all of her writing, which was extremely important to her. This erasure
of Nadia’s writing caused her acute distress because it was tantamount to an
erasure of her self.
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What is particularly noteworthy is that Nadia remained in a relationship
with Luis for quite some time in spite of these incidents and also that she then
became plagued by the fact that she stayed with him for so long. We might
speculate that one reason why she stayed with him was that he provided her
with a phallic signifier. Let’s recall Lacan’s work on the failure of the paternal
metaphor in psychosis, which results in a lack of phallic signification. In light of
that, perhaps we can say that for Nadia, Luis both gave her a perspective with
which to identify and also represented a desire for her—he wanted her and gave
her a place, so to speak. Nevertheless, Nadia beat herself up over staying with
someone who was a rapist.
We can also connect the question of why Nadia stayed with Luis for so
long, even after he raped her, with the connection between the drive and the
Other’s demand, which I mentioned previously. In light of her mother’s
prediction that she was sure she and Nadia would be raped or murdered by
men, it is perhaps not a coincidence that Nadia remained in a relationship with a
man who did rape her. This certainly does not absolve Luis or in any way
suggest that he was not at fault for what he did. What I am emphasizing is a
way of understanding, from a psychoanalytic perspective, what keeps some
people in such horrifying situations, and what leads them to continue making
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themselves suffer. Nadia felt unable to leave Luis, which speaks to her inability
to separate from her position as the object for the Other’s jouissance.
Even after her relationship with Luis ended, Nadia began to have visual
hallucinations that were very closely related to Luis. In fact, he continued to be
characterized as a persecutor through the hallucinations and she thus continued
to experience him as causing in her a suffering (abuse/invasion) from which she
could not separate. The visual hallucinations were ways in which she continued
to make him present to her and evidence of how she continued to be stuck in her
position as the object for the Other’s jouissance.

The hallucinations were like

continuations of her experience of the drive in relation to the Other’s demand—
living out and fulfilling a sort of demand for ongoing and seemingly limitless
abuse and suffering.
Indeed, Nadia had a larger pattern of flirting with death and dangerous or
bad situations in various forms, and one way of making sense of why she got
caught up in such cycles is that this pattern fits in with her psychotic structure in
which she had little sense of barrier against the lethal pull of the death drive.
Let’s now examine how this might be the case through her various presenting
issues.
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Overview of Presenting Issues
Holes, cuts, and the body.
Many elements of Nadia’s symptoms suggest a lack of control over
unregulated drives and/or an attempt to bring herself back to her body.5
When she was younger, Nadia would “make holes” by digging her nails
into the skin around the tops of her cheeks under her eyes. “People thought I
had a weeping disease,” she said, as she described how she would pick the scabs
off and let them become suffused with blood and pus. While this may be related
to how her mother used to talk about preferring lighter skin (Nadia’s skin was
darker than her mother’s but a bit lighter than her father’s), I believe it also
stands as an example of how she repeated behaviors that put her in painful
contact with her body, perhaps a reaction to the psychotic’s characteristic sense
of detachment from the body. Similarly, Nadia also reported that during
upsetting or traumatic incidents, she would often dig her nails down hard into
her palms or even smack herself. I believe this—as well as her other forms of
cutting herself and her bulimia—can be likened to attempts to make cuts or holes
in the body. Linked to that, they are also ways of trying to make cuts or holes in
jouissance, as I explained previously.

5

Psychotics often report strange bodily experiences, ranging from the electric sensations that Schreber
reported to a sense of being disconnected from the body. For more on Schreber’s bodily phenomena, see
Freud’s “Psychoanalytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia [Schreber],” SE XII,
9-82, and Daniel Paul Schreber’s Memoirs of My Nervous Illness (1988).
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Nadia’s struggles with bulimia had a similar character. Her bulimic
behavior began by way of an imaginary identification when one of her female
cousins talked to Nadia about her eating disorder when Nadia was between ten
and twelve years old. This mimicking of symptoms is often found in cases of
psychosis.6 Regardless of the specific details of how her bulimic behaviors
started, it is noteworthy that, just as with her making holes in her skin and
smacking herself, she experienced her bulimic activity as something that brought
her back in contact with her body and brought some kind of relief.
That is, Nadia also talked about how vomiting felt like “draining
something” from her body. She told me that sometimes she would vomit and
suddenly realize, due to the feelings that accompanied that activity for her, that
she had been “taking [her] body for granted.” She also talked about how she
sometimes would binge and purge in reaction to some “overwhelming feeling”
that she had not been able to say much about, but that she felt was diffuse,
inarticulable, and absolutely overwhelming. Her way of responding to that
feeling by vomiting and “draining something” seemed to be one way in which
Nadia attempted to drain off an overwhelming invasion of jouissance—and a
confrontation with the real—against which she had no protection and for which
she could find no symbolic mediation. She thus turned to the real of the body

6

And sometimes in cases of hysteria.
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through her binging and purging, to try to drain off some jouissance by way of
vomiting.
What is more, her binging and purging can also be interpreted as a way in
which she tried to create lack. That is, by devouring something and then
vomiting it up, she created an absence or hole—through the repetitive act of
filling and voiding. Nadia’s bulimia was a way of creating lack by creating a
hole (void/emptiness) in her stomach, so to speak. She was creating lack through
her bulimia as a way of defending against her experience of the real and a form
of Other jouissance that invaded, felt overwhelming, and lacked symbolic
inscription. As such, her bulimia can be seen as something like a replacement for
the function of the Name-of-the-Father, in the wake of its failure, as that which
would have installed a structural lack, protected against the real, and delimited
Other jouissance.
Another behavior that functioned for Nadia as a way of bridging a gap
between herself and her body was through cutting her body with razors. As I
suggested at the beginning of this chapter, Nadia’s cutting was also a way in
which she attempted to create holes (by making literal holes or cuts in her body)
and delimiting jouissance. Nadia told me that she had no idea when or how her
cutting behaviors began. She said she cut alone and also with partners during
sex. In both situations, she would make incisions only on areas of her body that
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already had pre-existing scars or cuts. She had mentioned that her entire body
was covered with scars, many of which she couldn’t account for. Nadia did offer
two specific examples of how she injured herself in the past. She said she
recalled falling into a sort of garbage pit once during her childhood and that she
had to pull bits of broken glass from her body. The other memory she recalled
was of having tried to get her father’s attention as he was driving away, and of
having her entire body dragged along the pavement as she held on to the back of
his car, which she said resulted in her having scars all over her body.
This certainly suggests an interesting possible connection between Nadia’s
father and her cutting behavior. In Lacanian terms, the idea of the absence of her
father was also about the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father. The signifier
did not intervene and set limits, so Nadia used cutting as one attempt at
replacing that function. In the absence of the cut of the Name-of-the-Father,
cutting itself may have been one way she tried to set limits for herself.
Nadia also had partners cut her during sex, and we might speculate about
whether this is a way of putting herself in touch with her body and trying to set
limits to a possible invasion of Other jouissance. While Nadia did not say
enough about these behaviors for me to speculate further, she mentioned that the
cutting during sex was always at four points around her lower abdomen. This
raises questions about the status of her jouissance during sex. For instance, it is
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possible that she experienced a kind of invasion of jouissance that she tried to
limit by cutting herself. It is also possible that she did not experience genital
pleasure during sex and cutting herself was figuratively an attempt to cut space
for that enjoyment to come to be. Given the location of these cuts, near her
uterus, it also calls to mind the idea that her mother never wanted her. Cutting
for Nadia seemed generally to take on the value of setting limits, dividing, and
regulating, and we can see how in her history there was a fundamental absence
of that in various ways.

Alcohol and writing: “a (w)hole feeling.”
Another important symptomatic behavior of Nadia’s, and one that relates
to her experience of the drive, involved her high levels of alcohol consumption.
Nadia said that she never kept track of how much she drank (often mixed drinks
or different kinds of hard alcohol) but that she drank quite a bit and had
developed a very high tolerance for it. At times she would drink so much that
she would black out. Her drinking patterns tended to echo the patterns of her
other symptomatic behaviors, particularly as a way she attempted to regulate
some sort of overwhelming jouissance invasion. Indeed, there seemed to be
numerous instances in which Nadia felt overwhelmed by something she found
diffuse and inarticulable, and she then turned to alcohol as a way to try to
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regulate and/or stave off that experience. What is more, the purpose of her
drinking always seemed to be that it led to her writing. This seemed to be the
primary medium through which she then attempted to symbolize and thus set
limits to some aspect of the real that would invade her.7
At times, Nadia’s drinking followed experiences of being overwhelmed
and feeling overtaken by something and having no words for the experience—
she lacked a signifier to name it and to limit it. For instance, Nadia described
several times when, in the middle of other situations or activities, such as being
in class or in a store running an errand, she would suddenly become
“overwhelmed” by “something rushing in.” She would describe a sense of being
overtaken by a jumble of incoherent thoughts, emotions, and sensations. She
would describe how at such times she could not find words for her experience,
noting, “words slip off; nothing sticks.”8 Her response would be to go home,
drink a lot, and write. Her drinking and writing thus seemed to be an attempt at
staving off or limiting some sort of jouissance invasion, and an attempt at finding
symbolic mediation.
After her relationship with Luis had ended, Nadia would drink in
response to feeling consumed by thoughts about their relationship. She

7

The important role writing played for Nadia further underscores how devastating it was when Luis erased
all of her writing.
8
Note the example here of how words are often thought of as things for the psychotic—here in Nadia’s
description of words as things that can slip off of something.
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described in particular being preoccupied and very distressed by not knowing
why she stayed with him at all, not to mention for so long. Even after they were
no longer together, she felt a lack of “closure,” as she put it. “It’s not over,” was
her frequent complaint. She would then drink and write in an attempt to come
up with an explanation as to why she had stayed with him. Nadia perseverated
about her remaining stuck in a position of the object for the Other‘s jouissance.
Every time she became wrapped up in the enigma of why she stayed with him,
she would confront a void, a lack of an explanation, a hole. She would drink and
then do what she described as journaling or free writing in an attempt to try to
come up with an explanation. Lacan reminds us that for the psychotic “there is
nothing more dangerous than approaching a void” (Lacan, 1955-1956/1993, p.
201). A question for which there is no answer is a kind of void or hole.
What is more, Nadia told me that what she sought to reach during her
episodes of drinking and writing was what she described as a “whole feeling.” I
think we can hear this in two ways, as in both whole and hole. She described
drinking and writing in an attempt to regulate what she was experiencing,
including a mix of thoughts and feelings as well as an absence of something.
What she experienced was both whole, in that she was overwhelmed and
overtaken by something (overfilled by something that resisted signification), and
also hole, in that she felt an absence or lack of something, such as an explanation
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as to why she stayed with Luis. Perhaps we can in some respects connect this
with what Lacan describes as the lack of phallic signification that results from the
failure of the paternal metaphor in psychosis. Through Nadia’s drinking and
writing she was trying to find an explanation, trying to find a signifier that
wasn’t there, and she kept coming up against a hole. Perhaps we might also say
that she was trying to find a signifier to name and set limits to her jouissance
(associated with staying with someone cruel and abusive), but that this signifier
was absent.
In psychosis, of course, it is fundamentally the Name-of-the-Father that is
the missing and foreclosed signifier, which leads to consequences for the status
of the symbolic order in psychosis. When the Name-of-the-Father fails to be
instated, something is forever irrevocably missing. There is always a structural
lack. We can see an extension of this in Nadia’s search through her writing
(mainly in her creative writing but also in her free writing) for “the perfect
word.” Nadia would describe becoming very frustrated by her inability to
convey her thoughts through her writing. On a phenomenological level, she felt
there was a word she could not find or access. She imagined that if she could
only come up with that word, she would “finally be okay” and finally reach that
“whole feeling.” Nadia felt unable to get there.
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There were also times when her writing functioned as her way of keeping
track of things that seemed evanescent and fragile to her, as a way of installing
symbolic markers. For instance, after Luis had beaten Nadia and erased her
writing, she was very distraught that she became confused and unable to recall
all of the details of what had happened in that scene. Without her laptop, she felt
herself to be lacking the instrument she had been relying on to keep track of
things—not only the incident with Luis but also a host of other things, as she
often used her writing to simply document things that had been going on in her
life (and make them feel more real to her). (It had not occurred to her to
handwrite her thoughts until I pointed that possibility out to her.) As she felt
the memory of what had happened during the scene with Luis slipping away,
she lamented, “I couldn’t write it down, and now it’s all gone.” Her drinking
and writing were thus also often attempts to simply find or install symbolic
markers, the absence of which left things continually coming apart.9
For Lacan the circuit of the drive in neurosis revolves around object a
which stands in the place of holes created by way of the imposition of the Nameof-the-Father. Perhaps Nadia’s case offers an example of how in psychosis the
hole left by the absence of the Name-of-the-Father—due to its failure to be

9

For Lacan the absence of sufficient quilting points (owing to the failure of the Name-of-the-Father to be
instated as the initial quilting point or point de caption) leaves the psychotic without a consistent symbolic,
leaving things continually vulnerable to unraveling and coming undone. For a fuller discussion of the
Name-of-the-Father as a quilting point, see Lacan’s Seminar III, pp. 258-270.
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instated—is tantamount to the psychotic lacking a means of regulating or
defending against some experience of Other jouissance—something like a
jouissance prior to castration.

When the self drains.
Beyond the instances I outlined in the preceding sections to address how
Nadia’s symptoms often involved reconnecting with her body and/or attempting
to regulate an invasion of the real, there were also situations in which the
security of her very being was challenged. That is, she often experienced
moments of ontological insecurity, moments when her very self began to drain
away.
For instance, Nadia reported that during the couple of years prior to the
beginning of treatment she had developed an intense fear of needles, a fear of
having blood drawn. By way of example, she described how, when she went to
have some blood tests done a few months into the treatment, she almost
“blanked out” as she “panicked” when the doctor began drawing blood from her
upper arm. She described feeling “an overwhelming rush” and a “weird
sensation all over [her] body” as the blood was being drawn, and said she could
feel a tremendous vacuum sensation throughout her entire body as this
happened. She said that at that moment she “felt [her] self drain” and had to
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snap herself out of it. Further layers of meaning attached to this experience are
suggested by the fact that her father was a phlebotomist, and that her mother
never showed any physical signs of affection to Nadia except when she would
occasionally touch her on her upper arm. Nadia found these maternal touches
“horrible” and an overwhelming hot rush throughout her body would
accompany them, similar to the “weird sensation” she experienced when she had
her blood drawn. One might further speculate about the extent to which her
mother represented the threat of being sucked into something, like a vacuum or a
kind of void into which one might get absorbed, the effect of which was that
Nadia had no separate sense of self. Against this her father (who did not
embody or represent the paternal function) had no mediating effect.
I asked Nadia for other examples of times when she felt her self beginning
to drain away. She mentioned the times when she was overwhelmed by Luis
and asked him to give her five minutes alone to collect herself during their
heated arguments. When he would refuse, even following her into the shower
(where she would go to try to get away from him), she said, it was like that
vacuum feeling associated with needles drawing blood, like her self draining.
She went on to describe that feeling as being like a stopper having been pulled
from a sink full of water, releasing the water to drain away.
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This led her to offer another example of times when she felt herself drain
away, which was when she used to have “kitchen sink arguments” with Natalia.
She said they would start out fighting about one thing, and then she would
become overwhelmed as Natalia would “throw everything into the kitchen
sink,” bringing in lots of different topics that were upsetting her. Note also the
curious modification of the more conventional wording of “everything but the
kitchen sink.” This modification may reflect the psychotic’s penchant for
concrete thinking, here as in the idea of dumping ideas into a concrete object:
“everything into the kitchen sink.” Regardless, the idea here seemed to be that
there was no symbolic thread or coherence for Nadia to follow, and that this is
what she found overwhelming.
In addition to these experiences of feeling her self drain in response to an
overwhelming invasion, there were other times when Nadia had a reaction to
situations that involved her not receiving a certain kind of recognition on a
fundamental, ontological level. Nadia offered the example of how Natalia used
to lie to her about having eaten (when she had not eaten for some time during
the heights of her struggles with anorexia) or how she used to go to the hospital
to have her weight monitored and she would make herself seem heavier than she
actually was by putting rolls of quarters in her underwear. Being lied to by
someone who was her “only certainty” seemed to challenge Nadia’s sense of
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ontological security, her fundamental grasp on what she could count on and find
security in being sure of. Other examples of situations in which Nadia felt
herself drain were when her relationship with Natalia wasn’t recognized by
certain members of Natalia’s family (because of their religious beliefs about
homosexuality); and when her boyfriend Luis had forgotten some important
things she had said to him—she exclaimed during the session, as she described
this, “what, do I not exist?”
Overall, Nadia’s world and her very sense of self were always quite
fragile, constantly vulnerable to unraveling. The treatment aimed at stabilizing
and shoring up her sense of self to whatever extent possible.

Treatment Interventions
Intervening with a metaphorical thread.
Midway through the treatment, Nadia came to session and sat on the
couch very gingerly, while holding her button-down shirt closed with one hand.
She began the session by saying to me, “I lost a button. Do you have anything to
fix this?” I got her a safety pin, she pinned her shirt closed, thanked me, seeming
relieved, and we continued with the session. This marked the beginning of a
phase of the treatment in which the work focused on suturing.
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Given the extent to which Nadia was prone to ontological instability,
times when her very being could potentially slip away, I was particularly careful
throughout the course of the treatment to provide recognition of her existence.
For instance, when she would tell me that she had “blanked out” recently and
couldn’t account for the lost time, I would try to help her piece things back
together again, which often also involved my reminding her of the things we had
been talking about in recent sessions, returning her words to her when they had
been lost. My hope in doing so was that this would help to install markers of
recent history where they might have been erased—by reinscribing details about
sessions, things she had told me had been going on or had been on her mind
recently, and so on. This was a procedure similar to stitching rent fabric back
together.
Another particularly important time when I made it a focus of the
treatment to try to help Nadia put some of the pieces back together again, so to
speak, centered on her violent sexual assault by Luis. The loss of her writing was
actually one of the most traumatic aspects of that experience for her. Her
reaction is understandable when we consider the extent to which she
experienced her writing as coextensive with her self: it was a piece of her. What
was important was not so much the content of her writing, but rather the fact
that for her it served as documentation of her existence. She often read through
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her writing or IM’s—Instant Messages—after she “blanked out” or dissociated,
to try to fill in the blanks, and to reconstruct and trace the simple fact of her
having continued to exist in spite of experiencing a dissociative episode. Nadia
and I worked to stitch together little bits of her experience that seemed lost to
her, and this was part of the larger task of helping her to stitch together a more
cohesive sense of self (helping her to build a more cohesive imaginary and
helping her to build a more stable ego).

Nada en el rio.
An incident that was perhaps similar to Nadia’s confrontation of holes
through her patterns of drinking and writing occurred when she went to a pool,
got in, and suddenly discovered she had “forgotten” how to swim and almost
drowned. For Nadia it was an experience of being almost overtaken or devoured
by a void. My attunement to Spanish homophones enabled me to make sense of
and have a transformative impact on her suddenly losing her ability to swim. As
we discussed this incident in session, her memories and associations included
recalling her childhood fear that there was someone or something in the river
that might pull her under. Being unable to see the bottom of the river frightened
her, because she felt the river was a “place of nothingness.” (She used to swim
quite often in a certain river during her childhood because of all the day-trips her
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family took there, close to her hometown.) When Nadia got into the pool and
felt she had forgotten how to swim, it is also possible that she lost track of the
outlines of her body and panicked, furthering the sense of her being detached
from her body and dissolving, as it were. I then offered an intervention by
saying to Nadia, “nada en el rio…,” which can mean both “nothing in the river”
and “she10 swims in the river” (depending on how the accent is placed on the
word nada).11
Utilizing this homophony of signifiers of her native tongue
simultaneously drew together material from recent sessions and opened up new
meanings. For instance, Nadia’s brother had announced that if she continued
dating women he would disown her and she would be “nothing” to him. Nadia
also described Luis’s efforts to brainwash her into thinking that the abuse didn’t
happen. She would feel so invaded by his attempts to brainwash her that she
would hide in the shower, as noted previously, running the water to try to
drown out the sound of him yelling at her and trying to twist her perceptions.
She felt like nothing as he undid her perspective—her very self was washed
away by him. Something like “rio” (Spanish for “river”) also resonates with

10

Considering the deliberately ambiguous form of this construction, “she” could have been heard as
referring either to Nadia or to her mother
11
Nada means “nothing,” but nadá means “she swims.”
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Nadia’s mother’s name,12 and recent sessions had also focused on how her
mother never wanted her. Nadia experienced herself as “nada,” nothing, in
relation to her mother, “rio.” After the work of these sessions, Nadia returned to
the pool and was able to swim again.
We can see how my intervention simultaneously drew together several
layers of meaning while also not tying things down to any one meaning in
particular. It is possible that the polyvalence reverberated and had its effects in
that fashion, in conjunction with the variety of related material having been
worked with over the course of several sessions. This would be consistent with
Lacan’s claim in Seminar 23 that in the end equivocation is the only weapon we
have against the symptom. Even so, it is debatable whether much equivocation
is possible when working with psychotic patients, given their concreteness of
language as well as the way in which, as Lacan puts it, the unconscious is present
but not functioning for psychotics.
Nevertheless, there might be another way to consider the impact of this
intervention and another layer of meaning to be heard in it. That is, nada en el rio
could also have the sense of “nothing in the mother,” recalling the connection
between something about the word rio and something about Nadia’s mother’s
name. Considered thusly the focus is then placed on the idea of a hole or lack in
12

I have used pseudonyms and disguised other identifying details throughout this paper in order to protect
confidentiality while also attempting to preserve something of the flavor of the multiple levels of meaning
that were at work in the case.
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the mother. Since the Other is considered complete for the psychotic, perhaps
this intervention, carrying the idea of the decompletion of the Other, introducing
the notion of a lack in the Other,13 contributed to some elements of progress for
Nadia during the treatment. That is, we might situate this intervention not just
in terms of the short-term effect of her being able to swim again, but also in terms
of longer-term effects. This intervention, along with several others, some more
directly related to her mother and family history, may have contributed to Nadia
beginning to have more breathing room and to be less vulnerable to being
overtaken or sucked in by different kinds of perceived voids or holes. The idea
here might be that if there is a lack within the mother, then the mother is less
aligned with a devouring hole, like a river that sucks one in. When there is a lack
in the Other, there is space for the subject to come to be (or swim, as the case may
be).
The intervention involving the multiple layers of meaning of “nada en el
rio” is an example of an intervention that may have simultaneously introduced
the idea of a hole in the Other and also protected Nadia against a hole. That is, it
helped Nadia to not fall into a hole (to refind her ability to swim and thus not get
sucked into the hole of the water/rio). Indeed, much of the treatment focused on

13

Note that I am not at all suggesting that Nadia shifted from having a psychotic structure to a neurotic
structure, for instance, but rather that there may have been modifications within her psychotic structure that
were achieved over the course of treatment. Fink (1997) notes that for Lacan, “once a psychotic, always a
psychotic.”
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helping her to form barriers against holes. I believe this ultimately contributed
not only to the reduction of her drinking but also to the reduction or
disappearance of many of her other symptoms as well, since, as was the case
with her drinking, she eventually accomplished in the treatment (through the
medium of speech) the protection against holes that she had previously been
attempting to achieve through things like her drinking.

Filling in holes.
Recall that Nadia’s cycles of drinking and writing often functioned as
ways she confronted holes (such as the enigma of why she stayed with Luis) and
attempted to fill them. Moreover, in light of the way in which she used her
writing either as documentation of her existence or as a tool to defend against an
invasion of the real, throughout the treatment I attempted to support and
encourage certain aspects of her writing. For instance, I would express interest in
her creative writing when she brought it up, ask her questions about it, and
demonstrate to her that I knew how important it was to her and that I saw it as
valuable and meaningful. However, I was also very mindful of another side of
her writing (the free writing regarding the enigma of why she stayed with
Luis)—that is, not only how much she was drinking while writing but also how
distressing and dangerous it became in her mind when she encountered a hole.
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Accordingly, I tried to help Nadia fill in some of the blanks in her writing
that she found particularly distressing. For instance, for some time in the
treatment when she felt particularly overwhelmed by not knowing why she
stayed with Luis for so long, given how horribly he treated her, she became quite
wrapped up in her writing in a rather masochistic and self-punitive way. She
would beat herself up over staying with Luis, being very derogatory towards
herself and causing herself a tremendous amount of suffering. And although she
attempted to journal about that so as to try to come up with an explanation for
why she stayed with him she would always draw a blank, come up with no
explanation at all, which horrified her. I therefore tried to help invent or
construct some explanations that could begin to function as sufficient plugs for
those holes and to drain away some of her masochistic self-flagellation.
I will summarize one of these. During one session when Nadia was in
distress about not knowing why she continued dating someone who was so
abusive, I could see that she was becoming very worked up and seemed to be
sinking into something dangerous and all-encompassing. Sensing that I should
try to intervene and try to put a stop-gap into what she seemed to be sinking
into, I said to her: “It’s like your family.” (Of course, this could have been heard
as “It’s like you’re family.”) My intervention functioned to graft a pseudoOedipal meaning onto her staying with a man who was abusive, violent, and
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intrusive. My comment was deliberately somewhat vague and meant to allude
to several things, to see what Nadia would pick up on and make use of.
Although I wanted to try to fill a hole with something, I also wanted to do so in
such a way that Nadia could make it her own.
Among the possible meanings, Nadia and I discussed her mother as an
intrusive and abusive figure and her father staying with her for so long. Nadia
had a passing familiarity with Freud and was amenable to thinking about how
one’s childhood impacts one’s later development, and so on. This version of a
semi-Oedipal meaning was one she was therefore prepared to consider.
Additionally, this construction positioned her in an identification with her father,
which I think was important in many ways, particularly given how susceptible
Nadia was to feeling fused with her mother and experiencing that as identityannihilating. My intervention propped up an imaginary-level way of seeing
things, and can thus be considered an intervention that contributed to a larger
process of helping Nadia to construct a more stable imaginary for herself.
For a number of reasons, my intervention “It’s like your family” was one
among others that contributed to the construction of an explanation that was
satisfactory to Nadia. It was, of course, just that: a construction. Nevertheless,
the point was to alleviate her masochistic self-flagellation, and that was
accomplished. This construction or pseudo-explanation allowed her to stop
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beating herself up over having stayed with Luis for so long, and to forgive
herself and move on (to attain “closure” as she put it). She gradually stopped
drinking excessive amounts of alcohol and getting wrapped up in writing that
perseverated on such holes. Accordingly, filling in this hole (the enigma of why
she stayed with Luis) with this construction also resulted in limits being set for
her—limits against masochistic self-flagellation and against falling into a kind of
hole.

Niño capricioso: a hole in Luis.
Even as there were many interventions across the course of treatment that
focused on helping to plug up holes for Nadia, I believe some of the
interventions having to do with Luis and her relationship with him involved (or
resulted in) the revelation of a kind of hole in him.
Late in the treatment, as Nadia was rethinking her relationship with Luis,
a shift occurred as she began to talk more about Luis’s own personal difficulties
and how they may have contributed to some of the problems in their
relationship. That is, the treatment also shifted her from perseverating on
beating herself up for staying with him to instead considering his contributions
to the problems in their relationship. This went hand-in-hand with other
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therapeutic techniques that also focused on helping her to find the “closure” to
their relationship that she so desperately sought.
Nadia talked about how, whenever she would try to discuss her
accomplishments with Luis, or to in some way demonstrate her intellect, he
would “cut [her] down.” I commented on how perhaps Luis felt insecure about
his own level of intellect and lack of achievements. Similarly, at another point in
the treatment as Nadia described Luis’s invasiveness, his tendency to stifle and
suffocate her, to cut her off from the outside world, and to refuse to give her five
minutes alone to collect her thoughts, she began considering that he was
incredibly lonely and needy. Focus began shifting to Luis’s intense fear of being
alone; this took the focus off of her a bit. She began talking about Luis being very
insecure in himself and about how all of this came from his history. She began to
shift from beating herself up for staying with him to considering why he might
have done some of the things he did.
Nadia then came up with a new way of referring to Luis, a new name for
him, so to speak: “niño capricioso.” Nadia told me about how her mother used to
talk about “niños capriciosos.” She said these were children who were impulsive,
unpredictable, and driven by whim, but also that the term carried the
connotation of spoiled brats, children who were in some way negatively
impacted by their upbringing, which caused them to be so impulsive, self-
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centered, ignorant, or dismissive of the needs of others. This marked a notable
transformation in how Nadia viewed Luis, as she began considering his childish
neediness (a sense of tremendous emptiness in him) as something like a lack or
flaw in his development, a hole14 that he was desperately trying to fill.
Nadia came up with a new name for Luis (and one in her mother tongue).
What followed was that instead of focusing exclusively on his cruel jouissance
and her masochistic sense of being unable to do anything but submit herself to
it—a jouissance from which she felt she could not separate—she began to
consider flaws in his upbringing and a fundamental lack within him. I believe
this marked an important shift from seeing him solely as a persecutor to making
room for also seeing him as a “niño capriccioso,” which contributed to giving her
space to separate from him and from the seemingly all-encompassing jouissance
of the relationship against which she seemed to lack protection. It is important to
emphasize that this shift in her perspective still involved recognizing the severity
and transgressive nature of many of the things he did (most notably, sexually
assaulting her)—in fact, it somehow made it much easier for her to do so.
Following these interventions and shifts, Nadia’s visual hallucinations
relating to Luis no longer recurred, which was perhaps owing to the fact that she

14

There is a similarity to these interventions resulting in pointing to a hole in Luis and the intervention
about “nada en el rio,” discussed in the previous section, involving the intimation of a hole in the mother.
Could this have to do with an effect of decompleting the Other (perhaps just the imaginary Other), showing
that the Other is lacking in some way?
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stopped seeing him as a persecutor from whom she could not separate.
Fundamentally, Nadia came to separate from her position as the object of the
Other’s jouissance.

Finding “closure” and piecing together a sense of self.
In working to help Nadia find “closure” to her relationship with Luis, the
lack of which she had found incredibly distressing, I was essentially trying to
help her to identify the ideas that Luis had instilled in her and then to assess
whether those were ideas or viewpoints that she really wanted to espouse, or
whether those were mere products of Luis (and his own thinking) in her, which
felt to her like a kind of invasion. For instance, Luis had essentially brainwashed
her in several ways, such as by hitting her and then convincing her that he
actually had not hit her and that her grasp on reality was tenuous. In reporting
these things to me, it seemed clear enough that that these beatings were not
fantasies or figments of her imagination and that these events actually did occur
in reality.
Nadia established a goal of wanting to undo the “brainwashing” that she
felt had occurred through Luis’s efforts to twist her perceptions. What he did felt
to her like an erasure of her very identity or self. In a dream she told me,
someone’s face kept melting off. The dream also contained references to similar
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phenomena in her waking life: experiences in which an identity—hers or
someone else’s—seemed to melt away. In terms of technical interventions to
help Nadia reestablish her sense of self (a self that no longer felt invaded by
Luis), at times I pointed things out to her—ideas she discussed or comments she
made—that sounded like they might have come from Luis and asked her where
she got that idea or where she might have heard it (to help her begin separating
Luis’s perspective from her own). At other times, later in the process, she was
able to spontaneously catch herself saying something that he used to say and
then undo it for herself.
For example, she described how Luis used to tell her that he could sleep
with other women but that she could not have other sexual partners. She was
convinced he was right. Nadia then came to realize that he had been
manipulating her for his own gain, and that she herself did not believe that one
person in a relationship should be faithful while the other was “allowed” not to
be faithful. This is just one example of how Nadia began to refind her own
perspective, to begin thinking for herself again. She described this as shifting
from what she called “Luis thinking” to “Nadia thinking.” Another result of this
process was that Nadia began to report no longer using what she labeled “crutch
words”: elements of the way Luis used to talk about things and particular turns
of phrase that he would often use that had slipped into her discourse (which felt
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to her like another way he had invaded her). Nadia began finding her own
words, her own voice, and thus was essentially refinding pieces of herself.
In helping to facilitate this process for Nadia, I tried to offer her more of a
space of her own within which she could come to be. In doing so I was
particularly careful to avoid leaving room for her to simply remove a perspective
she received from Luis and replace it with one from me. The primary purpose
behind interventions described in this section was to help Nadia begin piecing
together, on a very fundamental level, a sense of herself.

Setting limits, establishing difference.
Overall, an important function of the treatment had to do with helping to
set limits for Nadia against various jouissance invasions. This involved not only
helping Nadia separate from what she experienced as Luis invading her, but also
helping her establish a sense of difference between herself and her mother; a
form of “separation”15 thus came about through those limits/boundaries being
established.
For instance, one time Nadia told me that a few days before our session
she had the sense that she was literally going to explode as she was waiting at
the bus stop. She said she had no idea where she went after that or how she had

15

Not separation in the Lacanian sense of the term.
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spent her time (more “blanks”). Nadia said she just knew that she wound up in
her bed the next morning but that since that time at the bus stop she had been
plagued by an uncontrollable and incessant itchiness all over her body, from her
scalp to her toes (with a corresponding rash in some places). She told me that
she had hardly gotten any sleep in the past two or three days because of it, and
that she felt there was nothing she could do to stop it. As she sat in front of me
with a distressed, wincing expression on her face, she kept scratching herself all
over her body throughout the session. I encouraged her to tell me more about
her recent thoughts and feelings preceding the outbreak of itchiness. Nadia told
me several things, including her recent thought just prior to the outbreak of
itchiness that she had been unwittingly repeating something her mother had
always done, in keeping a very messy home. Hearing this I decided to test out a
hypothesis that she might have felt a sort of conflation of herself and her mother,
accompanied by a kind of maternal ravage,16 an embodied jouissance invasion. I
therefore said to her, “Nadia, even if you might have repeated some aspect of
your mother’s behavior, that doesn’t mean that you are your mother.” She
immediately calmed down, stopped scratching herself, and that uncontrollable
itchy sensation throughout her body never returned. By naming Nadia and
introducing difference between her and her mother, I sought to thwart what

16

Something like being invaded by the mother, overtaken by her.
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seemed to be an experience of her self draining or of being fused with the
mother.
Keeping this in mind, in subsequent sessions I also tried to highlight and
name any differences between Nadia and her mother that she herself articulated
in talking about something, or if I myself happened to notice them. In this
manner, my interventions were forms of naming in the wake of the failure of the
paternal function for her—that is, attempts after the fact to establish limits and
separation.

Nursing.
Central to this task, and part of the trajectory of the long-term work of
treatment, was helping Nadia to organize a life project for herself: some sort of
purpose or activity that could be meaningful to her and around which she could
organize her life. Indeed, this is crucial because, as Fink explains, “with the
psychotic, . . . the ego is all one can work with: the therapist must build up a
sense of self in the psychotic that defines who the psychotic is and what his or
her place is in the world” (Fink, 1997, p. 109). During the course of the
therapeutic work Nadia began to pursue a career in nursing, which may have
been something productive to stand in for that absence of an articulated place in
the world or explanatory metaphor. For instance, she might see an altruistic
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mission in trying to help others access quality health care, given the difficulties
both she and her mother had in being taken seriously by doctors and finding
adequate health services in their non-affluent area of the country. Her decision
to enter the nursing field could also take on the value of nursing herself in some
way. 17 I’m reminded of what she reported as her earliest memory: a description
of pulling pieces of broken glass out of her flesh after having fallen in a garbage
pile. Perhaps a career in nursing could offer her a way to rid herself
metaphorically of broken bits that invade and hurt her and take steps towards
suturing, in all senses of the term. In light of her comment towards the end of
treatment that therapy felt to her like a process of sewing, this task seemed
already to be well on its way.

Treatment Results
Constructing a life project for herself, as in pursuing a career in nursing,
had a very organizing and stabilizing function for Nadia. It was an essential
piece of the overall task of building a more cohesive ego for her and, more
broadly, building a more stable imaginary for her. We saw, when we explored
how given various aspects of her development she had come to develop a very
fragile imaginary, that the work of shoring up the imaginary was necessary. This

17

Other ways of understanding “nursing” are also obvious.
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was especially the case in that her fragile ego and imaginary were substantial
factors in her being vulnerable to feeling overtaken and invaded, which led her
to often turn to her cycles of drinking and writing. The latter were thus her
attempts at defending against the drive and establishing a barrier against the
real. Modifying these aspects of her ego and making her more stable thus carried
over into modifying her patterns of drinking and writing, as well as other things.
Over the course of the treatment, Nadia’s position in relation to her
pattern of drinking and writing fundamentally transformed. Although by the
end of treatment she sometimes drank recreationally with friends, she had just a
few drinks from time to time, which was in stark contrast to the excessive
amounts of alcohol she would regularly take in. Her experience of drinking was
also completely different: No longer did she drink and then write in an attempt
to regulate or stave off a jouissance invasion, in an attempt to try to fill in a hole
that she confronted.
I would argue that this shift was accomplished in large measure through
treatment interventions that focused on filling in holes and establishing
mechanisms whereby Nadia was more protected from feeling sucked in,
overtaken, and invaded. Notable among these interventions was “It’s like your
family.” This construction provided a semi-Oedipal meaning and plugged up a
hole. This was also part of shoring up an imaginary way of seeing things, of
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course (and thus part of the larger task of building a more stable imaginary for
her). This and other interventions that involved helping to install boundaries for
Nadia and facilitating separation from and protection against figures such as
Luis and her mother, resulted in a modification of jouissance for Nadia. She was
no longer in the position of the object for the Other’s jouissance. Through the
treatment Nadia became far less vulnerable to feeling invaded, overwhelmed,
and overtaken—that is, to experiencing an Other jouissance. Instead of this, and
instead of the kind of drinking and writing patterns she had been getting so
wrapped up in, she enjoyed in a more ordinary and far less painful way.
It is also important to note that my interventions about her alcohol use
were somewhat indirect. That is, I did not directly encourage her to stop or
reduce her drinking. I gave her no exercises or homework assignments; I gave
her no behavior plans. Instead, I worked to ascertain why she was drinking,
how the pattern of drinking and writing functioned for her, and then worked to
modify things on that level. I worked to help her find other ways to modify
what she was trying to regulate through her cycles of drinking and writing, as I
explained earlier. Accordingly, I believe the therapy resulted in a modification of
Nadia’s jouissance, and fundamentally did so by helping her to fill in the holes
she was confronting and previously trying to fill in through her patterns of
drinking and writing as attempts at defending against the drive. Filling in those
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holes gave her—in a way other than through drinking and writing—distance
from jouissance and more of a barrier against overwhelming experiences of the
real or a kind of Other jouissance.
Nadia’s drinking decreased over the course of the treatment, but her
binging and purging stopped completely. She had begun binging and purging
in response to encountering some “overwhelming feeling”18 that we can align
with a kind of unlimited and unmediated jouissance invasion (unmediated by
the symbolic, as she felt she could not find words for the feeling). She turned to
the real of the body by binging and purging in an attempt to drain off some of
this overwhelming jouissance against which she felt she had no protection or
barrier and to create a kind of hole or lack.
Moreover, Nadia’s binging and purging can also be understood as
symbolically devouring the threatening Other, or persecutor (and thus
responding to an overwhelming experience of the drive) and then vomiting
him/her out. Though the accent is slightly different in that way of formulating
her bulimia, it is still consistent with the idea that she was trying to create a hole
or lack through her binging and purging. This way of formulating her bulimia
even resonates with the idea of it being a response to the Name-of-the-Father’s
failure. That is, her binging and purging functioned as an attempt to lose

18

Another version of a “(w)hole feeling”?
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something (somewhat analogous to the subject losing das Ding through
castration) and thus regulate the drive—limit some Other jouissance.
Her drive-related activity of binging and purging seemed to shift when, as
I described, holes were made in the Other. That is, it may have shifted as a result
of things like the “nada en el rio” intervention, which perhaps had an impact with
regard to imagining a kind of a void or hole in the mOther, and interventions
involving locating a hole or lack in Luis. Perhaps the work of treatment also
resulted in Nadia’s drive-related position in relation to the Other’s demand being
rendered contingent—that is, no longer seeing herself as being in a necessary and
fixed position as the object for the Other’s jouissance, demanding that she suffer
and be abused or raped.
The treatment modified and set limits to the kinds of floods or invasions
of jouissance, or overwhelming experiences of the drive, and made Nadia
fundamentally and structurally less vulnerable to them. Accordingly, she no
longer needed to turn to things like binging and purging to control them. A
transformation within the structure of her addictions thus naturally followed
from the work being oriented around modifying their cause.
The transformation of the drive—including her no longer positioning
herself as the object for the Other’s jouissance—not only impacted symptomatic
behaviors such as these, but also carried over into an overall change in Nadia’s
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demeanor and even her way of speaking. For instance, towards the end of the
treatment she became more lighthearted and would even joke around a little bit.
Her way of joking about things implied some distance from her problems, taking
a different position in relation to them, and not suffering from them as much.
She also had a much freer use of language in general. She engaged in more
creative writing and poetry, and this writing no longer bore traces of the kind of
distressed writing and perseverating on things as it had before. Moreover, Nadia
generally seemed much more alive and vibrant, not only in terms of her
comportment and way of speaking but also in terms of her not being drawn to
dangerous situations, and so on, whereas earlier she had been almost
magnetically drawn to them. That may have been attributable to her experience
of the drive being structured in relation to the Other’s demand (prediction about
being raped or murdered by men) and thus to her inability to separate from a
position of the object for the Other’s jouissance.
She also began identifying with her father a bit more, in that she saw
herself as more reasonable like her father, and not just “crazy” like her mother,
and as someone who, like her father, pursued goals and achieved them. While
she was originally distressed by her certitude that her mother not only didn’t
want her but also hated her, by the end of treatment she changed position.
Speaking about her mother, Nadia said: “It wasn’t about me at all. She’s just a
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miserable person.” Nadia achieved some separation from her mother and made
something of herself. After a couple of years of treatment, Nadia developed a
more autonomous existence, a more cohesive sense of self, and became liberated
from her identification with “nada en el rio.” Rather than being identified with
nothing, she made something of herself.
She was no longer nada en el rio.
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Chapter 8
ADDICTION AND PSYCHOSIS
Working Within and Reorganizing a Delusional Structure: The Case of the
Woman Who Believed she was Jesus Christ

Case History: Janice
Introduction.
The following is a discussion of a case of psychosis in which a clear and
full-blown delusional structure was already operative at the outset of treatment.
The patient, whom I will refer to as “Janice,” believed that she was Jesus Christ1
and that she had a mission that she sought to carry out through her writing: to
“save all of the African-American children.” What I will focus on is the way in
which her alcohol addiction and writing were intertwined in her delusional
structure and were ways in which she attempted to regulate, translate, and
defend against jouissance. That is, Janice felt invaded by command auditory
hallucinations—voices telling her to hurt or kill her daughter—and, not feeling
very capable of resisting those commands, she would drink and write as a way

1

In my experience, although male psychotic patients who believe they are Jesus Christ are hardly unheard
of, it is highly unusual to find a female who believes she is Jesus.
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of at once fleeing into delusion and defending against the drive manifested
through the demands of the voices.
I believe this also exemplifies something I will discuss in more detail
further on, which I began to introduce in Chapter 5, about the relation between
delusion, drive, and the Other’s demand in psychosis. I propose that
hallucinated voices constitute a kind of demand. The drive is always a relation
to demand and the difference between neurosis and psychosis would seem to be
where the demand comes from—outside or inside.
Janice had a long history of alcohol addiction and mixed substance abuse,
the different functions of which will be described in detail throughout this
chapter. Janice was a teenager when she first began experimenting with drugs
and alcohol, which was her attempt at regulating jouissance and forming
imaginary identifications with peers who were also using drugs and alcohol.
Although the substance use of Janice’s teen years was both excessive and
pervasive in her life, her most notable addiction—to alcohol—first emerged and
spiked most seriously as a major problem when she had a psychotic break at the
age of twenty-four. That is, the problem was there all along but became
exacerbated and only emerged most fully in its severity—like the process of yeast
blooming in water—when she had a psychotic break later in life. Janice’s alcohol
addiction reached the peak of its severity during the year prior to her seeking
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therapy. She felt invaded by command hallucinations; she had a hard time
resisting their demands that she hurt or kill her daughter; and her delusional
structure became full-blown.
Janice’s alcohol addiction was obviously very problematic, in that it led
her to neglect and abandon her daughter, went hand-in-hand with her flight into
delusion, and resulted in major damage to her body (e.g., her doctor told her that
her liver was seriously compromised). Nevertheless, what I hope will also
become clear by the end of this chapter is that the patient’s alcohol addiction was
not the main problem. That is, her alcohol addiction was a symptom of a much
more all-encompassing problem: her difficulty regulating and defending against
the drive. This case illustrates how to have an impact on a patient’s addiction by
working within and reorganizing the delusional structure in which it is operative
by modifying the patient’s position in relation to the drive, the latter being
precisely the problem.

Clinical background.
At the time of treatment, Janice, a single African-American woman, was in
her late twenties and had a four-year-old daughter, Tamika. She was not in a
relationship with a man but maintained contact with her daughter’s father.
Janice had sophomore status at a college for women and aspired to become a
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professional writer. Janice initially approached the counseling center at her
women’s college for treatment, but she was instead referred to me at the clinic
where I was working because their facility did not take on psychotic clients. I
worked with Janice for approximately six months, at a frequency of twice-weekly
sessions. Although most of us would see this as a brief course of treatment, this
was fairly substantial for Janice, for although she had been hospitalized several
times in the past and had been in and out of various forms of inpatient and
outpatient treatment since she was eighteen years old, those brief stints of
therapy never lasted for more than a mere few sessions each.
Janice was somewhat overweight, dressed plainly and in a fairly genderneutral style, and went through several different pairs of eyeglasses (in a range
of very different styles) over the course of our six months of work. During
sessions she would either stare off aimlessly, gazing rather blankly at a fixed
point and not at me, or she would stare at me—even seeming to stare through
me—with a piercing gaze. She kept her coat on during most of our sessions that
occurred during the colder weather months and during every session always
kept her bag nestled right by her side as she sat on the couch. Indications of her
paranoia, though evident early in the therapy, became increasingly apparent as
the sessions unfolded.
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The “meltdown.”
During my initial consultation with Janice, she told me that she was
seeking therapy because she felt she was “having a meltdown.” She reported
that over the course of the week prior to our first meeting she had been becoming
more and more “frazzled” and finally felt she could no longer “cope with
anything.” She said she was having trouble at her part-time job at a department
store and was in danger of failing out of school, which she felt was due to the fact
that she was neglecting her school work in favor of spending all of her free time
working on her own writing. She also noted that she was having trouble
maintaining her home and taking adequate care of both herself and her
daughter. She said she had been feeling “extremely moody” and had been
having indescribable “overwhelming feelings,” which often caused her to have
difficulty concentrating and to have to excuse herself from the classroom several
times during class periods. She reported sporadic instances of suddenly
becoming very “panicky,” both during the day in her home or neighborhood,
and also when she was home alone at night with her daughter. Janice’s
psychotic anxieties had become very distressing for her, perhaps all the more so
because she could not put words to those experiences and was unsure of their
source.
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For the week prior to the initial interview she had been getting just a
couple of hours of sleep per night and had been drinking at least one bottle of
hard liquor per night. Although she had been drinking excessively for
approximately one year prior to her first seeking treatment, her alcohol
consumption had increased in frequency and quantity a few months prior to our
first appointment. It is likely that the sharp increase in her drinking coincided
with a triggering or worsening of her psychosis (a destabilization of her already
existing psychotic structure) and her flight into delusion. In subsequent sections
of this chapter I will discuss in more detail the particularities of her alcohol use
as it related to her psychotic symptoms. Note here, though, that it is important,
whenever a patient reports alcohol or drug use, to listen closely for how their
substance use is functioning. For Janice the problem was not the alcohol use but
rather the psychotic symptoms and intrusion of jouissance that she was trying to
regulate through her drinking.
During the first few sessions Janice reported having had an increase in
what she described as “flashbacks,” but which seemed more accurately to be
visual hallucinations. She said she felt these so called “flashbacks” had “always
been there” but usually became more prevalent when she was stressed. She told
me there was no way for her to describe the flashbacks or to communicate them
to me. She also displayed high levels of paranoia from the very beginning of the
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treatment, and she spoke of having the sense that most people were “out to get
her” or out to “teach her a lesson.” She told me she had only one friend at
school, Mary, and that everyone else talked about her daily. I eventually
deduced that Mary was either a visual hallucination or simply imagined. Janice
said that the other students and professors were making derogatory comments
about race and drugs behind her back and also to her face, but that when they
did she would “turn the other cheek.” I understood those to be paranoid
projections—Janice’s assumption that others were talking about her and
criticizing her for her substance use indicated that she was the one who was
critical of her own substance use.
During the first few sessions with Janice I took note of the religious
resonances of her statement that “Mary” was her only friend at school and that
when people made fun of her she would “turn the other cheek” (as Jesus said,
according to the Bible). She also told me that she frequently talked with a friend
named “Angel,” who, I surmised, might have been a hallucination. After a few
sessions Janice told me directly that she was Jesus reincarnated, the second
coming of Jesus. She added that she would not tell that to people on the street,
because she felt that if she did, she would get locked up in a hospital. (As I will
explain later, this is in fact what had happened to her in the past.)
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Nevertheless, a few days prior to the first session, Janice felt overwhelmed
by all of this and felt she needed to take a break from her daughter, whom she
characterized as extremely needy and a burden to her. They both stayed at
Janice’s parents’ house, where Janice began to accuse her mother of things like
stealing Tamika’s underwear. Janice told me she became enraged and accusatory
because she was sure her mother was abusing her daughter, which Janice felt
meant that her mother had also abused her when she was a child (though she
was never able to explain how she came to that conclusion). Janice also reported
having seen a woman standing in the middle of the street in front of her
apartment building around this time; she said the woman had blood dripping
down the back of her neck and wasn’t wearing any pants or underwear. While
Janice described this woman as having been real, it seemed to me to have been a
hallucination, particularly given the way it echoed her idea that her mother stole
her daughter’s underwear. It was clear that Janice was seeking treatment in the
midst of a psychotic break.

Precipitating events.
While Janice could not pinpoint a particular aggravating event that might
have triggered her recent “meltdown,” the break seemed to have been triggered
by an event that occurred about a week prior to the initial interview. Janice told
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me that she was extremely upset when the professor of her creative writing class,
whom she described as “a pain in the neck,” critiqued a piece of her writing and
asked her to delete sections of it. The professor also supposedly denigrated
Janice for having a weak vocabulary and for writing chaotically. Janice was
greatly offended, as she prided herself on her writing skills. Moreover, from a
theoretical perspective we can see that Janice’s reaction also stemmed from the
fact that her ego was so identified with her writing. She became quite agitated
and aggressive as she insisted that the professor did not “understand where [she]
was coming from.”
This encounter with the writing professor who asked her to delete sections
of her writing led Janice to feel “attacked,” as she put it—an erasure of her
writing being tantamount to an erasure of her self. The writing professor took on
the role of persecutor and was a castrating figure to Janice. Here, an Other was
making a demand on her, and perhaps also demonstrating that she herself was
lacking (was wanting more or something else from Janice, other than what she
had offered with her paper). This encounter with a castrating Other (recall that
for the psychotic, the Other is perceived as absolute) had no precedent and was a
central feature of the triggering of her break. Further, the cut in her writing felt
to her like an almost literal cut to her very flesh.
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As such, something of Janice’s experience with her writing professor was
rejected (foreclosed) but returned in the real in the form of the hallucination of
the woman in the street who had blood dripping down her neck and wasn’t
wearing pants or underwear. We might also say that the castration that was not
operative for her in her course of development made her more susceptible to
experiencing others as persecutors or castrating figures (as was the case with her
writing professor). Castration thus returned in the real in the form of
hallucinations such as the one of the woman whose neck had been cut. As I
explained in Chapter 5, in psychosis castration is not operative because the
Name-of-the-Father is foreclosed. Lacan emphasizes that it is thus a signifier that
is foreclosed in psychosis, and rather than castration as a symbolic function
having been operative, through the cut of the signifier, elementary phenomena in
psychosis often involve more concrete kinds of cuts. That is, it is common for
psychotics to have hallucinations bearing affinity with images of more literal or
concrete forms of castration, such as bodies having been literally cut or mutilated
in some way.
Lacan links this phenomenon of hallucinations in psychosis (particularly
hallucinations carrying castration imagery) with the mechanism of foreclosure
and clearly differentiates it from the neurotic mechanism of repression:
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What comes under the effect of repression returns, for repression and the
return of the repressed are just two sides of the same coin. The repressed
is always there, expressed in a perfectly articulate manner in symptoms
and a host of other phenomena. By contrast, what falls under the effect
of Verwerfung has a completely different destiny. . . . [W]hatever is
refused in the symbolic order, in the sense of Verwerfung, reappears in
the real. (Lacan, 1955-1956/1993, p. 12-13)
Lacan is essentially saying that the castration that did not occur (was “refused in
the symbolic order”) for the psychotic returns in the real in the form of a
hallucination. Lacan goes on to further explain this point by connecting the Wolf
Man’s childhood hallucination, related to having cut his finger with a knife,
which left his finger hanging by a piece of skin, with the fact that symbolic
castration had not been operative for him in his early history. Again, castration
having been rejected/foreclosed later generated a hallucination of a more
concrete kind of castration, as in the Wolf Man’s hallucination of a severed
finger.
Janice’s hallucinated image of the woman whose neck had been cut thus
exemplifies Lacan’s notion of the psychotic phenomenon of a hallucination being
like an image of castration in the real, in which “what did not come to life in the
symbolic appears in the real” (Lacan, 1956b/2006, p. 324). Janice’s hallucinated
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image can be read further as a conglomerate of fragments of her recent
experiences surrounding her “meltdown”: the hallucinated woman had no
pants or underwear, just as Janice believed her mother to have stolen her
daughter’s underwear and abused both her daughter and herself; and the
woman had blood dripping from a cut on the back of her neck, calling to mind
Janice’s comment that people were talking behind her back. This idea or image
of a cut on the back of one’s neck also resonates with Janice’s writing professor
asking her to make cuts in her writing, the professor whom she referred to as “a
pain in the neck.” Her writing professor had become a persecutory, castrating,
malevolent figure to her.
I will now address some details of Janice’s history and her various
presenting issues, and then I will turn to the course of treatment. In doing so, a
central issue I hope to expound upon is how one might work within and modify
an already existing, but problematic, delusional structure so as to impact the
drive.

Early childhood: Bubbles breaking, bees stinging.
When I asked Janice about her childhood and her parents, she said that
“no one ever really cared” about her, and that she often prayed for death. Janice
described her mother as “stuffy” and “lenient.” She said her mother “never
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cared” about what she did, and always let her do whatever she wanted. (Indeed,
formulations having to do with “not caring” came up very frequently as Janice
spoke of her sense of how her parents felt about her.) She said her relationship
with her mother was “distant” and that her mother always kept her “at a
distance on purpose.” She felt her mother never knew how to relate to her and
“didn’t care” to try.
What is more, Janice said that no one ever told her stories about her birth,
conception, or anything about whether or not she was wanted. She did not ask
but did feel certain that her mother neither loved nor wanted her. “And your
father?” I asked. “I guess he didn’t want me either. I never thought about it,”
she replied. She told me that her father was simply not around much while she
was growing up and “never set down rules, or if he did, I didn’t bother following
them,” she said. We can see how these details of her upbringing and family
constellation reflect the psychotic’s sense of not having a place within the Other’s
desire (as was also the case for Nadia) and also the sense of castration or the law
(or the Name-of-the-Father, and so on) never having been instated or accepted.2
When I asked Janice for her earliest memory, she first told me that she
could recall nothing prior to age twelve, but then she quickly reported two
memories that were supposedly from her early childhood. She said that when
2

The question of whether psychosis results from the Name-of-the-Father never having been instated at all
or from having been instated but not accepted by the psychotic is an interesting issue that is worthy of
further exposition but is beyond the scope of this project.
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she was around seven years old she was in a bathtub and heard the bath bubbles
popping. She said they made a “funny sound”3 that led her to become terrified,
leap out of the tub, and begin screaming for her mother. She said her mother
came and told her that the bubbles were “melting” and then laughed at her.
Janice did not describe her mother laughing with her about the bubbles; instead,
it felt to her like she was being mocked by her mother for that. (I will come back
to this memory when I address more details about Janice’s “meltdown.”)
The second memory dates back to when she was three years old. Janice
said she was stung by a bee while she was in her backyard picking dandelions
for her mother. She recalled that her mother watched this scene and said to her
father, “I don’t know why she’s picking them, I’m allergic.” She said her parents
then both broke out in loud laughter. Janice told me that this comment upset her
in that while she was trying to show her mother that she loved her, her mother
“made fun of [her].” “It hurt like a mother-fucker,”4 Janice added. Uncertain of
whether she was referring to the bee sting, her mother’s comment, her parents’
laughter, or the sense of rejection, or perhaps some combination of these, I asked,
“What hurt?” “The bee sting,” she replied flatly.

3

Indeed, as a child Janice seems to have had a high level of sensory sensitivity and a difficult time filtering
out various sounds or sensations that would go unnoticed by most people. This is very common in
psychosis.
4
We might say that Janice experienced her mother’s mockery of her, and so on, as a kind of molestation,
thus giving meaning to Janice’s fantasy that her mother had sexually abused her when she was a child.
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A common element of these two memories is the idea of a surface—
bubbles or skin—being punctured, breached. This is meaningful in terms of
what it communicated about the status of Janice’s ego development. For both
Freud and Lacan the ego is a bodily ego, which implies, among other things, that
ego formation is based on the role of the image of the body (and, as I discussed in
Chapter 2, also the important role of language and the ratification from the Other
in that process). The ego is like a skin or layer encapsulating the self that both
protects and contains and also serves as access point to the outside, receptor to
stimuli that come from outside. French psychoanalyst Didier Anzieu (1989)
formulated something similar through his notion of the “skin-ego,”5 which, to
summarize, refers to the manner in which the ego encloses the psychic apparatus
like the skin encloses the body, the former being developed on the model of the
latter. For Janice—and I think we can also draw more general conclusions about
the structure of psychosis itself—the integrity or consistency of her ego structure
was flawed. Janice’s description of the bee sting and the bubbles breaking spoke
to the way in which her ego was punctured. What should have been a layer of
protection, the encapsulation of her self, was punctured, and had a hole in it.
This is tantamount to the hole in the ego in psychosis.

5

See Anzieu’s book, The Skin Ego.
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Voices, the Other’s demand, and the drive.
In spite of Janice’s penchant for the concrete, her comment that “it hurt
like a mother-fucker” (when discussing the memory of the bee sting) seemed also
to suggest that the mockery and rejection inherent in her experience of the scene
involving the bee sting and being made fun of by her mother (and, by extension,
her experience of much of her childhood) felt to her like a painful assault. More
specifically, it felt like being the object of a maternal ravage.6 Janice was
positioned as the object of the Other’s7 jouissance: there was the mother’s
jouissance without paternal mediation, like a bee sting, and without phallic
signification. Freud taught us that early memories are incredibly telling, of
course, and it was clear that a lot was being communicated through what Janice
reported as her earliest memories.
The laughter is central. Janice experienced her mother’s laughter during
the scene of the bath bubbles and her parents’ laughter during the scene of the
flower picking as signs of their mockery of her. She experienced their laughter as
a manifestation of the jouissance of the Other. She felt they were enjoying her
distress, cruelly mocking her. Further, she experienced the laughter as invasive,
she being the object of the Other’s jouissance. That is clearly not much of a place
at all.
6
7

Something like being invaded by the mother, overtaken and almost “assaulted” by her.
We should keep in mind that Janice’s parents both laughed.
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Janice’s position as object also relates to her auditory hallucinations in that
they are, I am suggesting, a version of the demand of the Other. Further, her
hallucinations positioned her as the object of the Other’s jouissance, against
which she felt she had little protection. An auditory hallucination is a kind of
speech directed at the subject—like the Other’s demand in neurosis coming by
way of the subject’s interpretation of the speech from the Other—but as coming
from a different place, a different register. This relates to the point I raised at the
beginning of this chapter, that drive is always a relation to demand, and that the
difference between neurosis and psychosis is whether the demand comes from
outside or inside. For what Janice believed she heard was still the Other’s voice,
though it was a voice “in the real” through the hallucination rather than an
actual voice of a fellow human being.
On the one hand she heard command auditory hallucinations, a voice
enjoining her to do certain things. But she also imagined that people were
talking about her and laughing at her. She imagined that her peers at school
were laughing at her and mocking her, like her parents, her mother in particular.
Her parents’ laughter during her childhood carried a libidinal charge, a
traumatic excess of jouissance, which could not be assimilated or integrated, like
an unregulated invasion of jouissance. The Other’s jouissance then plagued her
by way of hallucinations, or voices in the real, the auditory hallucinations that
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invaded her and carried within them the same kind of unregulated experience of
the drive.
More specifically, Janice’s command hallucinations told her to hurt or kill
her daughter. These voices conveyed a demand made by the Other, a demand
that she make a sacrifice of her daughter. Can we see that as a form of castration
in the real, by way of the auditory hallucination? Janice perceived the voices to
be making demands of her, demanding that she essentially sacrifice her
daughter. Is this not a sacrifice of the source of her jouissance to the Other? This
illustrates the psychotic phenomenon of some aspect of castration being
foreclosed but returning in the real.
Is it possible to also understand Janice’s auditory hallucinations
specifically with regard to Lacan’s partial drives—oral, anal, scopic, and
invocatory? Although I am suggesting that Janice generally experienced
invasions of jouissance, like forms of an Other jouissance not delimited by
castration, or unregulated drives, it is possible to also discuss the invocatory
drive as a way in which that general experience of an invasion of jouissance
sometimes manifested itself by way of the voice as object. That is, I believe one
way to understand Lacan’s work on the invocatory drive, and the voice as object
of the drive, is in terms of the auditory hallucinations of psychotics. A
distinction between the register of demand and desire also suggests itself here as
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it is connected to the distinction between psychosis and neurosis regarding the
drive. That is, whereas the voice might be situated as object cause of desire in
neurosis, the role of the voice in psychosis is very different and as in the case of
Janice can be situated on the level of demand. Neurotic subjects, who are
“subjects of castration,” would not be susceptible to voices8 in the real such as the
auditory hallucinations of psychosis. Undergoing castration or not undergoing
castration determines one’s position in relation to desire and drive. Lacan’s
addition of the voice and gaze as objects, added to Freud’s list of the oral and
anal objects of the drive, are particularly relevant to considerations of the role of
the drive in psychosis—for the level of psychotic phenomena such as auditory
hallucinations (voice) and the paranoia of being watched (gaze).
Additionally, just as Janice’s mother’s supposed aggression against her
could not be assimilated by Janice, so too was her own aggression towards her
daughter not assimilated by her. In this manner, the voices Janice heard also
spoke that which she could not—that which was unthinkable to her. Janice
imagined her mother to be a persecutor and took her place in the fantasy
structure, just as her own daughter took her place as the child who falls victim to
a maternal ravage.

8

This is not to say that neurotics do not or cannot hear voices. However, those are more akin to the voice
of conscience or, even more basically, thoughts or wish fulfillments. The crucial diagnostic difference is
that psychotic patients say that they do not know where the voices are coming from, they view them as
coming from outside (not from within), and they have a sense of certainty about them, that they are real.
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Janice was unable to filter and regulate the traumatic excess of jouissance
that was inherent in the overdetermined nature of the voices. Janice experienced
a lack of control over unregulated drives—she felt invaded by the command
hallucinations and felt a minimal ability to resist their demand that she commit
violent acts. She turned to alcohol and writing as attempts to regulate the excess
of jouissance and defend against the command hallucinations. Her flight into
delusion and addiction was an attempt at forming defenses against the drive.
The stakes of this were very high, as her drinking was a last ditch attempt to
avoid submitting to the commands to hurt or kill her daughter. For several
months she drank excessively in an attempt to drown out the voices, and to
either drink and then work on her writing or simply drink so much that she
would pass out—immobilize herself, paralyze herself into a state of being unable
to act in accordance with the voice’s commands. Both were ways in which she
attempted to block out the voices.
There was a crucial switch from Janice feeling herself to be victim of the
voices, or the “imposed words” (paroles imposées),9 as Lacan describes the
auditory hallucinations of psychosis, to choosing to write and to give expression
to her own words. These attempts also fundamentally involved her then giving

9

Lacan refers to “imposed words” in his discussion of James Joyce and his writing in Seminar XXII.
Lacan also takes up the issue of imposed words in “A Lacanian Psychosis: Interview by Jacques Lacan” in
How Lacan’s Ideas are Used in Clinical Practice. The latter is a fascinating text and a very rare gem given
the almost complete absence of clinical cases or references by Lacan.
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voice to her own desire not to destroy but rather save children, as she explained
that her mission through her writing was to save African-American children.
Another way in which Janice often responded to hearing the command
hallucinations to hurt her daughter was to try to stave them off and not act on
the commands—by either leaving the house completely, so as to ensure that she
could not hurt Tamika, or by going into Tamika’s bedroom and waking her from
her sleep. Janice described needing to see Tamika and fundamentally needing to
hear her speak, so as to remind herself that she was a living being.
Perhaps we can also consider the role of the oral drive in Janice’s
hallucinations and the circuits she got caught up in with them as described. That
is, she experienced something that felt like being devoured or invaded by the
hallucinations and the corresponding feelings (overwhelmed, agitated, “charged
up,” and feeling “not in control of anything—who I am, what I think, or what I
do”), and feared that she then would devour and destroy her daughter. Her
writing and drinking were ways in which she tried to put a stop to that. Recall
also that Janice essentially felt devoured or overtaken by the Other’s jouissance
manifested in her parents’ laughter.
In the following sections I will examine ways in which in recent years
Janice had been engaging in attempts to translate jouissance and also to find or
make a place for herself, to give herself a name. The effect of the signifier and
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castration is to empty the body of jouissance, exteriorize jouissance, and give
hierarchy and organization to the drives. In psychosis, however, this does not
occur. We can see this in how for Janice she had not acceded to a position
separated from the Other’s jouissance, which had not been drained off; instead,
she experienced herself as being the object of the Other’s jouissance, and being
fixed in that position.

Making Herself: Sex, Drugs, and a New Name

The Name-of-the-Father as a first name.
According to Lacan, within the field of the Other, there is one signifier, the
Name-of-the-Father, that has a privileged function. The Name-of-the-Father is a
signifier that one takes from the Other and that comes to organize and regulate
one’s place in the Other. The Name-of-the-Father thus both gives and names
one’s place in the Other. As I reviewed in Chapters 2 and 5, if the Name-of-theFather is missing, the signification of the subject is also missing, and the absence
of phallic signification results from the failure of the paternal metaphor in
psychosis. In the absence of the Name-of-the-Father, the psychotic subject often
attempts to find or make a name for him- or herself. Lacan’s (1975-1976/2005)
famous example of this was James Joyce, who made a name for himself through
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his writing and thus managed to avoid a psychotic break for the entirety of his
life. Let us now turn to how Janice engaged in several different attempts to give
herself a place and to find a name for herself.

Renaming herself.
As Janice felt she had not been wanted by her parents, and had no place
within their desire, she was from the start rejected or cast out by the Other.
Phallic signification was lacking. Rather than becoming a being of desire, her
position was more like an object. Ironically, her given name even had something
to do with a cut of meat. When she was a teenager, though, she decided to adopt
a different, more common name and has gone by that name ever since. This
renaming of herself coincided with her trying to become more like everyone else,
or in her own words, “to be one of the girls.” This overlapped with attempts to
form imaginary identifications. Her adoption of a more common name, a
gendered name, also marked a shift away from her given name’s lack of gender
association.
Overall, Janice described her teen years as a time when she didn’t know
who she was and engaged in attempts to “make herself,” as she put it. She did
this primarily by experimenting with drugs, alcohol, and sex, experimentation
which she believed had an enigmatic “purpose” for her that she felt she could
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not articulate10 but believed held great importance. There was almost a sacred
quality to these attempts as she described them. We can see them as attempts to
find a place for herself and to regulate the drive.

Imaginary identifications.
Janice reported that when she was a teenager, especially between
seventeen and eighteen years old, she “had no direction in life” and engaged in
significant alcohol and drug abuse. She said she smoked “tons” of marijuana
daily and also drank heavily (hard liquor and/or beer) almost every day. She
said her parents had not been encouraging her to go on to college after
graduating, and she felt that meant they “didn’t care” about her and gave her
authorization to “do anything.” In the absence of her parents expressing a desire
for her to pursue college, and so on, she turned to self-destructive practices in
which she supposedly was attempting to give herself a name or designation and
“make herself.” She nevertheless often came quite close to destroying herself.
During the alcohol and drug abuse of those teen years, Janice sometimes
engaged in substance use with a group of peers. This constituted an attempt at
an imaginary identification with the group. She attempted to identify with peers
who were supposedly like her: a group of semblables, imaginary others that she

10

In this regard, it was more than ordinary teenage rebelliousness and attempts to “find oneself.”
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attempted to take as similar to her so that her ego would then be equated with
theirs. Her drug and alcohol use during her teenage years thus functioned as an
attempt at forming an imaginary stabilization by way of an “imitation” of
neurosis. Nevertheless, these identifications were not sturdy enough and so this
attempt at “making” herself ultimately did not succeed.
Janice’s substance abuse continued in its severity but became less regular
as time went on. In her early twenties, for instance, she would sometimes engage
in binge drinking alone when she wanted to “knock [her]self out” to get to sleep
or when she simply “didn’t know what else to do with [her]self.” She very often
drank heavily before sitting down to write for several hours at a time, which she
still sometimes did during the early portion of the therapy. She told me that she
felt she had something to communicate through her writing. She felt her
drinking was an attempt at facilitating that—at bringing out the words she
struggled to find—and perhaps an attempt to symbolize some real. We might
understand that struggle as an attempt to find “the good word,” the exact words
to symbolize something. Her substance abuse continued during the early
portion of her pregnancy with Tamika, which led to some pregnancy and birth
complications.
Janice also supposedly attempted to “make herself” (supposedly by
making various attempts to find an identity for herself) by experimenting with a
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myriad of sexual activities with different men. Janice asserted that her parents
never talked to her about sex, which she feels is why she “went crazy ballistic”
with sex when she could. She had her first sexual experience at the age of
seventeen with someone she met at her high school. Towards the end of high
school, Janice dated another man, Lamar, on and off. She said they rarely did
anything other than drink, smoke marijuana, and have sex. She said that Lamar
“used [her]” for sex and money and then left her. She said she was so drunk and
high she “didn’t know what [she] thought of him.” After her relationship with
Lamar, she experimented sexually with quite a few other men, which she said
usually happened while she was so drunk and high that she “didn’t even know
their names.” She then began a relationship with another man, Tyrone, whom
she met when she was trying to purchase drugs; she quickly became pregnant
with Tamika. Although Tyrone remained in her life to some extent after she
became pregnant with their child, their relationship supposedly ended when
Janice found out he had lied to her and had been dealing drugs behind her back
after he had promised not to do so. She took that as an unforgivable betrayal.
One way to understand Janice’s sexual experimentation is in terms of
imaginary identifications. That is, she might have been trying to identify with
the things that within her community at the time were associated with what was
run of the mill or “normal.” She might have engaged in experimentation with
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drugs, alcohol, and sex, in an attempt to be like others of her age and gender.
However, she took these behaviors to an extreme, which could have been linked
to her sense of not being present or fully in her own body during sexual
encounters, and linked to the fact that these behaviors functioned for her as an
attempt to organize unregulated drives. The extremity of these behaviors for her
suggest that their function went beyond that of most people (that is, they were
not on a neurotic level, and not typical teenage behavior) and related to her
psychotic structure and searching for a way to organize jouissance and reckon
with the real.
The common denominator in these attempts to “make herself” seemed to
be a repeated attempt to fundamentally find a place for herself, one outside of
the Other’s jouissance: an attempt to give order to unregulated drives, to engage
in an enigmatic “purpose,” and to find a name for herself. Janice was attempting
to do this, but her attempts at imaginary identifications and “making herself” did
not fully take hold. She then turned to a more radical attempt to find a place for
herself, through the formation of a delusional structure. We might speculate that
if her previous attempts had resulted in making a name for herself, she might
never have developed a delusional structure at all.
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The formation of the delusional structure: in the name of the Father.
The initial attempts during Janice’s late teenage years to “make herself”
were drastically unhinged by a series of events that occurred when she was
twenty-four years old. Within less than one year, just after Janice gave birth to
Tamika, Janice’s aunt and uncle died within three months of each other. She
then lost her job after accusing her co-workers of devising a plot to kill her, and
had to go on welfare because of the ensuing financial difficulties. Giving birth to
Tamika seemed to have left Janice uncertain of her ability to occupy a maternal
role. Indeed, she once remarked that when Tamika was born, she simply “didn’t
know what to do with it.” She thus saw her baby as an object (an “it”) rather
than a human being, and she didn’t know how to relate to her child.
The death of Janice’s aunt and uncle also had quite an impact on her as
they had been her closest relatives. While she was growing up they had
occupied a prominent role in her life and she told me that she had aspired to
become like them. When they both died suddenly, the imaginary-level support
they had provided was shattered. Losing her job also unmoored Janice, of
course, and imaginary supports of her sense of self or any semblance of her
having a place in the world became completely unglued, and she became quite
unstable. It was at this point that Janice’s delusional structure, in which she
believed herself to be the reincarnation of Jesus Christ, took shape.
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During the course of that year, Janice was involuntarily committed three
times. She said that she was hospitalized the first time because she was “being
crazy”—she never told me specifically what had happened—and that she was
hospitalized the second time, right around Christmastime, because she had
become aggressive with her family and had threatened to kill herself or them.
The third involuntary commitment took place one night just shortly after
Christmas. She drove her car up onto the church lawn and then crashed her car
into the front of the church. She said the police found her screaming in front of
the church and breaking the church windows. Janice told me that at first she had
been running up and down the street in front of the church, shouting about how
she was Jesus and wanted to “save” everyone. She said she wanted to go speak
with the pastor because no one believed her. She said she first tried knocking on
the doors and windows of the church, but when no one answered even though
she thought she saw a light on somewhere in the church, she decided that the
pastor was “tricking [her], hiding,” and refusing to answer, and she felt everyone
must have been “out to get [her],” which was why she screamed and broke the
windows. Janice also noted that she had been feeling quite overwhelmed at the
time and had not slept at all for four days straight.
As all of her imaginary supports had shattered, she needed to find a new
way to try to give herself a place and find a name for herself. We can see how
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through the development of her delusional system she aspired to a new name:
Jesus Christ. Through her delusional system, Janice identified as Jesus and
viewed herself as the phallus of humanity, ready to “save” the children, the
future generation. Her identification as Jesus Christ allowed her to say that she
had parents, and gave her a place within a system that for her had a defect, as
she had had no place in the Other. This identification as Jesus Christ was a way
of naming herself and designating herself in relation to a Father, giving herself a
very privileged place, indeed.

The “mission.”
Janice explained to me that around the same time when she had figured
out that she was the second coming of Christ and that she was “chosen” by God,
she also came to the conclusion that she had a “mission,” which she believed she
was to carry out through her writing. She told me that she wanted to write in all
genres, but particularly African-American literature for children, to give them
hope that there’s “something on the other side.” She said she was “disgusted”
by what she perceived to be the African-American community’s drug culture
and lack of ambition. Note that this was a distinct shift in attitude, from her
earlier attempts to form imaginary identifications by emulating her peers’ drug
and alcohol use and sexual experimentation. Now she could no longer form
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these imaginary identifications, and she saw herself as radically outside of her
community—now her attitude was one of supposed superiority to them, and
being “disgusted” with them. Accordingly, with the advent of her “mission,”
Janice hoped that by publishing her writing she could “save” the children on the
street who didn’t believe in a future. Janice said that although she was “always a
writer,” she felt “blessed” knowing that God had chosen to use her writing as a
vessel through which she could “save the children.”
She said she often spent many hours (about nine or more) per night
writing, a process she described as “frenzied” and “very exciting.” Janice
described her writing as a “chaotic mess of stuff” in her head and noted that she
was in the process of writing several different things: a fiction novel, a nonfiction book, poetry, and several short stories for children. Remarkably enough,
although she had been working on the non-fiction book, her primary writing
project, for a number of years already by the time the therapy started, often
practically non-stop for several days at a time, she had produced a total of only
twenty-four pages of writing.
I believe we can begin making sense of this remarkable detail by
considering the structural function Janice’s writing and delusional system served
for her. To review: Janice had no place within her parents’ desire. That is, she
believed she was neither wanted nor loved, and in her report her parents never
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told her that they wanted or expected anything of her: they “didn’t care.” The
absence of a cohesive sense of self and place within her parents’ desire
contributed, for instance, to Janice engaging in heavy substance abuse and sexual
activity during her teen years, when her parents did not encourage her to take
her studies seriously and go on to college. Later on, she had attempted to cobble
together a sense of self through her delusional system. By believing that she was
Jesus Christ and had a mission to “save” people through her writing, she
attempted to forge for herself a prosthetic ego or sense of self through a
delusional system in which she could exist and could have a place in a world of
meaning. Indeed, she could imagine not only having a place within a paternal
lineage—having a place in the Other—but also being in a place of privilege as
descended from God the Father. Her writing, similar to the substance abuse and
sexual experimentation that marked her teen years, was a way of responding to a
fault or hole.
In other words, Janice’s delusion as well as her writing project or
“mission” (and these were clearly intertwined) had the function of a sinthome.
Recall that for Lacan a sinthome is “something that allows the symbolic, the
imaginary, and the real, to hold together” (Lacan, 1975-1976/2005, Class of
February 17, 1976). In psychosis, the Name-of-the-Father is lacking or not
operative, which can result in the symbolic, imaginary, and real not being
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securely knotted or held together. In neurosis the three orders are knotted
together by way of the Oedipus complex or imposition of the paternal metaphor.
Lacan formulates how a sinthome such as a delusional structure, writing project,
and so on, can come to bind the three orders together in the absence of the
Name-of-the-Father, thus replacing it in its function. The sinthome is thus
something like a fourth ring that comes to organize the other three and keep
them together. This can be depicted accordingly:
Figure V:

Lacan refers to this as a Borromean knot, in which he depicts how each subject’s
psychic reality takes shape according to their particular organization of the
imaginary, symbolic and real, or the three rings in the knot.
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In the case of James Joyce, Lacan posits that Joyce’s writing is his sinthome,
and I believe this is similar to the function Janice’s writing had for her. Lacan
suggests that although for Joyce there might have been an absence of the
imposition of the Name-of-the-Father during his childhood, Joyce’s writing
became a fourth ring that kept him from ever experiencing a psychotic break, or
an unraveling of the knot. Joyce’s writing—perhaps like Janice’s delusion and
writing mission—served to make up for what was lacking on the level of the
Name-of-the-Father. As Lacan put it, “it was by wanting a name for himself
[through his writing] that Joyce compensated for the paternal lack” (Lacan, 19751976/2005, Class of February 17, 1976). The name that Joyce created for himself
through his writing filled in for the absence of the Name-of-the-Father. This
highlights the sinthome’s function of “filling-in-for (suppléance) the Name-of-theFather” (Lacan, 1974-1975, p. 44). Joyce’s writing gave him both a name and a
place, and was a way of creating a paternity. For instance, in A Portrait of the
Artist as a Young Man, Joyce wrote: “I go to encounter for the millionth time the
reality of experience and to forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated
conscience of my race. . . . Old father, old artificer, stand me now and ever in
good stead” (Joyce, 1916/1964, p. 253). Joyce’s writing was a prosthetic ego. In
fact, Lacan suggests that Joyce’s writing became constitutive of, and coextensive
with, his ego. Even more than this, another important function Joyce’s writing
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had for him was that through it he used language to organize jouissance. This is
most evident in Finnegan’s Wake. As I remarked earlier, I believe much of Janice’s
own writing had a similar function of translating jouissance for her.
There are certainly similarities between the function Joyce’s writing had
for him and the function Janice’s writing had for her. However, whereas Joyce’s
writing seems to have prevented him from ever having a psychotic break, Janice
had already experienced a psychotic break. Her writing was part of the
delusional system that was her way of attempting to repair the break, and it was
her way of cobbling together a sense of self and establishing a place for herself in
the world through her mission. Both Joyce’s and Janice’s writing functioned as
prosthetic egos or sinthomes through which both attempted to make a name for
themselves and organize and translate jouissance.
Nevertheless, Janice got stuck at twenty-four pages. Numbers can have a
lot of meaning, perhaps more so in psychosis. Let us recall that Janice had a
psychotic break when she was twenty-four years old. We might say that when
she had just given birth to Tamika, her aunt and uncle died, and she lost her job
and had to go on welfare, a fundamental hole11 was exposed. The things that had
been in any way holding her together fell apart and her sense of self thus seemed
to unravel. Being unable to produce more than twenty-four pages of her non11

Or perhaps multiple holes. Psychotic patients in the midst of a break often present as though things
continue to unravel at multiple locations, due to the emergence of several holes.
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fiction, autobiographical writing project seems to relate to an inability to
symbolize a self beyond the dissolution of her already fragile sense of self which
took place during her break when she was twenty-four years old.
Janice’s delusional system gave her a name, but not a very suitable one in
that the name of Jesus Christ is too difficult to live up to. Janice’s writing, as her
“mission,” can be considered somewhat better for the reason just noted as well as
for the fact that her writing is not just imaginary; it also exists on the level of the
symbolic. Since it was her “mission,” it gave her a place in the Other. It was also
symbolic by virtue of the fact that it involved her attempt to use language and to
give symbolic expression to feelings, experiences, and thoughts. Nevertheless, it
was not sufficient, as I will explain in the next section when I turn to reviewing
aspects of the course of treatment.
Furthermore, Janice’s writing had a very important function for her in that
it was an attempt to translate the jouissance of others. Her writing, much of it
autobiographical or in some way stemming from her own experiences or
situations she encountered with others around her, was a way of symbolizing
what was happening to her and around her, giving symbolic form to it and thus
giving herself some distance from it. Given Janice’s position as object of the
Other’s jouissance, this was particularly important.
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As we can see, Janice’s writing and delusional structure more broadly had
a function. They served as a way of trying to respond to the original hole left in
the absence of the Name of the Father, and to give herself a place and a name.
Nevertheless, these attempts were problematic for a number of reasons—as
evidenced by the fact that what precipitated the “meltdown” that led Janice to
seek therapy was her writing professor’s critique of her writing. Janice derived a
sense of ego cohesion by believing that she was Jesus and that her mission was to
save the children by publishing her writing, and yet submitting her writing to an
Other who might judge the writing made her vulnerable to delusions of
persecution. It was clear to me that something had to be done in order to
attempt to remold those structures, to help Janice find something more livable.

Course of Treatment
One of the first things that I felt was important in my work with Janice
was to take her delusions and hallucinations seriously, from the very beginning
of the treatment, and to consider them inherently meaningful. For instance,
when she spoke of her friends “Mary” and “Angel” I simply accepted and
worked with what she said to me, even though it seemed clear that these figures
were either hallucinations or mere objects of imaginative reverie. In general, I
did not attempt to pierce the delusional structure in any way. Even though the
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delusional structure was problematic, it was still keeping her together, albeit in a
rather tenuous fashion. As Freud pointed out, the formation of the delusional
structure is an attempt on the part of the psychotic patient at a solution.
Accordingly, the delusion is not what is most pathological or ill, as many nonanalytic clinicians seem to think, but is rather an attempt at repairing it. Indeed,
as Janice’s delusional structure shifted over the course of the therapy, she
gradually didn’t speak about Mary or Angel at all, as though they were no longer
necessary.
Instead of piercing or calling the delusional structure into question, I
slowly attempted to find ways to modify it—to make it into something not only
more stable or functional, but also more livable for Janice. For instance, since
encountering people who might critique her writing felt like an assault (recall her
hallucination of the woman with blood dripping from a cut on her neck) I felt I
had to move her away from trying to publish her writing and yet still preserve
something of the project itself. I felt that was important because her writing was
already serving as a kind of second skin for her, a continuation of her very sense
of self and a suppletion (suppléance) of her ego identity, or sinthome, as I
explained in Chapter 5. As her writing was interlaced with the delusional
structure that was holding her together, albeit precariously, it was like a
protective layer that encapsulated her, perhaps something along the lines of a
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bubble. When she had her “meltdown” after she encountered the criticism of her
writing professor, she experienced an invasion, like having her skin stung by a
bee or like having a bubble that had been encasing her self, melt away.
Within the treatment I took a position that involved supporting much of
Janice’s writing. I did so knowing that much of her writing was an attempt by
her—an attempted solution found by her—to symbolize and translate jouissance.
Her writing was thus her attempt to form some separation from the Other’s
jouissance. It was also what she often turned to after she would drink alcohol in
response to hearing the voices commanding her to hurt or kill her daughter
(alcohol and writing being media through which she tried to shut out the voices
and instead give voice to her own desire to save the children). Accordingly, her
writing had very important functions for her; however, this was not without
problems, as I outlined previously.
In light of all of those issues, I maneuvered so as to encourage Janice to
begin seeing her writing project as something that could be private, rather than
something she absolutely had to publish in order to carry out her “mission.” For
instance, since critique by a judging Other felt to her like an “assault,” I was
careful to emphasize that the writing was fundamentally hers—that she created it
and that no one could take it away from her. Whenever she spoke of her writing
I was careful to emphasize that—for instance, by repeatedly using and
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emphasizing the wording “your writing” when I spoke to her about it. In fact, I
never actually saw any of her writing, and instead encouraged her to tell me
about it, if she wished to do so. She never offered to bring in her writing, and I
chose not to ask her to do so. I did that so as to avoid the possibility that I might
become positioned as a persecuting Other who might be perceived as judging
Janice’s writing, like her writing professor.
When Janice escalated and became enraged as she spoke of her writing
professor just “not getting it” and not understanding “where [she] was coming
from,” I tried to reduce her sense of being persecuted by showing a bit of
empathy for how she felt, and at times by gently suggesting that feeling
misunderstood was also a common human experience. For instance, I asked her
whether she could imagine that any of the other students in the writing class had
ever felt somewhat misunderstood after someone else read their writing. She
was able to consider these sorts of ideas as I gradually and softly introduced
them after enough of a rapport had been built between us, and her levels of
paranoia and aggression in turn gradually began to be reduced. These types of
interventions were also designed to begin to insert her more effectively into a
social structure in which she could imagine occupying a position other than
being “the only one,” an exception or some sort of sole victim of a persecutory
Other who was “out to get” her. We might say that these sorts of interventions
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also facilitated the building of imaginary identifications wherein she might begin
to see herself as more like her peers at her women’s college, perhaps as “just one
of the girls.”12
I attempted to dislodge Janice from her perceived position as victim of
constant persecution by intervening in ways that aimed at defusing some of her
paranoia. For instance, early in the treatment Janice described repeatedly laying
awake at night for hours upon hours in distress hearing what she described as a
banging or knocking sound, which she believed was someone trying to break
into her apartment and “come to get” her. After a careful assessment of the
situation, it seemed more likely that she was hearing something else, like a tree
branch being rustled by the wind and repeatedly tapping against her window,
and that she was instead mistaking it through the lens of her paranoid fantasy
about someone being out to get her. Suggesting that there might be other
possible explanations for what she was hearing—suggesting that it might be a
tree branch tapping her window or the side of her building was one such
comment I made to her—slowly helped to defuse some of her paranoia.
Similarly, there was a time later in the treatment when Janice became enraged
that several people in her life had been calling her repeatedly. She began
attributing malevolent intentions to them and seeing them as persecuting her
12

She had already been attempting, on her own, to form imaginary identifications and supports during her
teenage years, when she was trying to be like “one of the girls,” as I described previously.
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with their repeated calls. I pointed out to Janice that she had suddenly cut off
contact with several relatives and friends and that they might simply have been
calling out of concern for her well being, not knowing what to make of her
suddenly breaking off contact with them. These interventions were designed to
call into question the paranoid meanings she was attributing to several events in
her life and to shake up her fixed belief that others were always persecutors.
This gradually led to rendering aspects of her paranoid beliefs more contingent
and generally far less fixed.
Throughout the course of therapy I also attempted to shift Janice’s
conviction that her writing mission entailed her having to “save” all of AfricanAmerican children. I accomplished this partly by encouraging her to discuss
issues that might have been driving that project, such as her own wish that
someone could have “saved” her as a child, and then by opening up the
possibility that she might reorient her writing “mission” so that she could use it
instead to “save” her own daughter. That is, we talked about how Janice had
lamented (quite angrily) that her mother “never cared” about her, how her
parents never expressed a desire for her to pursue her studies and go on to
college after high school, and so on. We also worked with the idea that she
might have wished that if she herself had had parents who had “cared,” she
wouldn’t have felt so abandoned and then, later, compelled to try to “make
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[her]self”—for instance, during her teen years through experimentation with
wild sex, drugs, renaming herself, and so on. We worked with the notion that
Janice now had a chance to be a mother who could “care” for her own daughter,
Tamika, as she wished her own mother could have cared for her.
Part of this work of transforming Janice’s delusion entailed working to
modify her position as the object of the Other‘s jouissance. As I described earlier
in this chapter, Janice’s auditory hallucinations were enjoining her to hurt or kill
her daughter. She experienced this as a demand of a maleficent Other for her to
sacrifice her daughter. I intervened to create a division between thought and
action by emphasizing to Janice that having thoughts about hurting her daughter
would not result in her being hospitalized or incarcerated, but that taking action
on those thoughts would. This helped to dispel Janice’s fear that telling me
about the voices might result in her being put in a hospital or jail. Such
interventions created an important distinction between thought and action—a
distinction that had not been particularly clear to her—and also established a
firm limit and supported the law.13 Janice seemed calmed by such interventions.
Emphasizing to Janice that the thoughts and the voices were important things to
be talked about in the therapy also helped to open up a space for her to talk

13

Interventions that support the law, with all of the meanings inherent in doing so, are often very important
to make with psychotic patients.
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about them, to give them symbolic expression, with the aim that doing so would
make their enactment less likely.14
Another aspect of working to separate Janice from a position as object of
the jouissance of the Other involved reorganizing particular signifiers that were
laden with meaning from her childhood and connected to her more recent
struggles. This was done with the aim of draining off some of the toxic
jouissance and creating a different space for her, a space outside of the jouissance
of the Other. For instance, when Janice described her recent experiences of
feeling persecuted and mocked, I said, “Your hurt is something to be taken
seriously; it stings and it’s nothing to laugh at.” This was to help her consider
the possibility that, in contrast to having felt mocked and “laughed at” by her
parents during the childhood scene of picking flowers and being stung by a bee,
she could instead experience things differently now, and that perhaps others
might not be malevolent. Similarly, when Janice spoke of times when she would
hear the voices and leave the house so as to ensure that she would not hurt
Tamika, I commented, “You drink and write to keep yourself at a distance from
your daughter; you love her and take care to not hurt her.” And then, “Let’s
work on helping you to keep yourself at a distance from the voices.” These

14

A significant amount of safety planning, risk assessment, and contracting for safety were also key
features of handling these issues within the therapy.
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interventions were grounded in and reorganized the persecuting signifiers, to
create a space for Janice to occupy a different position.
This move of helping Janice find a place outside the jouissance of the
Other went hand in hand with fundamentally modifying her delusional
structure and mission. First, we discussed how Janice might think of her writing,
particularly the stories for children, as something she could pass on to Tamika, to
help teach her values and to help her learn to deal with the struggles she might
encounter—that might accompany growing up in their rather impoverished and
unsafe neighborhood, and so on. By finding meaning in that particular way of
using her project, and in seeing an opportunity to not repeat her own upbringing
in her rearing of her own child, she could become more able to find meaning in
taking on those goals as new uses of her project—a new way of being in the
world and having a more ordinary, though still very meaningful, purpose. This
transformation of her delusional structure involved a shift from “all”—seeing it
as her mission to save all of the children—to “not all”—not all of the children,
necessarily, but perhaps just her own child. This was also a shift from the
delusion and her mission being the sole focus of her existence to there being
room for other things, and it not taking over and becoming all that there was for
her—another form of shift to a “not all.” In this manner there was a
decompletion of the delusion and a shift within the fantasy such that she could
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take a different position within it. This also resulted in a transformation on the
level of jouissance, which I will explore further in the following section.

Treatment Results
Indeed, as Janice began to see “caring” for her daughter as an important
project, significant changes started taking place. Whereas Janice had been
avoiding and essentially abandoning Tamika—for instance, when she came
home from school she would lock herself in her bedroom and read or write,
while leaving Tamika to watch TV and be responsible for her own meals (Janice
had claimed that when Tamika became hungry, she assumed she would just
make herself a peanut butter sandwich—this resulted, unfortunately, in fouryear-old Tamika becoming undernourished)—now she took pride in being more
responsible, spending more time with Tamika, preparing three square meals for
her, and even signing them up to take an art class together.
As the therapy progressed and Janice became more willing to “care” for
Tamika, as the nature of her delusion and mission had fundamentally shifted, the
auditory hallucinations also receded and she was no longer plagued by thoughts
of hurting or killing her daughter, as they were encapsulated in the command
hallucinations. Rather than viewing Tamika as an extension of herself, perhaps
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by conflating Tamika with herself as a child, a child who had wished for death15
and who felt like a victim of a maternal ravage, Tamika became more of a
separate being to her, and someone she could care for, as she herself had not
been cared for by her mother.
Another important change that came about by the end of the therapy was
that Janice’s alcohol use subsided significantly and her drug use stopped
completely. In light of Eric Laurent’s assertion that a “drug incarnates a function
connected either to desire or to delusion, according to the subject’s structure”
(Laurent, 1996, p. 132), we can understand that the modification of Janice’s
delusional structure led to a corresponding modification of the nature and
function of her substance use. The delusion and the substance use were
intertwined, as I explained earlier in this chapter. Janice had been using alcohol
and writing as media through which she attempted to translate and regulate
jouissance—to defend against the drive, and her feeling unable to reign in the
drive, as it was manifested most particularly through the command
hallucinations to kill her daughter. By the end of treatment, Janice’s auditory
hallucinations had ceased. Accordingly, when her position as the object of the
Other’s jouissance shifted, and she no longer felt constantly invaded and
persecuted, so too did her alcohol use shift. She drank in moderation

15

Her own death, Janice told me, but we might also speculate about death wishes towards her parents.
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recreationally and no longer in excess as an attempt to defend against the drive
and retreat into delusion, the latter having been rendered no longer necessary
given the modification on the level of the drive. The addiction shifted because its
cause was modified.
Janice’s shift from being a “savior” to all African-American children to
instead becoming someone who could find meaning in the project of “caring” for
her own daughter offered her a new way of organizing her identity and life
project, or way of finding a meaningful place for herself in the world. From a
delusional structure in which she imagined herself to be Jesus Christ and a
“savior” to a less dangerous and more ordinary project of being a woman who
could “care” for her daughter—that seemed to be the trajectory of the therapeutic
work.
Interestingly, this marked a transformation of her position in relation to
the Other’s demand and was a shift from a full-blown delusion to something
more similar to a neurotic fantasy. Janice did not “become neurotic,” which
would not have been possible given the permanence of Lacan’s structural
diagnoses. However, there was a shift from delusion, which is itself the
psychotic’s attempt to reestablish a relation to the world, to something closer to a
stabilized psychosis which was somewhat imitative of aspects of neurosis and
the neurotic’s (fantasmatic rather than delusional) way of relating to the world. I
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believe untriggered or stabilized psychosis can be thought of as a way in which
the psychotic gets through life by way of an imaginary identification with or
“imitation” of neurosis.
Janice’s decision to discontinue the treatment coincided with her decision,
which she proudly discussed with me, to invest more of her time and money in
her daughter—she and her daughter enrolled in an art class together, she
enrolled Tamika in a dance class, and Janice herself enrolled in a parenting class.
She made this decision around the time when I was preparing to leave the clinic,
which she was aware of. I do not know how much of a factor the latter was in
her decision to discontinue treatment. Although I gently encouraged her to
consider continuing her therapy with another clinician after I left, she reiterated
her interest in instead investing more of her time and energy into her daughter. I
chose not to push the issue any further. My sense was that although Janice had
achieved an adequate level of stability, ongoing work would have helped her to
achieve a greater and perhaps more enduring level of stability and to manage the
stressors of life. The treatment of psychotics is often a very lengthy, ongoing
process. Regardless, Janice chose to focus on her daughter, which could have
been a very constructive new project for her.
Janice came to occupy a more ordinary place, and simultaneously one that
was not only less painful but also fundamentally more her own. That was the
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last step in her process of “making” herself, accomplished within the therapeutic
work.
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Chapter 9
Concluding Remarks

The Project as a Whole
My hope in undertaking this project was to accomplish two tasks: 1) to
contribute to the advancement of Lacanian clinical scholarship in the U.S., and 2)
to contribute to the improvement of the clinical treatment of addictions.
I reviewed in my first chapter the fact that there is a disappointing paucity
of Lacanian clinical scholarship in the U.S. The primary consequence of this is
that most American clinicians are not particularly aware of the clinical utility of
Lacanian theory. In the U.S., Lacan’s work is more likely to be read within
literature or film studies programs than psychology departments or
psychoanalytic institutes. In fact, in most clinical training programs Lacan is not
even on the radar. I consider this to be a very unfortunate state of affairs, in that
I believe Lacan’s work is not only innovative, compelling, and intellectually
stimulating, it is also extremely useful.
Through this project, I set out to explore how a clinical approach guided
by Lacanian theory might be useful with regard to one specific clinical problem:
the treatment of addictions. The field was ripe for exploration, since the
predominant treatment modalities currently being used to treat addictions—
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primarily CBT and 12-Step programs—seem not to be terribly effective. That is
evidenced by the shockingly high relapse rates for addictions: over 75% (Armor,
Polich, & Stambul, 1978; Hunt, Barnett, & Branch, 1971; Svanum & McAdoo,
1989). Since addictions involve drive-related circuits of repetition and Lacanian
psychoanalysis aims to facilitate for subjects transformations on the level of the
drive, an exploration of the potential utility of a Lacanian approach to the
treatment of addictions seemed promising.
I approached this project with a simple hypothesis—that each subject
experiences his or her addiction uniquely. What logically followed from that
idea was that the treatment of addictions should also be tailored to each
individual subject and the particularity of his or her addiction. I sought to
explore that through a Lacanian lens, theoretically and clinically, by examining
differences in how addictions show themselves and function depending on the
subject’s structural diagnosis—neurosis, perversion, psychosis—as well as how
each individual subject’s experience of the drive comes to be shaped by
particular events and circumstances in his or her development.
In an effort to bridge the gap between theory and practice, I paired
theoretical exegesis with the presentation of detailed clinical case studies to
explore how it might be possible, by utilizing a Lacanian approach, to impact the
drive roots of an addiction. This project is the first of its kind, in that a Lacanian
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psychoanalytic approach to the clinical treatment of addictions has not yet been
written.

Findings
I believe this project demonstrates that addictions do indeed show
themselves very differently depending on the subject’s structural diagnosis and
the particular ways in which the subject’s experience of the drive is shaped by
how he or she is Oedipalized, undergoes castration, and enters language. I
described how the subject’s experience of the drive follows from how the subject
positions him or herself with respect to the Other’s demand. I hope I have also
demonstrated, through the case studies, the treatment efficacy of a Lacanian
approach that takes into account these differences.
For instance, I believe both my theoretical exegesis and the case studies
demonstrate that a neurotic addict is very different from a psychotic addict.
In neurosis, the result of the subject undergoing castration is that some
enjoyment is retroactively determined to have been lost. The subject then
engages in drive-related attempts to recover some hypothetically lost jouissance.
Also, the neurotic subject mistakes the Other’s demand for the Other’s desire and
lives out the drive according to the position he or she takes with regard to the
Other’s demand—for instance, by fulfilling it, refusing to satisfy it, or being
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generally fixated on it such that there is little room for one’s own space of desire.
After all, desire is the Other’s desire.
In the cases of Buck and Phil—two obsessional neurotic addicts—I
highlighted that their addictions related to how they underwent castration, or
experienced a kind of loss of jouissance, and to their stances with respect to their
perception of the Other’s demand.
Buck seemed to lament the loss of a kind of “golden age.” He described
the loss of a time when the family enjoyed all of the spoils of wealth, privilege,
and social class—when they were mixed with the upper crust of the British
elite—and memories of a lost enjoyment associated with his early relationship
with his mother. Buck’s “oral” addictions functioned as manifestations of his
drive to recover some jouissance associated with his mother, as I described.
Those included what he described as attempts to find satisfaction by putting
myriad objects into his mouth, from soda to paperclips. He engaged in repeated
attempts to find some object that might fully satisfy him and fill his lack, and the
failure to achieve that saturation of lack frustrated and angered him. The
metonymic displacement of those objects was attributable to the fact that no
object can eradicate lack, though addicts sometimes seem to believe that there
could be an object that might allow them to overcome castration.

311

Buck’s “anal” drive patterns related to his position in relation to the
Other’s demand. That is, he imagined that the Other (his father) was demanding
his academic success—that Buck make good use of his education, work hard, and
earn good grades. Buck experienced a great deal of jouissance in pushing his
father to become angry and yell at him. He staunchly refused to satisfy his
father’s demand and withheld what his father was demanding, by sabotaging his
education and risking flunking out of school. In so doing, Buck also maintained
desire as impossible, and in this way too his addictions were intertwined in his
obsessional neurotic structure. I described how the treatment, though I believe it
ended prematurely, involved beginning to bring into focus the drive roots of his
addiction by attending to manifestations of the unconscious (such as slips of the
tongue) and punctuating signifiers connected with the circuits of his drives.
Just as many of Buck’s addictions related to what he imagined to be some
lost jouissance associated with his early relationship with his mother, so too did
Phil’s addiction—to marijuana—relate to his relationship with his own mother.
That is, he imagined a kind of primal fusion with his mother through his
smoking which took on a lethal value in that his interpretation of his mOther’s
demand was something like “fuse with me, suffocate, and die.”
Throughout the presentation of Phil’s case in Chapter 4, “The Color of
Emptiness: Re-enacting the Paternal Metaphor,” I emphasized technical
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interventions that were designed to impact the real by way of the symbolic. I
described how Lacanian techniques such as scansion and attending to and
working with what he refers to as the signifier’s “literating structure” can have
an impact on and transform the drive roots of a symptom such as an addiction.
By the end of treatment, Phil’s drug use changed, which I described as a
transformation from “mamajuana”—experiences of smoking that felt limitless,
anxiety-inducing, and suffocating, and seemed to operate beyond the pleasure
principle—to ordinary marijuana—experiences of pleasure in occasional
smoking that had a beginning and an end and did not cause anxiety or suffering.
Phil himself affirmed that he experienced substantial changes—by the end of
treatment he experienced far less mental and physical suffering overall and felt
he was able to “breathe again.”
After exploring neurosis and addiction through the cases of Buck and
Phil, I presented the case of Gary, a structurally perverse subject, in Chapter 5.
Gary had a history of drug and alcohol addiction which then shifted to a kind of
addiction to shoplifting. Fitting within the dynamics of perversion, Gary’s
shoplifting and other criminal activities functioned as attempts to enact
castration and bring the Other into existence, and to metaphorically (and
sometimes literally) get himself beaten. The therapeutic work targeted
difficulties on the level of his perverse structure itself. That work included
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helping him to dialectize his identification with the master signifier “Thief”—to
mobilize it, loosen its fixity, and make room for other aspects of his identity or
sense of self to emerge or to be created by him. That shift away from his thief
identity was accompanied by a sharp decrease in his behaviors that involved
being a criminal and a thief and also marked a shift within the structure of his
addictions.
I then considered how, from a Lacanian perspective, addiction functions
very differently in psychosis. I presented my own formulations of the drive in
psychosis and the relation between addiction and the drive in psychosis. As far
as I am aware, this has not been done before.
Whereas in neurosis the instating of the paternal function or Name-of-theFather results in a loss of jouissance and an organization of the drives—oriented
and organized according to the mechanism of repression and the process of
entering language—in psychosis the paternal function fails to be instated, which
has consequences with regard to the psychotic’s experience of the drives. That is,
since psychotics do not undergo castration—some loss or delimiting of
jouissance—they experience an unregulated drive, do not have sufficient
distance from or defense against the drive, and are more prone to experiencing
an overwhelming or invasion of the drive. I also hypothesized that the relation
between the drive and the demand of the Other could be theorized with regard
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to psychosis. I argued that hallucinations can usefully be thought of as
manifestations of the Other’s demand in a different register. Moreover,
psychotics have little ability to separate from being positioned as the object for
the Other’s jouissance. Having presented my theoretical formulations of those
ideas I then discussed my thoughts about how psychotics sometimes retreat into
a delusional world and/or turn to drugs, alcohol, and other forms of addictions
in an attempt to engage in a kind of self-regulation or defense against the drive.
I illustrated this point in Chapter 7, “A (W)hole Feeling: Filling in and
Creating Holes to Modify the Drive,” through the presentation of a case study
about Nadia, a psychotic young woman whose drive-related behaviors included
cutting, bulimia, and drinking and writing. Not having undergone castration,
Nadia developed a psychotic structure which resulted in her being prone to
experiencing unregulated drives and invasions of jouissance against which she
had no defense. Her addictions were attempts at forming defenses against such
experiences of the drive. I argued that she attempted to delimit or make cuts in
jouissance through her bulimia and cutting herself. Those were ways in which
she attempted to make cuts or holes in jouissance. At other times she confronted
holes of different sorts (such as a question for which she could find no answer),
which felt overwhelming, anxiety-inducing, and all-encompassing. She turned
to drinking and writing as attempts to plug up those holes, to guard herself or
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form a protection against the real and against unregulated drives which went
hand-in-hand with her difficulty separating from her position as the object for
the Other’s jouissance.
In reflecting on treatment results, I described the efficacy of interventions
that were designed to help Nadia find means, other than her addictions, by
which she might establish forms of protection or defense against the drive. I
described how her drinking reduced—she had only a few drinks here and there
when she was out with friends—and also was completely different in kind: she
no longer drank and wrote as ways of trying to regulate a jouissance invasion or
fill or defend against a hole she faced. Moreover, by the end of treatment
Nadia’s moods and demeanor brightened, and her writing was more creative
and no longer distressed and perseverative. She had a much freer use of
language overall, and her cutting and bulimia stopped completely. My
contention is that these improvements suggest that a transformation was
accomplished on the level of the drive. Treatment interventions were designed
to fill in holes and establish defenses for Nadia against her experience of the
drive such that by the end of treatment she was much less prone to feeling
sucked in, overtaken, and invaded. She had more of a barrier against the real.
In Chapter 8, “Working Within and Reorganizing a Delusional Structure:
The Case of the Woman who Believed she was Jesus Christ,” I presented the case
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of Janice, a psychotic addict whose alcohol addiction and writing were
intertwined in her delusional structure. I argued that her patterns of drinking
and writing were her attempts to modulate, translate, and defend against
jouissance. Janice’s experience of the drive also involved her feeling invaded by
command auditory hallucinations which told her to hurt or kill her daughter. I
formulated those command hallucinations as forms of the Other’s demand in
psychosis. As she felt little ability to regulate and defend against her experience
of the drive, and as she felt so invaded by the voices and fixed in her position as
victim of persecution, she turned to drinking and writing as attempts to defend
against the drive and stop herself from acting in accord with the commands that
she commit violent acts.
I believe the trajectory of the therapeutic work took Janice from a fullblown delusional structure in which she believed she was Jesus Christ and had a
“mission” to save all of the African-American children to something that was
instead much closer to a neurotic fantasy, though she did not “become” a
neurotic. That is, she developed an ordinary life project of caring for her
daughter as she herself had not been cared for by her parents. I hypothesized
that the treatment successes followed from the work of shifting the structure of
her delusion and mission, helping her to separate from a position of the object of
the Other’s jouissance, and helping her to form ways of defending against the
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drive other than through her drinking and writing. By the end of treatment she
began taking care of her daughter, her auditory hallucinations ceased, she let go
of her delusion, her drug use stopped completely, and she drank only
recreationally—more moderately and no longer in response to feeling invaded
by command hallucinations against which she felt she had little protection.
Janice’s addiction shifted as a result of working on the level of her psychotic
structure itself.
In all of the cases, I treated the addictions “indirectly.” That is, I did not
target the addictions “directly”—for instance, by trying to make the patients
simply stop a behavior by way of behavior plans or by accepting that they were
somehow powerless against their addiction. 1 Instead, I viewed each patient’s
addiction as a sort of symptom within a larger structure. I considered the
addictions to be problems of the drive which manifested in very different ways
depending on the subject’s diagnostic structure and the particularity of his or her
history and events of development. By working on a much more structural level
and aiming to modify the cause of the addictions, a good deal of success resulted
from impacting the drive roots of the addictions and thus transforming them.

1

A veritable cornerstone of 12-Step treatment.
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The Project’s Holes: Limitations of the Study
Upon reflecting on my project at this stage of its completion, I have a
mixed sense of being satisfied and also somewhat frustrated. That is, although I
was able to articulate many ideas, many things went unsaid. This is not only a
practical reality which is attributable to constraints upon writing time and other
factors; it also speaks to a truth of the human condition—that being a subject of
language means that something will always remain, something will always resist
signification. The symbolic is not whole, not complete. As Lacan reminds us, it
is impossible to “say it all.” In spite of the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis—
to “say everything”—complete expression through language is impossible. The
symbolic comes up against the real and there is a fundamental structural
resistance that renders complete expression through language an impossibility.
This is perhaps particularly relevant when the task involves speaking of the
drive, which itself encircles a point of emptiness and is a concept that
encompasses both the symbolic and the real.
Beyond this fundamental truth about the structural limitations inherent in
language, many things were left out of this project due to deliberate choices that I
made. Insofar as protecting the confidentiality of my patients was my top
priority, many interesting and important details about each case had to be left
out completely. Similarly, in writing up the cases many alternate readings of
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certain moments of the treatment or other details of the therapeutic work
occurred to me but have not been fully elaborated in this project. I tried to keep
the role of the drive in addictions as my central focus, and I shaped my case
studies in light of that focus. Nevertheless, illuminating some things results
simultaneously in a shadow being cast over others.
Moreover, what I have presented through the case studies is my own
reading of each case—my own formulation of the case, the course of therapy, and
what worked or didn’t work. Other readers or even the patients themselves
might interpret things very differently. I share Lacan’s appreciation that Freud’s
case studies leave the work of the dig in place so that other readings can become
possible. That is the case by virtue of the fact that the courses of therapy are
presented in great detail and with many direct quotes that tell the reader what
was actually said by the patient and by the analyst. My hope is that in
presenting detailed case studies—and not aiming to fully reduce the details to
any one “conclusive” reading—I have presented a respectful account of the
treatments that does not aim to act as a “master discourse” in which only one
reading is possible or is upheld as the only “correct” account. I believe this is
consistent with an aspect Lacan’s own presentation style: “given the way I think
that I have to approach problems, you always have the possibility of what is said
being open to revision” (Lacan, 1955-1956/1993, p. 164).
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Other limitations of this project were inevitably attributable to my own
limitations as a scholar and as a clinician. Additionally, in the absence of longterm follow-up studies, I have no way of knowing whether and to what extent
the changes the patients may have experienced by the end of treatment proved to
be enduring. I can only hope that they did.
Some would argue that in focusing on a specifically Lacanian formulation
of and approach to the treatment of addictions, I have limited my study by
excluding other perspectives, other brands of clinical and theoretical approaches.
In response, I would argue that my project is a substantial contribution and its
value stands on its own. My project was to present something that has never
before been done: a sustained exploration, through theoretical exegesis and the
presentation of clinical case studies, of a Lacanian approach to the treatment of
addictions. I make no claims to be all things to all people. Nevertheless, my
hope is that this project will appeal to a broad audience—of Lacanians and nonLacanians alike—because it bears on the shared focus of our work: clinical
practice, which at its most basic level involves listening to the speech of suffering
subjects and trying, by listening and speaking with them, to relieve some of their
suffering.
The clinical work that I did with my patients was something I would refer
to as Lacanian analytic psychotherapy. The constraints of the clinic where I was
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working, in addition to the patients’ limitations regarding time and money, were
such factors that inevitably affect the frame of treatment. Nevertheless, in many
of the cases the session frequency was greater than weekly (e.g., I conducted
twice-weekly sessions with Gary, and I sometimes met with Nadia four or five
times per week). I raise this issue of what label to use because I anticipate that
some readers might wonder to what degree the interventions I discuss in this
project apply to analytic intensive psychotherapy or psychoanalysis proper.
There is, of course, significant debate in the field today about what distinguishes
analytic intensive psychotherapy from psychoanalysis. This is a major question,
but not one that relates to the efficacy of the interventions I described throughout
this project. I believe that the interventions I discussed could be implemented
within analysis or analytic psychotherapy, not to mention any range of other
approaches. For example, those who practice the recently popular approach of
“Motivational Enhancement” therapy for addicts might find it quite useful to
think about the ways in which a patient’s drive satisfaction keeps his or her
addiction in repetition and goes directly against any motivation of the ego. I
believe that many aspects of the theory of addictions as well as the interventions
I described in this project can be implemented within and improve the efficacy of
any range of other, non-Lacanian, clinical approaches.
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Other readers might argue that my project is overly complicated. To
many, the practice of Lacanian psychoanalysis is considered inherently
complicated. Rather than devoting such intense focus to being attuned to
complex networks of desire and layers of signifying overdetermination, many
clinicians would prefer instead to practice according to approaches that can be
seen as a bit less complicated. Furthermore, there is no manual for Lacanian
work—no simple recipe or set of techniques that would supposedly work all of
the time for everyone:
Indeed, such a manualized approach would be impossible in Lacanian
work, in that the psyche to be cured is regarded as a subject-effect caused
by the interplay of signifiers in the unconscious, a process that dissolves
its supposed ego-like solidity, and, in a word, de-substantializes it.
Therefore, the Lacanian [approach to clinical work] requires a complex
conceptual battery, which may be discouraging for those who expect
comfortable technical recipes. (Rabinovich, 2003, p. 208)
In spite of these potential limitations (of my study or Lacanian work in
general), Lacanian psychoanalysis may well be the turtle amidst the hares of
contemporary psychoanalytic approaches. Indeed, as Lacanian psychoanalysis
has grown steadily over the past few decades in places like South America and
parts of Europe, the number of people doing classical psychoanalytic training of
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other stripes has decreased (Kirsner, 2000). For those who take to the approach
as clinicians, and for those who derive significant benefits from it as patients, the
limitations around it and the effort that it demands seem well worth it.

Implications for Further Research
Although I explained previously my sense of the inherent value of a
specifically Lacanian clinical study of addictions, I am aware that there could
have been ways to put my work into dialogue with other approaches. As I wrote
this project, several such points of potential—and potentially important—
dialogue occurred to me but were not included in this project because of my
effort to maintain its primary focus. What I will present below is one such
attempt to put Lacan into dialogue with other addictions treatment approaches,
by examining one particular treatment issue and differences in how Lacanian
and other approaches conceptualize treatment decisions about patients’ drug
use.

Debates about whether or not to require that patients abstain from drug
use during treatment.
In Chapter 4, I discussed why I didn’t agree to directly ask Phil to stop
smoking or even make that a precondition of the treatment. I would like to take
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this as an opportunity to discuss, on a more general plane, issues to be
considered in making treatment decisions about patients’ drug use in cases of
addiction. That is important not only because of how such decisions impact the
treatment, but also because, with addicted subjects, beginning the treatment can
in and of itself be one of the biggest challenges.
There are certainly analysts who, as a matter of course, insist that patients
who present with substance abuse issues stop using drugs or alcohol first—often
with the generic recommendation that they participate in a 12-Step program or
behaviorally-oriented treatment in order to accomplish that—before the patient
would be accepted into analysis. Moreover, a wide variety of clinicians (not just
analysts) approach things in that manner: sending the patient to AA meetings or
the like rather than thinking of the addiction as something that could be worked
on within the therapeutic process itself. That practice—referring a patient to
something like a 12-Step program rather than working on his or her addiction
within the therapy itself—has somehow become very commonplace, but I think
it is important to call it into question and examine it more thoroughly.2
Indeed, many analysts opine that no analytic work can happen until the
patient is clean—meaning not only that they would not accept the patient into

2

It is probable that 12-Step models are generally considered to be “the” treatment approach for addictions
because other approaches have not yet been adequately researched and demonstrated to be effective or
“empirically validated.” People probably gravitate towards 12-Step treatments largely because of their
hype, so to speak, without giving much serious thought to the value of other treatment modalities.
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analysis until the patient is clean, but also, in many cases, that they think the
patient would not be able to “do the analytic work” anyway until he or she stops
using. As is true of any treatment decision, the question of whether or not to
require that a patient abstain should be carefully thought out within the context
of each individual case and not be based on a general rule that automatically gets
applied to every case. Decisions about this issue should take into account many
factors, including but by no means limited to the particularities of what is going
on with the patient, the effects of the patient’s drug use, how much danger3 the
patient is putting him- or herself in, and how much damage the patient is doing
to him- or herself or to others.
It is also important to consider how much jouissance the patient
experiences through his or her substance use—that is, how much space remains
within the patient’s psychic economy to invest in (cathect) the analytic process
and thus essentially give up some of the jouissance attached to the drug use. The
patient transferring at least some of his or her investment from the drug use over
to the analysis itself4 implies a kind of trade, not a simple renunciation of
something with no return benefit. That is, the patient can instead derive a

3

Depending on the circumstances, acquiring drugs can, in and of itself, be dangerous (crime, tainted
needles, drugs laced with something else, dealing with people whose judgment and self-control might be
impaired due to their drug use, etc.).
4
There is, of course, always a risk that the patient might become, loosely speaking, “addicted” to the
analysis itself—that is, reenacting the dynamics of their addiction not with the drug as their object but with
the analysis as their new object!
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different kind of satisfaction from the analytic process itself: a kind of
satisfaction that can be obtained through the work of decoding the unconscious
and exploring its various manifestations, through the process of putting things
into words, and through the transferential relationship with the analyst. This is
based on the assumption that the analyst has brought his or her desire to bear—
that is, has conveyed to the patient and brought to bear on the treatment what
Lacan refers to as “the analyst’s desire.” That is a desire for, above all else, the
work of analysis to occur. Lacan emphasizes that the analyst must continuously
demonstrate to the patient that he or she is interested in all manifestations of the
unconscious—every slip of the tongue, dream, bungled action, and so on—and
fundamentally wants the patient to continue with the analytic work. Lacan
underscores how crucial the analyst’s desire is by giving it a central place in the
treatment: “It is ultimately the analyst’s desire that operates in psychoanalysis”
(Lacan, 1964/2006, p. 724). The bringing to bear of the analyst’s desire is
therefore crucial not only in cases of addictions but also in any case, regardless of
the presenting issues, in that the jouissance of the symptom—be it an addiction
or something else—is not likely to be easily given up, and certainly not
automatically!
There certainly could be situations in which the patient’s fixation on the
drug is extremely strong, such that, if the patient has been unreceptive to the
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analyst’s initial interventions oriented towards engaging the patient in the work
of analysis, there might be good reasons for prioritizing, as an initial task, the
patient’s cessation or reduction of his or her drug use.5 That is, in such situations
the patient’s engagement in the analytic work might be more easily facilitated if
some space is first opened up by the patient finding a way, by whatever means,
to stop or reduce his or her drug use. That could involve referring the patient to
someone else to do that work first or simply making that a primary focus of the
early stages of the analysis. It is possible that in some cases a patient’s drug use
fundamentally and obdurately blocks access to something, thus functioning as a
strong form of resistance that needs to be modified in order to clear a space
within which work can occur. Indeed, drug use can sometimes involve the
annihilation of speech, thought, and access to feelings. That is not necessarily
limited to addictions, however, and patients in general often come in for
treatment experiencing difficulty accessing their thoughts and feelings, and
difficulty putting a whole host of things into words. Resistance is to be expected,
and it can be worked with.
Nevertheless, if the approach taken by the clinician is to set an initial goal
that the patient reduce or terminate his or her drug use, the clinician should
strongly emphasize to the patient that this is not the end of the work—not the
5

Note that I am not suggesting that this be assessed according to some vague measure of relative “severity”
of an addiction, whatever that might mean, but rather according to its level of fixity and intractability—not
budging in spite of the clinician’s efforts and interventions.
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end but, more likely than not, the beginning. That is, the clinician should convey
and explain to the patient what I argued previously: that a simple separation
from the drug does not resolve an addiction and does not necessarily change the
overall structure of the addiction. The clinician might then take that as an
opportunity to express a strong desire—the analyst’s desire—for the patient to
then engage in the deeper work of analysis, if that is in fact what the clinician
believes would be helpful and productive for the patient.
Treatment decisions relating to the patient’s drug use should therefore be
made thoughtfully and carefully. Other factors in these decisions take into
account not only the patient and his or her drug use but also the clinician him- or
herself. For example, issues to be considered are: the clinician’s own level of
training, the particular brand of training to which he or she was exposed,6 the
clinician’s level of comfort and experience in working with addicted subjects, his
or her way of understanding addictions and how to work with them, and the
clinician’s overall biases and presuppositions. Many of those can be categorized
as “countertransference.” Indeed, Lacan broadly defines countertransference as
“the sum total of the analyst’s biases, passions, and difficulties, or even of his
inadequate information, at any given moment in the dialectical process” (Lacan,

6

Many graduate psychology training programs and even psychoanalytic institutes teach that 12-Step
approaches are the only ones suitable for the treatment of addictions.
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1952/2006). The clinician’s level of self-awareness and ability to self-reflect are
thus important factors in the decision-making process.
For example, deciding to refer patients out so that they can work on their
addiction prior to engaging in therapy or analysis, or even prioritizing that
within the treatment itself to the exclusion of examining other issues, as though
the addiction were so strong as to preclude the examination of anything else,
could, in some situations, reflect the clinician’s own feelings of impotence in the
face of an addiction. Addictions can seem fiercely intractable to some, which can
lead to David and Goliath fantasies. Regardless, clinicians must also recognize
their own limits and keep in mind the patient’s best interests. These are, of
course, issues that should be considered in any treatment.
I have been presenting various reasons why a clinician might decide that a
patient must get clean before he or she is accepted into therapy or analysis—by
the clinician referring the patient elsewhere or by making sobriety the first goal
to be worked on within the treatment. Now I would like to address the other
side of the argument and present some reasons against stipulating that the
patient must get clean before entering therapy or analysis. This is not meant to
be an exhaustive list.
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1) It is sometimes simply unrealistic to expect that a patient would be
willing—let alone able—to stop using his or her drug of choice prior to engaging
in substantive treatment.
a. First, I will address the question of the addicted subject’s “ability” to get
clean prior to engaging in substantive treatment. I say substantive, thus
revealing perhaps a bias of my own, because, based on what I have seen, 12-Step
programs often seem not to facilitate much rigorous or “deep”7 work. It seems
likely that this can leave the patient very vulnerable to relapse—that is, if the
treatment is successful in the first place. That is a very big “if,” in that the relapse
rate for addictions exceeds 75% across treatment modalities studied, which tend
to be mainly CBT and 12-Step programs (Armor, Polich, & Stambul, 1978; Hunt,
Barnett, & Branch, 1971; Svanum & McAdoo, 1989).
b. As for the question of the patient’s supposed “willingness” to give up
his or her drug prior to engaging in therapy or analysis, we must keep in mind
Freud’s point—which Lacan also endorses—that individuals both complain
about and cling to their symptoms. Early on, Freud was surprised by the
“resistance of the neurotics to the removal of their symptoms” (Freud, 19161917/1963, p. 292). Eventually he was able to formulate that people derive a kind

7

The term “deep” is problematic, given Lacan’s effort to steer away from Freud’s archaeological
metaphors of the unconscious, but I use it here colloquially to refer essentially to something substantial,
rigorous, and thorough—something that gets at the heart of the symptom or addiction and operates on that
level.
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of satisfaction from their symptoms—“secondary gain” or “substitute
satisfaction” (Freud, 1916-1917/1963)—which makes them far less willing or able
to give up their symptoms! Lacan also suggests that people are reluctant to give
up their symptoms because, on some level, they are enjoying their symptoms.
For Lacan, the symptom “in its nature is jouissance” (Lacan, 1962-1963, Class of
January 23, 1963).
2) Patients do not always see their drug use as problematic. Requiring
that the patient reduce or eliminate his or her drug use might therefore sound
absurd to him or her, perhaps leading such a patient to drop out of treatment
entirely.
3) Analysis is not surgery. Symptoms—including addictions—cannot be
simply isolated and removed. It is generally necessary, during the therapeutic
process, for the patient to delve into a variety of topics and areas of his or her life
before things begin to shift or get worked through, including the relinquishing of
symptoms.
4) Asking patients, as a condition of therapy, to stop the problem for
which they are seeking help—if they are entering treatment to work on their
addiction precisely because they have not been able to fix it on their own—is
paradoxical, to say the least.
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5) Underlying decisions to refer patients to 12-Step or other programs to
get clean before accepting them into analysis is often an assumption that analysis
itself cannot help addicted subjects with their addictions8—that is, that analysis is
not an “appropriate” treatment for addictions. It should be clear by now that
this entire dissertation aims to refute that notion!
6) Other assumptions underlying a notion that analysis is not for addicted
subjects are that analysis is a kind of ivory tower of treatments and that addicts
are mere “junkies,” the bottom of the barrel, and not worthy of a treatment that is
supposedly for wealthy people who are not suffering all that much. I believe
that is a myth. Lacan, referring to neurotics, even notes that: “They have a
difficult life and we try to alleviate their discomfort” (Lacan, 1976, p. 15).
7) Hastily removing an addiction that is functioning as a sinthome for a
psychotic patient can result in the triggering of a break.
8) Neither Freud nor Lacan ever suggested, to the best of my knowledge,
that analysis is an inappropriate treatment for addicted subjects. Lacan implored
analysts to not shy away from working with psychotics. I take Lacan to mean
that most clinicians will inevitably encounter psychotic patients at some point
and would need to educate him- or herself about how to treat such patients. Can
the same not apply to the issue of working with addicted subjects?

8

As I explained before, that should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

333

9) A demand for a separation from the drug—whether it comes from the
patient or the clinician—could function as a resistance to doing the deeper work
of analysis.
10) The only demand the analyst should make on the patient, according to
Lacan, is that he or she speak.

Having an Impact: The Clinical Utility of a Lacanian Approach
I hope this project demonstrates the practical value of Lacanian theory—
its clinical utility. I believe this project proves that approaches guided by
Lacanian theory are genuinely useful not only with regard to Lacanian analysis
but also psychotherapy. The therapeutic ends of Lacanian analysis are even
suggested by Lacan himself, who, referring to neurotics, notes: “They have a
difficult life and we try to alleviate their discomfort” (Lacan, 1976, p. 15, as qtd.
in Fink, 2007).
Through what is in many ways a delicate craft of working with the
subject’s language—touching lightly on the particularity of his or her speech—
deep transformation can be achieved. The real can be impacted through the
symbolic, creating a transformation on the level of the drive and profound
changes in the very moorings of one’s being. Indeed, Lacanian approaches to
clinical work have the potential to create profound transformations in the
subject’s suffering by “touching, however lightly, on man’s relation to the
334

signifier . . . [to] change the course of his history by modifying the moorings of
his being” (1957/2006, p. 438).
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